Civil Appeal (Haifa) 24900-01-26 Yitzhak Goita v. Orit Ben Gigi

Appeal against a judgment of the Hadera Magistrate's Court (the Honorable Judge Yaniv Heller) in Civil Case 51965-07-17 of November 10,2025 (hereinafter: the "Final Judgment" or the "Judgment").

General Background and Previous Proceedings -

1. This is a dispute between four families who hold land rights in Plot 481 in Block 10035 in Hadera (6 and 8 Goldenberg St., hereinafter: "the plot"). A rectangular structure is built on the plot, which includes four detached housing units.  One unit belongs to the appellants, H.H.  Alonit and Yitzhak Goita (hereinafter: "Goita", and "Goita's Unit"); The second unit is owned by Ofek Marzouk (hereinafter: "Marzouk" and "Marzouk's unit"), after the rights were transferred to him by Hofit Marzouk, and the rights were transferred to her by the Ben Gigi couple (hereinafter collectively "Ben Gigi", followed by the Sade, the late Yosef and Naomi, hereinafter collectively "Sadeh"); the third unit belongs to respondents 6-7, H.H.  Aharon Goltz and the late Livna Goltz (hereinafter: "Goltz" and "Goltz's Unit"); and the fourth unit belongs to Respondent 9, Ms. Sima Sheetrit (hereinafter: "Sheetrit" and "Sheetrit's Unit").
2. The two northern units are bordered by Goldenberg Street (hereinafter: "the road" and "the front units"), and these are units of Marzouk and Goita; and the two other units, of Goltz and Sheetrit, are rear units (hereinafter: "the rear units"), with Goltz "behind" Marzouk, and Sheetrit "behind" Goita. As a result of the aforesaid, in order to reach the two rear units of Goltz and Sheetrit by vehicle from the road, it is necessary to pass through the area of the two front units, of Marzouk and Goita.
3. In order to clarify the above description, the following is a transcript made by the trial court:

4. The legal proceedings began when, from a registered point of view, the plot was not divided into the separate housing units, and the owners of the rights in the housing unit were registered as the owners of an indefinite quarter (25%) of the ownership of the entire plot. This is despite the fact that the area on which the housing units are built is not uniform, in the sense that the area of each unit does not constitute exactly 25% of the total area of the plot.
5. The Ottoman Settlement [Old Version] 1916The situation described, in which there was no registration of the rights, raised a difficulty with regard to the ability of the rights holders to transfer the rights to others and make the best use of their rights in the land, and even raised tension between the parties in light of the fact that on the one hand there is a claim that each of them is supposed to "receive" 25% of the area, and on the other hand, the actual area of each unit is not exactly 25% of the total area.
6. 12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D.  51 (2)Over the years, many attempts have been made to reach understandings as to how it will be possible to divide the rights and register the rights for each unit separately, but the parties have not reached understandings.
7. Against this background, the claim was filed in 2017 with the Trial Court. The lawsuit was filed by Ben Gigi and Sadeh, against Goltz, Levi David, Shitrit and Goita, in which the Trial Court was asked to order the dissolution of the partnership in the land by virtue of section 38(a) of the Land Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter: the "Land Law").  The remedy requested was to issue an order to dissolve the partnership by way of signing a partnership agreement (hereinafter: the "Sharing Agreement") and operative remedies were requested that would obligate all the respondents to sign the documents required in order to register the partnership agreement at the Land Registry Office (section 17.1 of the amended statement of claim).  Alternatively (in section 17.2) a remedy of dissolution of the partnership was requested by way of turning the building into a condominium, in accordance with section 42(a) of the Real Estate Law (hereinafter: "Condominium").
8. The trial court appointed an appraiser and surveyor on its behalf (hereinafter: "the expert"), and the latter submitted an opinion that included a proposal for division by way of registering a condominium on the basis of the existing situation. The opinion noted that the building was built with a certain deviation from the side lines of the building as it appears in the building permit (Permit No. 75/88 of May 24,1988, hereinafter: "the Building Permit"), although this deviation is negligible and apparently constitutes a change in the structure and not a material planning change, or stems from an error in marking the line that outlined the construction of the building's foundations.  In his opinion, the expert deliberately ignored the building additions added by the parties, but clarified that building additions exist in all the units (and we will recall that each housing unit "went through" several "hands" until we reached the current situation).
9. Quoted from NavoRegarding the arrangement of the possibility of reaching the rear units with vehicles from the road (an issue that also provoked controversy), the expert explained that in practice, there are two ways to pass to the rear units from the road, one "on each side of the building" (hereinafter: "the passage roads"). Regarding the regulation of the passage roads, the expert proposed two alternatives.  One is to define the passage roads as common property, so that the owners of the rear units will be able to use them.  The second is to include the area of the passage roads in the area that will belong to the owners of the forward units, but to define an interest in respect of the passage roads for the benefit of the owners of the relevant rear units.  The expert explained that in practice there is no practical difference between the two alternatives in terms of the scope of the "nuisance" that will be caused to the owners of the front units, since there is no dispute that the owners of the rear units should be allowed to reach the rear units with their vehicles, and in any case this has been done for years by the parties "in the field".  The expert adds that if the passage roads are considered joint property, all the owners of the rights of all four units will have the possibility of making reasonable use of the common property, and alternatively - if an interest interest is defined, it will only be for the benefit of the owners of the rear units and not for the benefit of all the owners of the rights of all four units.
10. In addition, the expert's opinion refers to the possibility that it will be necessary to pay balance payments in order to reflect the differences in the area, to the extent that from a legal point of view, the court will reach the conclusion that such balance payments are indeed due. In the opinion, the expert also specifies what will be the sums that certain parties will pay to others, and what will be the amount that certain parties will receive from others.  The opinion also presented two alternatives regarding such balance payments - one option relates to a situation in which the alternative that will be implemented is to register the passage routes as common property, and the second possibility relates to the fact that the solution that will be implemented will be to register beneficial interests.
11. On August 2,2023, the Honorable Court of First Instance issued a partial judgment (hereinafter: the "Partial Judgment"). Kama's conclusion was that the dissolution of the partnership should be ordered by way of registering a condominium; that there is no reason to change the part that each person holds in the area; that the possibility of registering beneficial interests regarding the routes of passage should be preferred, and that there is no room for balance payments.  The Trial Court further added that in accordance with the requirements of the law, the approval of the Supervisor of Land Registration (hereinafter: "the Supervisor") must be obtained before the registration of the condominium.  Therefore, the conclusion of the partial judgment is that the building must be registered as a condominium, and it was even determined that the execution of the aforesaid is in the hands of a receiver, who has already been appointed in the past in the same case for the purpose of carrying out the registration (hereinafter: "the receiver").  Also in the partial judgment, it was determined that Goita must pay legal expenses to the other parties, in a cumulative sum of approximately ILS 150,000 (and see the details on the issue of expenses in paragraphs 94 to 98 of the partial judgment).
12. Goita filed an appeal against the partial judgment (Civil Appeal 30530-11-23, hereinafter: "the First Appeal"). On October 29,2024, a judgment was issued in the first appeal (hereinafter: "the judgment in the first appeal"), in which the appeal was rejected, with the exception of an intervention in the amount of expenses owed by Goita, in such a way that the expenses were reduced to half.
13. An application for leave to appeal was filed on behalf of Goita (within the framework of Civil Appeal Authority 66949-12-24). On March 9,2025, a judgment was issued by the Honorable Supreme Court, in which permission to appeal was granted and the appeal was granted.  It was held that Goita's main argument was regarding two errors that occurred at the factual description stage in the judgment, which, according to them, influenced the decision.  The Honorable Supreme Court ruled that since it was agreed that the two errors did indeed occur, the proceeding was returned to the District Court, for the purpose of rendering a supplementary judgment in the first appeal, including with respect to the issue of costs.
14. At the same time, the hearing in the trial case continued. At this stage, in accordance with the instructions of the trial court, the receiver performed a series of actions for the purpose of registering the condominium, claims were raised regarding her actions, and interim decisions were given while carrying out the actions.
15. On November 10,2025, the Court of First Instance issued the final judgment, which is the subject of the present appeal.
16. On January 8,2026, the appeal was filed here, and we will expand on it below.
17. On January 14,2026, the supplementary judgment was given in the first appeal (hereinafter: "the supplementary judgment in the first appeal"). There, it was determined, similar to the initial determination, that no defect was found in the fact that the trial court chose to apply section 42(a) of the Land Law and order the dissolution of the partnership in this manner.  Thus, Goita's first appeal regarding the partial judgment was rejected, while it was determined that the rights of all the parties were reserved to them with regard to the final judgment that was given in the meantime.
18. Goita filed an application for leave to appeal regarding the supplementary judgment in the first appeal (in the framework of Civil Appeal Leave 48285-04-26). On June 16,2026, a decision was issued in which it was determined that there was no reason to grant leave to appeal.  The Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the preliminary decisions are rooted in the specific facts of the case, and do not raise any legal question of principle that deviates from the individual interests of the parties and which deserves, according to its nature and essence, to be clarified in the framework of an application for leave to appeal "in its third incarnation".  It was further held that granting leave to appeal is not necessary in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, especially since most of Goita's arguments were also made by them in the framework of the appeal against the final judgment - a proceeding that has not yet been decided.
19. So far we have reviewed the proceedings so far, and we will now return to the current appeal, regarding the final judgment.

The Trial Judgment -

20. The final judgment spans 27 pages (henceforth referred to as the "judgment").
21. The first part of the judgment reviews the summary of the decisions that exist in the partial judgment. It was ruled that there was never any dispute that the building was built in a manner that did not conform to the building permit, and that it was "shifted" to the west, in a manner that changed the size of the area adjacent to each unit, and which has been used for years by the owners of each unit.  This means that the entire structure "moves" toward the west and is not located in the center of the plot, and the plots of the apartment owners on the western side (Goita and Sheetrit) have a smaller lateral space relative to the adjacent lot, relative to the lateral space on the east side.  In the judgment it is also clarified that an argument raised on behalf of Goita regarding "conspiracy" in this matter against them was factually rejected in the partial judgment as well, since the "diversion" of the building was not an initiative of any of the parties, but, apparently, a constraint on the part of the contractor, which all the owners of the rights were forced to accept without any other choice.
22. It is also mentioned in the judgment that in the partial judgment it was factually determined that Goita purchased their rights many years after the other parties (and it is detailed that they purchased the rights in 2004, while the other "original" parties purchased the rights in 1987). The trial court reiterates that even in the partial judgment it factually determined that Goita knew at the time of the purchase of the rights what the house would look like, what the buildings looked like, and what was the area held by each party.
