"Politically, the company is the vehicle for, and the embodiment of, capitalism; giving it human rights strongly protects trade, profit and property and reinforces the market economy - often at the expense of other interests, such as those of workers, consumer interests and civil society. Whatever may be the actual reason behind corporate human rights, jurisprudentially it is difficult to justify them"
Therefore, the authors' conclusion is that even if rights are to be granted to corporations, the types of rights and the manner in which the corporation is to be protected must be considered (ibid., at p. 233:
"…both human and non-human or organizational actors may assert basic rights but…their respective rights may not be of the same nature, and so may be said to have different currency"
(emphasis in the original).
The fact that, as a rule, corporations are almost always the defendants in economic offenses supports this conclusion.
A similar criticism was made by Anna Grear, "Human Rights - Human Bodies? Some Reflections on Corporate Human Rights Distortion, the Legal Subject, Embodiment and Human Rights Theory" 17 Law and Critique, 171 (2006):
"…by re-attending to the implications of human embodiment for human rights theory it might be possible to re-invigorate the protective potential of human rights for vulnerable human beings and communities against powerful disembodied legal persons (corporations).".
Prof. Barak-Erez, the person at the center, also raises concerns about granting privileges to corporations, especially in the era of privatization, in which corporations fulfill functions previously held by the government, and are liable to infringe on individual rights. Prof. Barak-Erez emphasizes the need to examine in depth the rights being considered, and whether they are suitable to apply to a corporation. In this context, Prof. Barak-Erez refers to other legal systems, which make such a distinction explicitly (ibid., at p. 42 of the article):
"A different and more limited approach is reflected in the German Basic Law and the South African Constitution. The German Basic Law stipulates that when it comes to "artificial persons", the constitutional rights will apply to the extent that their nature allows it. Similarly, the South African Constitution distinguishes between a "natural person" and a juristic person, and requires that the latter enjoy the rights granted by the constitution only to the extent that it is consistent with the nature of the right and the characteristics of the legal person. I believe that adopting a point of view that emphasizes the place of the real person at the center of the law can help to choose the appropriate solution, in the spirit of the trend that arises from the constitutional law of Germany and South Africa."