Indeed, I do not rule out the possibility that there will be exceptions to this rule in exceptional cases, but these cases should be extremely rare. In my opinion, the court must order the granting of a full subsistence order only in those cases in which restitution does not do justice to the parties, provided that the following cumulative conditions are met: the contracting party is completely in good faith, while the conduct of the authority is in bad faith or amounts to misrepresentation or negligence [compare: Grosskopf, 601 and 620; the Rehovot Municipality case, 388; and compare: Friedman, Illegality II, 186-188; Shalev Contracts, 389]; An examination of the authority's budget shows that the financial charge had a budgetary source during the relevant period; and failure to meet the formal requirements set forth in section 203 of the Municipalities Ordinance or section 232 of the order does not get to the root of the matter, for example, when a written agreement was drawn up signed by the treasurer of the authority and the head of the authority, but without the seal of the municipality. "The absence of a written agreement, in general, will not be considered a defect that does not go to the root of the matter. I am of the opinion that these cumulative conditions are consistent with the criteria outlined by this Court in the Zagori case and in the Vehicle House case, and they serve to guide more clearly the courts that routinely hear claims of this type before us, as well as to create a greater degree of legal certainty [see also Biham, 16, and on the other hand: Zamir, 427-428].
I will emphasize that this determination relates to consideration for services provided or work that has already been performed, and it does not apply at all in cases where enforcement of an illegal forward-looking agreement is requested, in which a subsistence order should not be granted, if only for the reason that the service provider or the person performing the work did not fulfill his obligation as required under section 31 of the Contracts Law. I am of the opinion that only when the circumstances of the case show that we are dealing with such an exceptional case in which the cumulative conditions mentioned above have been met, should the administration of individual justice between the parties be preferred to the formal requirements set forth in section 232 of the order or set forth in the provisions of the same purpose."