23. The trial court goes on to describe that at a relatively early stage of the proceeding, the parties agreed to dissolve the partnership on the basis of the existing actual use of the land, with the exception of Goita, who objected to the dissolution in any way. Further on, it is noted that according to the expert's opinion, which was given back in 2021, the partnership can be dissolved by way of registering the house as a condominium, with the part that each of the tenants actually holds in the building, including the exterior part held by each tenant, to be registered as his part.  With regard to the paths adjacent to the building from the east and west, leading from the street to the rear units (and as defined above, "the passage roads"), the expert proposed two alternatives, between which he did not find a significant material gap that would favor one alternative over the other.  Therefore, in the partial judgment, the court's expert opinion was accepted, according to which it would be possible to dissolve the partnership by way of registering a condominium, in which the ownership of the area of the passage roads would be in the hands of the owners of the units adjacent to them, while granting a right of passage, or "an usufruct of the right of passage on each path", as the expert put it in his opinion, in each of the passage roads in favor of the rear unit to which the road leads.  The partial judgment further held that although the dissolution of the partnership will not create units of exactly equal size, in the circumstances of this case, there is no room for awarding balance payments in favor of Goita, or in favor of other parties, due to several cumulative reasons.
24. Subsequently, the trial court further notes that with regard to the manner of dissolution of the partnership, it ordered in the partial judgment that the receiver must act to complete the registration, on the basis of the expert's opinion, including applying to the Land Supervisor for approval of the registration. In more detail, the receiver should have applied at the first stage to obtain an opinion from the Supervisor, in accordance with the provisions of section 42(a) of the Real Estate Law, and after an opinion in principle is given according to which the registration of a condominium is possible, the second stage will be carried out, and it will be possible to render a final judgment.
25. The second part of the judgment describes the Receiver's actions after the partial judgment. It is noted that on September 2,2024, the Receiver petitioned for a wage award, and more importantly, for the court's instructions regarding her continued work, in light of Goita's actions, which, in her view, led to "thwarting the registration of the condominium".  The Receiver stated that on March 13,2024, Goita contacted the Hadera Local Planning and Building Committee (hereinafter: the "Local Committee") with a "letter of objection", which in effect objected to the provisions of the partial judgment (hereinafter: the "Letter of Objection").  The trial court notes that the sending of the letter was not brought to its attention "in real time", and the main thing is that its sending led the local committee to revoke the initial approval given for the registration of a condominium.  According to the Receiver, the letter caused a delay in her ability to act, including because as a result of it, the local committee refrained from providing the Receiver with an inspector report (hereinafter: "the Supervisor"), relating to the construction irregularities in the building.
26. Subsequently, an explicit instruction was given to the local committee to issue an inspection report, as requested by the Receiver (hereinafter: the Supervision Report). During the discussion on the matter, the legal advisor of the local committee clarified that the committee has no objection in principle to the registration of a condominium, and that in her understanding, the existing construction irregularities in the building, which are not of the type of addition of a housing unit, do not prevent registration, provided that a warning note is registered in respect of them in accordance with Regulation 29 of the Real Estate Regulations (Management and Registration), 5762-2011 (hereinafter: "the Registration Regulations" and "Regulation 29").  Kama adds that the position of the family appellant of the local committee is consistent with the opinion of the court's expert, i.e., that construction irregularities of the type existing in the building, especially when some of them belong to the party opposing the registration, are not supposed to prevent the registration of a condominium.
27. On May 19,2025, the Receiver submitted a "Notice of Registration of a Condominium" to the file, and the Receiver attached a Land Registration Document to the file, as well as the decision of the local committee by virtue of which a warning note was registered regarding construction irregularities.
28. The trial court, in decisions of May 22,2025 and June 17,2025, clarified that it expected that notice of the supervisor's opinion approving the dissolution of the partnership would be given before a supplementary judgment ordering the actual registration would be issued, and instructed the receiver to detail her notice and attach the sketch of the condominium.
29. In her response of June 19,2025, to which the condominium bylaws (hereinafter: the "Bylaws") were also attached), the Receiver clarified that she understood from the decisions in the case that approval in principle for the dissolution of the partnership given by the Supervisor by the very opening of the file for the registration of a condominium was sufficient, in order to qualify the registration. In any event, the house was registered as a condominium and the documents were presented to the trial court for review.
