"A promissory note is an unconditional promise made in writing by a person to his friend, signed by the maker of the promissory note, in which he undertakes to repay a certain amount of money to a certain person or to his order, or to a promissory note, upon demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time, a certain sum of money.
Section 92 of the Ordinance provides as follows:
- A document or writing that is required under this Ordinance to be the signature of a person does not need to be signed by him himself, but his signature written by another person with his permission or according to it or his signature stamped on them by himself or with his permission is sufficient for them.
- When it comes to a company, a cooperative society, a partnership or some other legal entity, it is sufficient for them to have a document or a letter that requires a signature under this Ordinance, which will be stamped with the seal of that legal person.
- In contrast to modern contract law, which does not usually impose strict formal requirements, and the greatest weight is given to the intentions of the parties, the Banknotes Ordinance does so, and one of those formal requirements is the signature of the promissory note (see Shalom Lerner, Banknotes Law 113 (2nd edition, 2007) (hereinafter: Lerner 2007)).
In the first part of the discussion, we will examine the accepted interpretation of the requirement to sign a deed as it has been designed over the years, and in the second part we will discuss the Electronic Signature Law and the purposes that underlie it. After examining these issues separately, I will discuss the relationship between them and the question of whether an electronic signature can be considered a signature on a note. This will of course affect the ability to execute a deed that has been signed electronically in the execution proceedings.
The Accepted Interpretation of Banknotes Law in Relation to the Signing of a Promissory Note
- The signature in the Banknotes Ordinance was discussed by the Supreme Court in Other Municipal Applications 566/71 Feige v. Spitzkopf, IsrSC 27(1) 355 (1973) (hereinafter: the Spitzkopf case), and held in relation to it that "the legislature requires a clear personal act, according to which it is possible to assume a final opinion on the part of the underwriter and an intention to assume a promissory note liability". In the same matter, the question of the recognition of a signature with a rubber stamp was discussed, and the court noted the essential difference between a rubber stamp that bears the form of a person's signature and is kept with him only, which the court in England recognized as a signature on a deed (GOODMAN v. EBAN: (1954), 1 ALL E.R. 763 769; (1954), 1 Q.B.W.L.R. 581; 98 SOL. JO. 214 2 ,)1954) ; 550), as opposed to a rubber stamp that is not kept exclusively by its owner, and which can also be used by a clerk, which cannot be seen as a signature on a deed.
Since the Spitzkopf case, the issue of signing a deed has been discussed several times, and the courts have shown some flexibility in relation to it, focusing the discussion on the question of purpose and giving weight to the merchants' custom.