"Improper considerations are, in general, also hidden from view. They are based in rooms, in tacit agreements, in thoughts in the heart and in the wink of the eye. There are few cases in which their existence can be proven from a positive perspective. It is very difficult, at times, to expose them to external criticism. It is easy to disguise them under a cloak of proper considerations which, according to his version, the man in power weighed too carefully. And where the administrative authorities have the same fundamental presumption as to the validity of the administrative work, the task of disclosure becomes doubly difficult" (High Court of Justice 1637/06 Armon v. Minister of Finance, paragraph 5 of the judgment of Justice E. E. Levy [Nevo] (January 3,2010)).
Indeed, "Thoughts are difficult to prove, and unlawful thoughts, all the more so" (High Court of Justice 571/89 Moskowitz v. Board of Appraisers, IsrSC 44(2) 236,246 (1990) (hereinafter: The Moskowitz Matter); See also: Matter United Torah Judaism, paragraph 49 of the judge's judgment A. Fogelman; Interest The Open House, at p. 40).
Moreover, these difficulties are compounded by the procedural limitations inherent in the judicial review process of this court sitting as the High Court of Justice: unlike the civil proceeding, in which the litigants have the procedural tools of requirements for disclosure of documents and launch Questionnaires, the means of disclosure available to the petitioner, As part of a petition to the High Court of Justice, are much more limited. The possibility of cross-examining representatives of the authority is also very limited and is contingent on a special permission of the court, which is rarely granted (for more information, see: Zamir, Volume 5, at pp. 3358-3359). The difficulty in proving the existence of the extraneous consideration is further exacerbated by the presumption of propriety enjoyed by the administrative authority, whereby the court will assume that its action was lawful, and that the burden of proving the contrary rests, as a rule, on the petitioner's shoulders (Name; See also: Barak-Erez, Volume 2, at pp. 669-670; Dotan, at pp. 640-641).