30. In light of the aforesaid, in the judgment, the trial court clarified that there was a certain misunderstanding as to the timing of the registration, since it itself expected to receive the Supervisor's opinion regarding the possibility of approving the registration (as required by the provisions of the Law), prior to the issuance of the supplementary judgment ordering the registration, and in practice the registration was carried out even before the Supervisor's approval. However, the Trial Court is of the position that the aforesaid stems from a misunderstanding (and it even refers to its decision of June 17,2025).  According to it, its original intention in the partial judgment was that the Receiver would first apply for an opinion in principle from the Land Supervisor, and only then would a final judgment be issued ordering the actual registration.  However, the Receiver made the final registration even before such a final judgment was given by the court.  The Honorable Justice explains that the Receiver clarified in her response to the application addressed to her in this context that she understood from the previous decisions of the Trial Court that approval in principle for the dissolution of the partnership, which is given by the very opening of the file by the Supervisor, is sufficient to legitimize the actual registration.  The Honorable Justice Kama accepted this explanation and wrote explicitly that: "Until I pin the fault on the Receiver, therefore, I will hang it on me, " and clarifies that the title "partial judgment" and the wording he used (such as the use of the phrase "Supervisor's Approval" instead of "Supervisor's Opinion") were what led to the Receiver's misunderstanding, and even in the District Court's decision regarding the delay in execution.  Ultimately, the trial judge ruled that the receiver's clarification was acceptable to him, and the important thing is that "since the Supervisor approved the registration of the condominium in the form it approved, it appears that she too does not see any impediment to the execution of the registration." This registration is based on the suggestion of the court's expert, who also expressed his opinion that the registration is possible, and therefore there is no impediment to its final approval.  In other words, the main thing is that in the end, the local committee approved the sketch presented by the Knesset on February 18,2025, after it acted to register a note on the building irregularities in accordance with Regulation 29 on February 9,2025; Subsequently, there was an approval by the Haifa Land Registry Supervisor, Adv. Ayelet Kalfon, dated May 12,2025, and she approved the final drawing on May 15,2025.  Therefore, it was determined that the aforesaid did not detract from the registration notice.
31. The third part of the judgment deals with the steps taken after the building was registered as a condominium. On August 26,2025, the Trial Court asked the Receiver to clarify the alleged changes in the scope of the areas registered in the condominium file relative to the Court's expert's proposal approved by the Court.  On September 3,2025, the Receiver clarified that the basis of the court's expert opinion is the actual possession of the land by the parties; that the expert himself determined in paragraph 6.15 of his opinion that "it is possible that at the time of registration it will be found that there is a difference in the area of the units and the area of the registered attachments", since all the parties expanded the area of the original unit that they had in their possession in different constructions and to a different extent.  The Receiver also submitted a comparison table between the expert's calculation and the calculation of the areas in the condominium drawing, which shows minimal gaps of about 8 square meters in the calculation of the total area, i.e., about 0.8% of the total area, and within an acceptable deviation range.
32. The trial court relates to the legal question - whether, in the framework of the dissolution of a partnership by way of the registration of a condominium, the court is entitled to determine attachments to apartments without the consent of all parties. Its conclusion is that the answer to this question is in the affirmative, especially when the division of use of the area has been known and implemented in practice for years, and the party should not be allowed to receive a "gift from heaven" that it does not deserve as a result of an erroneous registration.  It was held that Goita's rights were not violated as a result of the registration of the linkages, since the condominium, as it was registered, accurately reflects the division of historical possession in the area and does not change anything from the actual use.
33. The fourth part of the judgment deals with Goita's request to cancel the registration of the condominium. It should be noted that at this stage the requests and arguments in the preliminary proceeding were on behalf of Mr. Yitzhak Goita himself, without representation.  The trial court specifies that on behalf of Goita, a motion was filed to instruct the receiver to cancel the registration of the condominium "which she had registered in the land registry fraudulently and illegally".  The trial court details all of Goita's claims, including: the existence of fraud, the submission of bylaws that are ostensibly agreed upon despite Goita's objections, a note in the bylaws that there is a prima facie agreement in Goita's name for the right of relocation in favor of the owners of the rear unit adjacent to them (the Sheetrit apartment) and the owners of the neighboring plot (482) despite their objections to this and in a "serious nuisance and endangering human life", claims regarding the allocation of the parking lots, regarding the fact that the registration that was actually carried out does not correspond to the situation on the ground, It is based on "fabricated and non-identical drawings signed by Mr. Jonathan Martin on January 23,2025", regarding the fact that in both drawings there are "many misleadings", handwritten amendments (regarding the construction line and the width of the passageway), regarding errors in the registration of the interior area of the units (contrary to what was stated in the court's expert opinion), regarding the discrepancy between the drawings and the map presented by the Receiver and the original partition plan that all parties signed before purchasing the rights in the land.  Regarding the fact that the Receiver deducted an area of 6 square meters from the Guaita "in favor of pirate parking for the rear unit", regarding the fact that the Receiver "misled the law authorities" by making them understand that there is already a judgment regarding the dissolution of the partnership, while a final judgment was not given, regarding the fact that the registration of the condominium with a note regarding the construction irregularities in accordance with Regulation 29 is not appropriate for the circumstances of this case, regarding the fact that the building contains "material building violations" and that "at any time the Municipality of Hadera or any subordinate can issue a demolition order", and more.
34. Later on, the trial court details the receiver's response to the aforementioned arguments, when, in essence, she sought to dismiss the entirety of the arguments (see the details in the judgment).
35. The fifth part includes in fact the decision on the claims. Kama clarifies that a significant part of Goita's arguments are an objection to the court's expert's principled determinations, according to which the registration of a condominium according to his proposal is possible.  The court's expert was aware of the building irregularities, and of the unique condition of the building in question (which was built outside the center of the plot and stood in this state for a long time), while the authorities ignored the aforesaid.  In this context, Kama reiterates that he found the outline for resolving the dispute and the division proposed by the expert to be accepted in the partial judgment, since they are based on the existing division in practice (without justifying any building deviation whatsoever).
36. With regard to the serious personal allegations raised against the Receiver, regarding "forgery" and "fabrication" on her behalf, the trial court rejects them one by one, and we will turn to the details of its reasoning there.
