In this respect, the defendant's position cannot be ruled out, that the defendant's manager should be considered as someone who considered a medical consideration of refraining from leaving a coronavirus patient in the public space, when the plaintiff's home is nearby, even if the evacuation was intended for the purpose of isolation from the population and not for the purpose of receiving medical treatment.
- In summary, the decision of whom to drive is not detached from the very first mistake of the defendant's employees and the compliance with the Corona guidelines. In this situation, the decision to drive the defendant and not the plaintiff due to the coronavirus guidelines is not unfounded. Although the defendant did not get out of the ambulance and did not endanger anyone, the defendant's employees acted under the erroneous assumption that the defendant got out of the ambulance or began to get out of the ambulance, or at least thought that he would not continue traveling and thus violate the coronavirus guidelines.
- In examining the conduct of the defendant's employees in connection with the terms of the policy, I did find it necessary to give weight to the fact that this was the first months of the pandemic, of the spread of the pandemic, the consequences of which were severe and took human lives, and the beginning of the operation of the Corona hotels, and the fact that the defendant began operating the shuttle service about two weeks before the event in this case.
The driver and his manager failed to make the decision, but in the rivalry between the defendant and the Ayalon company, weight must be given to the background to the decision and the fact that it was made in circumstances of error on their part.
In view of all of the above, the decision of the driver and his manager is protected under the policy that the defendant purchased from Ayalon and therefore Ayalon must indemnify it for the charges that will be applied in this case.
- In view of all of the above, the notice to Ayalon Company should be accepted.
The Question of Expenses
- Regulations 151 to 157 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779 - 2018 deal with rulings on legal expenses. Regulation 151, which deals with the "purpose of expenses", determines the parameters that must be taken into account and the balances that must be made in ruling on costs. Regulation 152 states that the expenses must be reasonable and fair.
- Once the claim against the defendant is accepted, it must bear the plaintiff's expenses. No documents were submitted in this regard, and therefore the defendant will bear the plaintiff's expenses in respect of attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 14,228.
- Once the claim against the defendant is dismissed, the plaintiffs must bear the defendant's expenses. No references were submitted in the matter and therefore the plaintiffs will bear the defendant's expenses for attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 14,228.
- Once the notice was received by the Ayalon Company, the Ayalon Company must bear the expenses imposed on the defendant in this proceeding, as well as its expenses as the sender of the notice for attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 14,288.
Conclusion
- The defendant's driver prevented the plaintiff from being transported to the Home Front Command's Corona motel because she was a confirmed COVID-19 patient, claiming that the plaintiff was wearing "immodest" or "exposed" clothing. The plaintiff refused to accept the decision and spoke with the driver's manager, but even that was not because the decision remained in place, while repeatedly demanding that the plaintiff change into "modest" clothes, which she did not have. Therefore, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from receiving the evacuation services to the motel due to a demand to dress, in violation of the law, and thus humiliated and humiliated the plaintiff on the basis of her gender and sexuality. In doing so, the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff in the provision of a service, and the attitude of her employees to the manner of her dress amounts to sexual harassment and therefore she must compensate her.
The plaintiff is entitled to compensation by virtue of section 5(b) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law and by virtue of section 6(b) of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, but she is not entitled to double compensation by virtue of both laws. In the circumstances of this case, I found that the injury was mainly sexual harassment and therefore the plaintiff should be compensated in the maximum amount set out inthe Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law.
- I determined that the defendant's demand not to add another female passenger in the car was not related to the plaintiff's clothing, but rather to his erroneous fear that the presence of another confirmed patient in his presence would worsen his medical condition.
- I further determined that the defendant's decision to drive the defendant and not the plaintiff was made negligently, because its employees mistakenly believed that this was the defendant's demand, and not because they themselves held positions that she was not entitled to receive the service because of "immodest"/"exposed" clothing.
Given the mistake of the defendant's employees, that in the circumstances that arose, it was not possible to drive the plaintiff and the defendant together, then the decision to instruct the plaintiff to return home and wait for another transportation and to continue traveling with the defendant, who lives in Ashdod, was in accordance with the Corona guidelines, which required the presence of a confirmed patient in isolation for fear of public health risk. In these circumstances, the actions of the defendant's employees were done negligently and not intentionally or maliciously, and therefore Ayalon Company's claims for lack of insurance coverage are rejected.
- Summaries of things:
- I accept the claim and order the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ILS 120,582 together with shekel interest from the date of filing the claim until the date of actual payment. The defendant will also bear the payment of court fees in the amount of ILS 4,942 and attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 14,228, both together with ILS interest from the date of the judgment until the date of actual payment.
- I order the dismissal of the claim against the defendant and order the plaintiffs to pay the defendant attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 14,228, together with shekel interest from the date of the judgment until the date of actual payment.
- I receive the notice to Ayalon and obligate the Ayalon Company to pay the defendant the charges imposed on it in section A above.
Upon receipt of the notice to the Ayalon Company, I order the Ayalon Company to pay the defendant attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 14,228 together with a court fee of ILS 4,944 for the notice, both together with ILS 100 interest from the date of the judgment until the date of actual payment.
- Ayalon can bear payments directly to plaintiff 1 and thus prevent malfunctions/delays in the payment of the amounts awarded.
The right to appeal by law.