"Q. Your contact person was Yoav Hasson.
- Our agent in Israel was Yoav Hasson."
- Haddad further confirmed in his testimony in the application for an injunction in the previous lawsuit that during the period of the license agreement he visited the offices of Jinli once, during 2013, and that this was the only time he met Mr. Jinli (ibid., pp. 8, paras. 8-11).
- Strengthening of Mr. Hasson's status as the plaintiffs' exclusive representative vis-à-vis the defendants throughout the life of the license agreement, which is not limited to being a "connecting factor" or a "conduit" as the plaintiffs tried to present it (paragraph 13 of the plaintiffs' summaries), is found in the testimony of Ms. Alexandra Boritz (hereinafter: "Ms. Boretz"), the head of the design department at plaintiff No. 2, which was brought to testify by the plaintiffs themselves. In her affidavit, Ms. Boritz stated that her day-to-day conduct with regard to the approval of the models was carried out vis-à-vis Mr. Hasson, who conveyed the approvals or rejections to the defendants (paragraphs 3, 5 of Ms. Boretz's affidavit).
- In her testimony, Ms. Boritz confirmed that Mr. Haddad had instructed her that all contact with the defendants was solely with and through Mr. Hasson; that Mr. Hasson was "managing everything related to the license in Israel [...] the approval process"; and that during the course of the day-to-day activity, Mr. Hasson "was supposed to send me all the company's plans, the styles, the brands, everything related to the packaging that we would see that everything was going well, the representation of the brand in Israel" (minutes of the hearing of November 10, 2025, p. 22, paras. 16-21; p. 26 s. 3-4; p. 27, paras. 12-15).
- Ms. Boritz testified that Mr. Hasson served as the plaintiffs' representative in Israel , in accordance with a directive given to her by her managers, and this was not necessarily due to the alleged language gaps between the plaintiffs and the defendants (transcript of the hearing of November 10, 2025, p. 29, paras. 6-18).
- To this must be added Mr. Hasson's statement (in paragraph 15.1 of his affidavit) that all the franchisees who worked with the plaintiffs did not know them or Mr. Hadad, and did not work with them, and that all activity in connection with the brand, including product approvals, sales reports, payments, publications, etc., was conducted through and through Global Brands. It is clear that as the plaintiffs' representative, Mr. Hasson did not have the authority to approve or not approve products himself, and even Mr. Hasson confirmed in his testimony that it was not his job (transcript of the hearing of November 12, 2025, p. 259, paras. 1-3; p. 292, paras. 8-9). However, this does not detract from Mr. Hasson's status as the sole representative of the plaintiffs in their activity in Israel vis-à-vis the defendants in all matters relating to the granting of approval for the marketing and sale of products bearing the plaintiffs' brand, and in his own words: "I was an agent of [the plaintiffs]... I am the emissary" (transcript of the hearing of November 12, 2025, p. 240, paras. 16-17).
- Thus, in fact, it seems that at this point it is difficult to find a real dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the status of Mr. Hasson and the extent of his significant involvement as the plaintiffs' representative throughout the engagement between the parties with regard to the approval of the models and the ongoing work under the license agreement. It seems that the fact that Mr. Hasson is an "agent", an "agent" of the plaintiffs in the plaintiffs' activities in Israel, constitutes a direct and natural continuation of his significant status as such even at the stage of negotiations that preceded the signing of the license agreement.
- With regard to the transfer of the quarterly reports to the plaintiffs: Mr. Haddad confirmed in the course of the hearing on the request for an injunction in the previous lawsuit, which took place on September 16, 2015, that Mr. Hasson, as the plaintiffs' agent in Israel, was the one who provided the plaintiffs with the quarterly reports in accordance with the license agreement, and that "it was [Mr. Hasson's] responsibility to pass on the information." He also testified there that "I trust my agent to pass on information to me." When Mr. Haddad was asked whether he had conducted any tests regarding Don Geely, he replied, " I trusted my agent" (p. 8, paras. 21-23; pp. 9, 13-16).
- From this testimony of Mr. Haddad alone, a picture emerges according to which the plaintiffs did not see Mr. Hasson as someone who served only as an "intermediary" or as a "conduit" between them and the defendants, whose role was to convey information in a "technical" manner, but rather as the plaintiffs' representative in all matters relating to the brand's activity in Israel, which serves as a party that could be "trusted" within its area of responsibility, who would convey full and complete information, and that he would do his work faithfully. It is not for nothing that in his testimony Mr. Haddad referred to Mr. Hasson more than once as "our agent", in a way that shows that he saw him as someone who could be trusted to represent the interest he was sent to represent - the interest of the plaintiffs under the license agreement.
- From the aforesaid, it appears that with regard to the ongoing conduct of the commercial relationship between the parties, including with regard to the transfer of the quarterly reports in accordance with the license agreement, Mr. Hasson served as the sole representative of the plaintiffs, and this is even according to Mr. Haddad himself. He was the one who served as the plaintiffs' "address" in all matters relating to the brand's representation in Israel vis-à-vis the defendants, who too, as Mr. Hasson was presented to them as such, saw him as their spokesperson in all matters related to the implementation of the license agreement and the transfer of quarterly reports pursuant to it, as part of their ongoing activity.
The legal implications of the fact that Mr. Hasson is a central factor in the commercial system between the parties
- In their summaries, the defendants seek to deduce from these sets of facts the conclusion that Mr. Hasson is an agent of the plaintiffs for all intents and purposes, and even if, according to them, he acted in deviation from authorization, his action is binding on the plaintiffs (paragraph 10 of the defendants' summaries).
- Section 2 of the Shlichut Law, 5725-1965 (hereinafter: "the Shlichut Law") states that: "The agent of a person like him, and the act of the shlichut, including his knowledge and intention, binds and entitles, as the case may be, the sender is obligated and entitled."
- Section 6 of the Shlichut Law provides as follows:
"6(a) If a person acts as an agent of another without being authorized to do so or in deviation from his authorization, that person may, subject to the provisions of subsection (b), approve the action retroactively; and retroactive approval - as permission from the outset, provided that a right acquired by another person in good faith and in consideration prior to the approval will not be violated.