37. We will recall from the totality the position of the trial court regarding Goita's claims that the receiver acted fraudulently and manually added markings of the digits "180" and "535" on the sketch in order to mislead the Land Supervisor. The court instructed the receiver to respond to these claims in a detailed affidavit, and from the affidavit it emerged that the markings were made by the draftsman, the construction engineer Jonathan Martin, and not by the receiver.  The judge completely rejected the claims of fraud and ruled that these were legitimate technical markings intended to clarify the existing situation on the ground, and that no act of fraud on the part of the receiver had been proven.
38. A similar argument by Goita was that the Receiver deceived the authorities by misrepresenting that there was a final partial judgment that allowed the registration. The court rejected this argument and ruled that the Receiver did not mislead the local committee or the supervisor, but rather acted in good faith and according to a reasonable interpretation of the interim decisions and the partial judgment.  It was determined that it was Goita who concealed information from the authorities, did not disclose that their request for a stay of execution was denied, and exerted pressure on the local committee to thwart the registration.
39. The trial court further points out that claims regarding the forgery of documents were also raised on behalf of Goita against the other parties, in relation to the agreement of August 20,1987 that was submitted to the case, and even these arguments were discussed at length and rejected in paragraphs 81-90 of the partial judgment.
40. The trial court also addressed in detail Goita's arguments regarding the fact that the condominium sketch approved by the Receiver and the other parties is not similar to the original division sketch signed by all the parties before they acquired the rights to the land (hereinafter: the "original drawing"). Kama clarifies that this argument was already discussed in the partial judgment, and recalls that his determination there was that from a factual point of view, there is in fact no dispute, that the original sketch signed by the parties at the time did not correspond to the reality on the ground, it never corresponded to the reality on the ground, and it was signed by the other neighbors with it clearly and in writing stating on it that it was "not for registration purposes" (paragraph 66 of the partial judgment).  Again, it is clarified that in practice, the building in question was erected outside the center of the lot, apparently due to a constraint related to the contractor and the relationship between him and the owners of the neighboring buildings (paragraph 9c of the partial judgment), and therefore there is a discrepancy between the documents, and in any case - this is an event that took place nearly 40 years ago.  Kama further reiterates that his determination in the partial judgment on this matter was that the fact that the building was built in deviation from the permit cannot be justified, but apparently it was not at the initiative of any of the rights owners, and the important thing is that all the owners of the rights knew the situation in its entirety.  The same is true of Goita, who knew very well when they purchased their unit how the building was built (paragraph 60 of the partial judgment), like all the other neighbors who preceded them in the land - and the trial court reiterates its factual determinations in the partial judgment in this context.
41. Goita's argument was further rejected that granting the right of passage to vehicles on the passage roads to the rear units "endangers" the residents of the building and changes something of the existing situation on the ground. It has been proven factually (and the subject was not in dispute) that the passage roads have been used for years for vehicles to access the rear plots, and hence - the argument that the passage of vehicles creates a "serious nuisance and endangers human life" cannot be accepted.
42. With regard to the building irregularities, the trial court relates to the fact that the registration of the condominium, while noting a note regarding the building irregularities by virtue of Regulation 29, in fact "perpetuates" the building irregularities, but rules that in the circumstances of this case, and as explained by the appellant's family of the local committee - the committee's policy is to distinguish between construction offenses that do not allow the registration of a condominium (such as the construction of a housing unit), and deviations of the type that exist in the building, which do not prevent registration and together a warning note. The trial court goes on to detail why in our case there are several good reasons why the court should allow the registration of a condominium while registering a warning note, despite the exceptions, and we will not review all of its reasons.  We should only note that, inter alia, it is described that Goita themselves live in a unit with construction irregularities (such as a closed column floor with an area of 26 square meters; a closed area of 6.6 square meters; as well as a built shed with an area of 12 square meters), and if the registration of the condominium is conditional on the regulation of the deviations, and as long as they themselves do not legalize the deviations in their unit, they will be able to delay the registration.
43. It was further held that in practice, Goita's claims are not directed at the construction irregularities, but rather at the fact that they were "deprived" due to the size of their share in the overall area. It was determined in this context, as already determined in the partial judgment and as already noted above, that this is a building that was built in deviation about 40 years ago, the deviation was not initiated by the parties to this case, the "guilty" contractor is no longer alive, Goita knew the situation well before they acquired their rights - and because of the aforesaid, they have been piling up difficulties in any way to resolve the disputes for more than eight years.  It was further determined that "had it not been for excessive financial demands" on the part of Goita, as a condition for cooperation, the discussion would have been superfluous and understandings could have been reached.
44. In the last part of the judgment, the trial court addressed Goita's arguments regarding the manner in which the condominium was registered and regarding the bylaws that were registered, despite Goita's objection to the bylaws, and when it includes provisions regarding attachment from the common property, in a manner that detracts from Goita's area of about 54 square meters. Goita's arguments in this context are also rejected.  It is reasoned in this context that in the agreed bylaws, as drafted by the Receiver, the right that exists in respect of the passage roads was defined as a "right of passage" (section 7 of the agreed bylaws), while a name was added, on behalf of the rights holders, that they give consent to register mutual benefits for the common western access to the building and the adjacent plot - 482.  In this regard, the Receiver explained that there is no need to register usufruct interests at this time in order to regulate the passage of the two plots, and the bylaws of the two houses allow for this.
