In this regard, what was written in a background document regarding the right to a fair trial submitted to the Knesset (Dr. Amnon Reichman, Sarit Yakuti, Nurit Inbal, Lior Nevo, Omer Bachman, Gilad Katz, Ayelet Levin, Inbal Rabinowitz, "The right to alternatives to detention, the right to immunity from self-incrimination, the right to invalidate evidence collected illegally or in violation of the rights to protection from double risk, the right to compensation for a negligent, unfair proceeding, or a proceeding that violated rights", submitted to the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee (2005, hereinafter: Reichman, Rights in Criminal Procedure):
"The right to remain silent is the clearest expression of immunity from self-incrimination (although, as noted, it is broader than that). In its "absolute" form – not to compensate here and not to say anything – the right to remain silent was explicitly granted by the legislature only to the defendant in the course of his trial (section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982). .... The immunity from self-incrimination, in the framework of an interrogation, confers only a "relative" right to remain silent, i.e., the right not to answer incriminating questions. However, in the case of a suspect in the commission of an offense, who is being interrogated by a person of authority, this privilege is interpreted, broadly, as a right to complete silence. The position that the right to immunity from self-incrimination is a constitutional right was strengthened after the enactment of the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty. The dispute in the case law does not deal with the question of whether this right is constitutional or not. The starting point is that this is a constitutional right, and therefore the question arises whether a violation of this right gives rise to a constitutional remedy for the disqualification of evidence that was discovered following the violation of the right.".