Civil Appeal Authority 65005-03-26 Nissim Vattori v. Mordechai Harari

Civil Appeal Authority 65005-03-26

Judgment

Judge Alex Stein:

The Request

1. I have before me an application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Nof HaGalil-Nazareth District Court (Associate Judge Avraham), which was granted on March 22,2026 Other Municipality Applications 86583-01-26 [Nevo].  As part of this ruling, the District Court reversed the judgment of the Tiberias Magistrate's Court (Senior Registrar R.  Hamati), which was given on January 1,2026 ina civil lawsuit in a fast-track hearing 19132-10-24 [Nevo].  The Magistrate's Court accepted a defamation suit filed by the Applicant against the Respondent and ordered the Respondent to pay compensation in the amount of ILS 10,000 together with legal expenses in the amount of ILS 7,000 - in favor of the Applicant.

The Facts

2. The applicant, Nissim Vattori, is a member of Knesset and deputy speaker of the Knesset. The Applicant posted a tweet on the social network "X" (formerly Twitter), which included a photograph of the Applicant with the Minister of Justice, which was filmed shortly after the Basic Law: The Judiciary (Amendment No. 3) (hereinafter: the Law for the Abolition of the Grounds of Reasonableness) was passed by the Knesset, along with the words "The law has passed.  Longlive the State of Israel." On July 24,2023, the Respondent, Mordechai Harari, published a response to the Applicant's tweet in which it was written as follows: "Nissim Vattori who is corrupt in man, N[Y] Vattori is uneducated and prides himself on his worthlessness, Nissim Vattori is an abomination of Israel and a despicable Jew, Nissim Vattori is a malicious man who repulses and is a great shame to the State of Israel" (hereinafter: the Publication).  As a result, the Applicant filed a defamation suit against the Respondent.

Previous Proceedings

3. At the end of the evidentiary hearings, and after being impressed by the witnesses, the Magistrate's Court accepted the applicant's claim. The court ruled that some of the expressions in the publication are opinions that do not amount to defamation.  At the same time, it was ruled that the expression "corrupt" is an attempt to present the applicant as a criminal, as we will also learn from the respondent's testimony, and accordingly it amounts to defamation.  The Magistrate's Court rejected the respondent's arguments for the existence of a defense of truth in publication or the defense of good faith.  With respect tothefirst claim, it was held that the respondent did not meet the burden of proving the claim that the applicant was corrupt, and that the publication was made in the absence of a factual basis.  With regard to the defense of good faith, it was held that the respondent did not take reasonable measures to ascertain whether the publication was true, and he did not even seek to retract his words and apologize at the hearing.  In the meantime, the court rejected the respondent's argument that this was a "silencing claim" and ruled that there was not a single feature of such a claim.  At the end of the day, the court ordered the respondent to pay the applicant compensation in the amount of ILS 10,000 and legal expenses in the amount of ILS 7,000.  The respondent appealed this judgment to the District Court.
4. The District Court accepted the appeal, reversed the Magistrate's Court's ruling, and dismissed the claim - based solely on the pleadings, while applying Regulation 138(a)(5) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018. The court reclassified the respondent's words as "an expression of opinion" and not as a "determination of fact".  It was held that in the context of the protest against the judicial reform, a reasonable person would view these expressions as "subjective insolences" and not facts as they are, and as such they do not amount to defamation.  The court was of the opinion that even if the publication amounts to defamation, the respondent is protected under the protection of good faith, since the publication is an expression of an opinion about a public figure, and it did not deviate from the realm of reasonableness.  The court ruled that in the present case, freedom of expression should be preferred over the right to a good name, and emphasized that the respondent had resorted to offensive language that had no place.
5. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916Hence the application for leave to appeal before us.

12-34-56-78 Chekhov v.  State of Israel, P.D.  51 (2)