45. Similarly, there is a discussion on the question of whether the determination of linkages by way of dissolution of a partnership by way of registration of a condominium is possible - and the conclusion is that this is possible and necessary in this case. The trial court clarified that the term "agreed bylaws" is a legal-technical concept defined in section 62(a) of the Real Estate Law, and does not require the unanimous consent of all the owners.  According to the provisions of the law, these articles of association can be registered with the consent of the owners of two-thirds of the common property, and in the circumstances of the case, the receiver was lawfully authorized to sign it on behalf of the owner by virtue of the ruling approved by the court on November 1,2023.
46. The conclusion of the judgment is that the Receiver acted to carry out the court's decisions, with the necessary adjustments to the building irregularities found in the inspection report and to the sketch approved by the local committee; and from a practical point of view, the condominium - as recorded - is in accordance with the principles of the proposal proposed by the court's expert and accepted in the partial judgment. It was ruled that the registration does not change anything from the actual use that has been practiced for many years, including the use of the passage and parking roads for vehicles near the rear units, and the trial court approved the registration of the condominium, as it was recorded.
47. In addition, due to the Receiver's need to deal with the many motions filed by Goita against her on her own, the Trial Court ordered Goita to pay the Receiver legal expenses in the sum of ILS 7,000 plus VAT, and noted that this sum was awarded "on the very low side".

Summary of the appellants' arguments, Goita, regarding the trial judgment -

48. As Goita defined the two issues that are at the core of the present appeal (paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal), they complain about the preliminary rulings on two main issues: first, the deduction of an area of 54 square meters (or 56 square meters) from the area that was registered in their name at the Land Registry Office over the years. They owned 25% of the total area over the years (without any claims that the registration was wrong), that is, they had rights to 245 square meters, but following the registration of the condominium, 54 square meters were deducted from them, which is almost 23% of the total area.  According to them, the judgment harmed them from a proprietary point of view - and therefore, is wrong.  The second main argument is that the trial court and the Knesset had no legal authority to sign an "agreed bylaws" on their behalf and by force and submit them to the registration and planning authorities, in complete contravention of their explicit written objection.
49. Goita also raises serious allegations regarding the existence of many significant building irregularities in the building, which, according to them, make the entire building illegal and dangerous.  They note that there are in practice six housing units built in violation of the law and without a permit (of which two additional units are on the colonnaded floor on the eastern side and two units on the western side), while according to the original building permit, number 75/88, only four housing units are permitted to be built.  According to them, the court-appointed expert confirmed in his interrogation that all the parties exceeded their building percentage by about 60%.
50. Goita further claims that the plan of the condominium and the bylaws drawn up by the receiver do not give a "faithful picture" of the house and its apartments, contrary to the legislature's mandate and Regulation 54(b) of the Land Regulations.  They call the maps and drawings submitted to the authorities "one big bluff" and "bluff maps", and claim that the receiver and the surveyor on her behalf deliberately omitted material data and critical measurements.  In particular, they note that the drawing omitted the marking of the western side building line on the first floor, which stands at 3.54 meters and is also illegal according to the zoning plan, was omitted.
51. Another claim is that the Receiver independently made "improvements" to the partial judgment and the expert's opinion, and unlawfully expanded the strip of land separated from them.  According to them, while in the opinion and in the partial judgment it was determined that the width of the western strip of land, which would be used as a passageway, would be 1.5 meters (with a total area of 29 square meters), the Receiver increased the width in the plan of the condominium to 1.91 meters (with a total area of 36 square meters).  Thus, they claim, additional property rights in an area of 7 square meters were expropriated and stolen from them without any legal authority.
52. Goita further argues that the Receiver canceled on its own initiative the "benefits of interest" that were determined in the partial judgment and the expert opinion in favor of the rear apartment (Sheetrit) and the adjacent plot 482. In place of these usufruct connections, the Receiver drew up an agreed bylaw "from her imagination only" that includes special and multiple attachments at the expense of Goita's property.  According to them, section 62(a) of the Real Estate Law explicitly states that the attachment of part of the common property to a certain apartment may not be determined except with the consent of all the apartment owners, and therefore these attachments cannot be imposed on them.
53. 00 Goita also alleges, in general, improper conduct, lack of transparency and lack of supervision on the part of the Receiver throughout the period of her appointment. They complain that the Receiver acted "in the dark" and "in secret", and concealed from them and the court material documents and reports about her activities and financial expenses for over a year.  They further note that the Receiver and the surveyor on her behalf were appointed under duress without giving them a proper opportunity to argue their claims, and without submitting to the file an affidavit regarding the absence of a conflict of interest as required by law.
54. 0 Another claim relates to the Receiver's financial demands for a fee of ILS 40,000, in addition to the sums of more than ILS 50,000 that have already been paid to her. According to Goita, it is inconceivable that the Receiver would demand additional funds when she failed to register the condominium lawfully and her original request was rejected by the Director of the Licensing and Engineering Department in the Hadera Municipality, Mrs. Shoshi Weiss, on July 30,2024, due to the many construction irregularities.  They claim that their obligation to pay expenses to the Receiver in the amount of ILS 5,000 on November 12,2024 constitutes ongoing discrimination and an unjustified punishment for providing reliable information to the authorities.
