When the suspect's right not to self-incriminate was recognized, and within the framework of the right to remain silent, the main desire was to prevent the prosecution from exerting pressure on defendants to confess, this is the modern conceptual basis for these rights (see the following judgments in this regard: Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988) . For an analysis of the case law, see: Donald P. Judges & Stephen J. Cribari, "Speaking of Silence: A Reply to Making Defendants Speak", 94 Minn. L. Rev. 800 (2010)).
Even today, when we talk about the conceptual basis for these rights, we find the same principles, first of all, to prevent the suspect from the situation in which he must choose between lying during interrogation or in court, remaining silent and serving punishment or incriminating himself. Choice puts a person in an impossible situation. Second, these rights are derived from the presumption of innocence. In the adversarial legal system, in which the prosecution must prove that the offenses were committed, the defendant or suspect should not be obligated to assist the prosecution in doing so against the presumption of innocence available to him. The third reason relates to the stage of the investigation. At the interrogation stage, when the interrogee is sometimes alone, he should be allowed not to answer his interrogators' questions at all. Allowing a suspect to remain silent denies the police the possibility of forcibly extracting information from suspects and is one of the barriers to false confessions. In addition, granting these rights requires the law enforcement authorities to find external evidence against a defendant, thus preventing unfair pressure to extract confessions. This was discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its judgment: Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966), stating that the right is required to: