"It is a common rule on the basis of a long list of judgments from the time of the Mandate and since the establishment of the State, that usually this court has the power to examine and examine the actions of the authorities not only as they appear to be in terms of formal legal authority, but also in the midst of the matter, whether the use of the authority is based on law, that is, whether it was done - inter alia - in good faith on the basis of valid considerations and for the purpose for which the authority was granted. In other words, this court examines, as usual, both the external form and the internal essence of the actions of the authorities. both the shell and the inside, and he shall not leave on the institutes of deeds that are indeed wrapped in kosher outer garments, but the inside of which is not the same" (High Court of Justice 98/54 Lazarovitz v. Supervisor of Alimony, IsrSC 10,40,47 (1956)).
Indeed, this ground, which is called the "cause of extraneous considerations" (some call this cause "the ground of matter", see: Yoav Dotan Judicial Review of Consideration Administrative Opinion Volume B 607-608 (2023) (hereinafter: Dotan)), has been part of common law since time immemorial (see, for example:Westminster Corporation v London and North Western Railway [1905] AC 426; Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578; Short v Poole Corporation [1926] Ch 66), and from there it was absorbed into our system already in the early days of the state (see, for example: High Court of Justice 70/49 "Spice" Ltd. v. Minister of Supply and RationingIsrSC 5 1613,1618 (1951); High Court of Justice 210/52 Lakel Furniture Center v. Minister of Trade and Industry and Director of the Light Industry Division, IsrSC 6 795,798 (1952); High Court of Justice 92/52 Dib v. Superintendent of Alimony, JerusalemIsrSC 6 1079,1084 (1952)).
- Initially, the cause of action for extraneous considerations was perceived as a derivative of the requirement of authority. Thus, it was held that where an authority's decision was made on the basis of considerations that the authority was not authorized to consider, or for the purpose of realizing a purpose for which the authority was granted in the first place, it is a matter of deviation from authority. However, over the years, case law has expanded the scope and determined that the examination of whether a decision was made on the basis of extraneous considerations is not limited to the authorizing law alone, but also includes an examination of whether more general considerations were considered in respect of which it can be assumed, as a kind of interpretive presumption, that the legislature did not intend to authorize the administrative authority to weigh them, and that it was not for the purpose of their realization that its authority was granted to it (see: High Court of Justice 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, IsrSC 42(2) 309,329-330 (1988) (hereinafter: the Poraz case); High Court of Justice 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 45(1) 28,36 (1990) (hereinafter: the Dekel case); High Court of Justice 154/98 The New General Workers' Union v. State of Israel, IsrSC 52(5) 111,121 (1998) (hereinafter: the Histadrut case); for more information, see: Barak-Erez, vol. 2, at pp. 636-641; Zamir, vol. 5, pp. 3497-3504; Dotan, at pp. 613-614).
If so, when the decision is based on a consideration that the authority did not agree to consider, whether explicitly in accordance with the wording of the authorizing law or implicitly in light of the basic principles of our legal system, this decision is liable to be invalidated.