55. Further to the above, Goita claims that the Receiver actively misled the Supervisor and the Local Planning and Building Committee by presenting them with the ruling approved by the Court of First Instance on November 1,2023, as a final order for the registration of a condominium that was supposedly given with their consent.  They also claim that the Receiver tried to circumvent the decision of the Engineering Department to postpone the registration, and took a detour to the Betterment Department to obtain approval for the Land Registry.  According to them, this request was initially granted with approval on August 2,2024, but on August 28,2024, the Director of the Betterment Department, Appraiser Danny Feinstein, sent an explicit cancellation letter to this approval after it became clear that the Receiver was committing a sin to the truth.
56. Goita also attacks the report of the Building Inspector (hereinafter: "the Building Inspector") dated September 15,2024, which was submitted to the Court of First Instance on September 22,2024 by the Hadera Municipality (hereinafter: the "Municipality"). According to them, this is a "denial and mostly erroneous" report, since the Building Inspector completely ignored material deviations from the building permit, the building lines, and the building percentages.  They complain that the building inspector's visit to their apartment lasted only 9 minutes, was carried out visually and without appropriate measurement tools or an up-to-date map, with the clear aim of "burying facts cast in concrete" and circumventing the decision of the Engineering Department.
57. Another general argument of Goita is that there are extreme power disparities between them, as senior citizens, disabled people (with Mr. Goita being recognized as 66% permanently disabled and receiving a disability benefit) and sons of unrepresented Holocaust survivors, and the other parties in the case.  They claim that the other neighbors and the contractor have united in a joint "conspiracy" and "conspiracy" against them, represented by a battery of experienced and well-connected lawyers.  They claim that throughout the nine years of litigation, they have been experiencing a constant "hell, torture and miscarriage of justice" designed to "exhaust, deter and subdue" them so that they will forcibly sign the waiver of their property rights.  Goita even claims that they did not receive "an open heart and a willing soul" from the trial court, but rather suffered ongoing discrimination and hostile treatment.  According to them, Judge Kama formed a negative opinion against them from the very beginning of the proceeding, and unjustly presented them as "refuseniks", "bad faith" and "thugs".  They recall that Judge Kama even deleted their defense in the past, on September 16,2019, and as part of the partial judgment, imposed on them heavy and unprecedented punitive expenses in the cumulative sum of approximately ILS 150,000 (which were reduced by half in the appeal), all with the aim of exerting intimidating pressure on them to act against their interests.
58. Therefore, in summary, Goita argues that the trial court made a factual and legal error when it ordered the dissolution of the partnership by way of registering a condominium on top of a building built entirely in violation of the law and while committing criminal construction offenses. According to them, it is not possible to give legal approval and "legitimize" an illegal and dangerous building by means of a partnership dissolution proceeding, and the plaintiffs in the first instance should have first presented explicit approval from the planning authorities and the municipality that the building was built lawfully and should be registered as a condominium.  They ask theappellate court to cancel the judgment in all its parts and to order the cancellation of the registration of the condominium that was carried out "fraudulently and in violation of the law".

Summary of Respondents' Arguments 6-7, Goltz -

59. Goltz wishes to dismiss the appeal in all its parts. They rely on the final, supplementary judgment and the partial judgment of the trial court, and according to them, this is an empty appeal filed in extreme bad faith, with Goita once again trying to exhaust the legal system and the other partners in the real estate by revolving claims that have already been discussed and decided.
60. In response to Goita's claim of "conspiracy" and "conspiracy" that allegedly took place during the construction of the building and its westward shift, Goltz responds that this is a baseless accusation that has not been proven even prima facie.  They clarify that they were not among the original partners in the land at all, nor did they sign the original 1987 sharing agreement.  Therefore, the claim that they were partners in some conspiracy against Goita, many years before they even acquired his rights in the property, is devoid of any logic and common sense.
61. Regarding the manner in which the rights were acquired and the use of the area, Goltz emphasizes that Goita purchased their rights "in an existing situation" and with clear and full knowledge of the division of the lot and the actual use.  Goltz also claims that they themselves relied upon the existing drawings at the time of purchase, which were made by certified surveyors, and never challenged this.  The division and physical possession of the housing units in the area have been known and fixed for decades without any change, and Goita knew very well where the passage path to the rear units passed.
62. With regard to Goita's claim that Goita built a "separate unit" in violation of the law, Goltz replies that this is not a separate unit at all, but rather an existing parking area that they closed off by a wall only. They also emphasize that Goita did exactly the same thing on their property, and therefore their claim is tainted by hypocrisy and bad faith.  It is also argued that this is a normal use of the area historically associated with them, which does not infringe Goita's rights in any way.
63. Regarding Goita's claims regarding the existence of many building irregularities that ostensibly prevent the registration, Goltz argues that the existence of the deviations does not prevent, and should not have prevented, the dissolution of the partnership by way of registration of a condominium, as was done. They support the legal position that the property registration is intended to regulate the rights between the partners, while the issue of deviations is dealt with separately by the planning and enforcement institutions.  It is also emphasized that this solution was implemented in practice in this case, by registering a note regarding non-conformity in accordance with Regulation 29, as was done in practice when registering the condominium.
64. Goltz also argues that most of Goita's arguments regarding the court's jurisdiction and the adoption of the expert's suggestion regarding the methods of access are silenced due to "court action" and are already conclusive.  These issues were examined in depth and decided both in the partial judgment of the trial court and in the judgments of the District Court and the Supreme Court.  Thus, Goita is not permitted to reopen in the framework of the present appeal substantive disputes that have already been finally decided in three different instances.
