The same applies to our case. When attributing an offense to a corporation, one must refer to offenses of the type of justification that relate to the criminality of the act. Immunity as a result of a state-witness agreement is not a defense claim, but it is more similar to an exemption claim.
In summary, it can be seen that developments in corporate law on the one hand and in penal law on the other have led to the conclusion that there is room to impose criminal liability on corporations, even for offenses that require a mental element of criminal thought or negligence, i.e., a conscious act of choosing behavior or refraining from it. Since the corporation operates through organs, the theory of organs was used to determine that the company itself committed the offense.
The doctrine of organs, whose purpose is to attribute criminal liability to a corporation, does not apply personal protections that apply to the organs in favor of the corporation. In contrast to the defenses relating to the criminality of the act of the offense, as explained above, they will apply, as a rule, because if one identifies between the conduct and thoughts of the organ and those of the corporation, and the conduct or thoughts of the organ does not establish criminal liability due to the protection that arises for him, then by virtue of that attribution, criminal liability should not be attributed to the corporation.
From the aforesaid it appears that the purpose of the Organs Theory is to identify between the organ that committed the offense and the corporation in order to attribute responsibility to the corporation, it is not an absolute identity or even a mutual identity. Thus, in order to convict a manager of an offense committed by a corporation, the theory of organs was not used, but specific offenses were established for managers, also known as "managerial offenses" that relate mainly to their supervision of the relevant field. As a rule, these offenses determine that a manager will not be liable to law if it is proven that he did not know, should not have known about the commission of the offense, and could not have prevented its commission (regarding managerial offenses, see, for example: Criminal Appeals Authority 26/97 Lax v. State of Israel, IsrSC 52 (2) 673 (1998). See also: The issue of Israel's ports)