Therefore, the reference to the plaintiff's "exposed" clothing is a derogatory reference to her sexuality as a woman. The demand that the plaintiff change clothes was humiliating and even constituted sexual harassment.
- In light of all of the above, I determine that it has been proven that the defendant acted against the plaintiff with prohibited and improper discrimination on the basis of her gender and dress and prevented her from receiving an essential service - transporting a verified patient to a corona hostel, and that the statements made by the defendant's employees regarding the plaintiff's clothing amount to sexual harassment.
- In view of my determinations above that the defendant violated the provisions of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law and the provisions of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, I did not find it necessary to also discuss the tort of negligence under the Torts Ordinance and the administrative-constitutional tort.
Rate of Compensation
- The plaintiff petitioned to be awarded compensation for two main damages, the first under the Prohibition of Discrimination Law for excluding her from receiving essential services, and the second under the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law for humiliation and humiliation on the basis of her sex and sexuality.
The plaintiff requested that she be awarded compensation in accordance with the maximum amount set by law; in accordance with section 5(a) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law in the sum of ILS 66,328 and in accordance with section 6(b) of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law in the amount of ILS 120,582.
- Section 5(b) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law states: "The court may award compensation for a tort under this law not exceeding ILS 50,000, without proof of damage; this amount will be updated on the 16th of each month, in accordance with the rate of change in the new index compared to the basic index...".
- Section 6(b) of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law states that "the court may award compensation not exceeding ILS 120,000 due to sexual harassment or harassment, and for sexual harassment or harassment committed out of a motive of racism or hostility towards the public as stated in section 144F of the Penal Law - double the aforesaid amount, without proof of damage...".
- In its summaries, the defendant explained that "although it was clear that defendant 2's demand was unreasonable, not all - since it was appropriate, it was also because we were dealing with an exceptional situation (to say the least), which was an important and immediate need to be resolved in order to prevent the risk of infection and harm to human life" (paragraph 12 of the summaries). However, it was the defendant who created that unusual situation. If the defendant's employees had taken the trouble to clarify with the defendant the meaning of his objection, they would have discovered that the matter had nothing to do with the plaintiff's clothing, and they would have been able to convince him that just as he was willing to travel with the other passenger, the plaintiff's presence would not increase or decrease, since these are all confirmed patients. Even if the defendant did not wish to continue traveling together with the plaintiff, no attempt was made to make it clear to him that his departure from the ambulance into the public sphere constitutes a violation of the Corona guidelines, according to which he must be in isolation with all that this entails, and that he is exposed to the consequences of the violation, including summoning the police to the scene. In its summaries, the defendant emphasized how difficult these days were in terms of the extent of the illness (both the patients and those who died from the disease), but its employees took an unclear calm of mind in the face of the conduct they attributed to the defendant. According to the defendant's employees, the defendant issued an ultimatum that he would not travel with the plaintiff, but no attempt was made on their part to replace him in any aspect, neither in terms of explanations nor in the possibility of assistance to the Israel Police if necessary in light of the violation of the Corona guidelines.
In this context, I cannot accept the defendant's arguments in her summaries that any of the options available to her (summoning the police or notifying the defendant that the police would be summoned as a tool to change his decision, putting the plaintiff in an ambulance and waiting on the spot until another ambulance arrives) was worse than the alternative of continuing to travel without the plaintiff. The defendant's employees did not consider these alternatives in real time, and therefore these are retrospective estimates. The defendant's employees did not present the defendant with a fait accompli that the plaintiff was also joining the trip, they did not speak to his heart at all, at which time they would discover that he was refusing for meaningless medical reasons, of the possibility of a deterioration in his medical condition due to exposure to another confirmed patient.