65. With regard to Goita's objection to the registration of the "Agreed Articles of Association" and the linkages that were made, Goltz responds that the Real Estate Law does not allow a single partner to prevent the dissolution of the partnership by means of a strict and stubborn refusal.  Section 62(a) of the Land Law allows the registration of an agreed bylaws with the consent of a majority of the owners of two-thirds of the common property, a condition that was fully fulfilled in our case in view of the consent of the other partners.  The Receiver was authorized to sign the Articles of Association in the name of Goita by virtue of the ruling that was duly approved, in order to prevent them from thwarting the proprietary proceeding.
66. Goltz rejects Goita's personal slander against the Receiver and claims that she acted honestly, professionally and with the court's long hand. According to them, Goita's claims regarding "obscuring" or "hiding documents" are baseless claims intended to intimidate the Receiver and the professional bodies in the Hadera Municipality and the Registration Office.  The Receiver reported on its activities on an ongoing basis, and all the technical corrections made to the sketch were lawfully made by the competent authorities and approved by the Supervisor.
67. Finally, Goltz seeks to put an end to Goita's conduct, to dismiss the appeal and to charge them with realistic and significant legal expenses.

Summary of the arguments of respondents 1-5, Ben Gigi, Sadeh and Marzuk -

68. Respondents 1-5 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Marzuk"), wish to dismiss the appeal in its entirety, to adopt the supplementary judgment of the trial court and to charge Goita with court expenses and attorney's fees. According to them, the partial judgment that determined the manner of dissolution of the partnership became final after an appeal against it was rejected and the Supreme Court returned the case only for the correction of very minor technical errors.  Therefore, Goita's attempt to reopen all the fundamental and factual determinations regarding the very dissolution of the partnership and the manner in which it was carried out should be rejected.
69. Marzouk emphasizes that the registration of the condominium constitutes a "done act", since the request for a stay of proceedings was rejected and the registration was actually completed in the condominium register.  According to them, the judgment reflects the only proper and feasible solution to the situation that has arisen in the area, in which the apartments have been built and occupied for decades (starting around 1987).  It was also emphasized that another division "in kind" is not possible, and that the registration of the condominium corresponds to the state of the parties' actual possession and use of the land for years.
70. It was further claimed that Goita acted in clear bad faith and dragged all the partners into a lengthy, exhausting and expensive legal proceeding that lasted about 9 years in the trial court.  While the owners of the rights in three of the four units reached an agreement in principle as to the proper solution many years ago, Goita refused any practical solution and insisted on signing an out-of-date sharing agreement, which does not reflect the existing situation on the ground, and when Goita cannot offer any other realistic alternative to regulating the rights in the land.
71. Marzouk categorically rejects Goita's claims of conspiracy, fraud, fraud or deception on the part of the court-appointed receiver.  They emphasize that the receiver acted in accordance with the instructions of the trial court, and that the results of its activity and the registration of the condominium received the approval of the local committee and the approval of the Supervisor of Land Registration.  It was emphasized that in the final judgment, the trial court analyzed all the claims against the receiver one by one, found that they had no substance, and that this determination should not be interfered with.
72. Therefore, it was requested to dismiss the appeal in connection with the charge of expenses.

Summary of Respondent 9's arguments, Sheetrit -

73. Sheetrit also seeks to dismiss Goita's appeal in its entirety and to charge them with costs. Her first main argument is that large parts of Goita's notice of appeal should be dismissed out of hand or deleted, since the partial judgment finally and conclusively decided on all the fundamental issues of dissolution of the partnership, the registration of the condominium and the appointment of the receiver.  Sheetrit argues that the final judgment, which is the subject of the appeal, deals only with a few limited issues, and that Goita should not be allowed to reopen all the determinations of the case, when their arguments have been examined and rejected repeatedly by three different courts.  It was further emphasized that a significant part of Goita's arguments that the trial court was required to address in the framework of the supplementary judgment were raised by Goita from the outset because at this stage Mr. Goita represented himself.  Thus, since Mr. Goita was a "layman" in the planning and legal field of the registration of condominiums, the final judgment extended over 27 pages, since the Honorable Justice Kama had to deal with many details and very many arguments, only because of the repeated "harassment" by Goita (who alone filed motions and arguments at this stage).
74. In response to Goita's claims about building irregularities that prevent registration, Sheetrit responds that building irregularities do not prevent the proprietary registration of a condominium.  According to her, the property issue is regulated by registering appropriate comments on building irregularities in the Land Registry after registration, while planning enforcement is handed over to the supervisory authorities separately.  She emphasizes that Goita purchased their rights to the land "in an existing state" and with clear knowledge of the field data, and that the map they presented does not reflect reality.
75. As for Goita's claim that the receiver acted in a "fraudulent" and "bluff" manner, it was argued that the entirety of the allegations should be rejected and that they were baseless slander and slander.
76. With regard to Goita's claim that there was a change in the areas that they were supposed to receive in favor of "linkages", Sheetrit refers to documents submitted on behalf of the Receiver, which indicate that the gap between the expert's calculation and the actual drawing that was actually recorded is minimal, and as previously determined - this is a gap of about 0.8% of the total area, which amounts to only about 8 square meters, which stems from the fact that the parties themselves have carried out various building extensions over the years.  This deviation is within the completely acceptable range and does not prejudice the substantive rights of the parties, including Goita.
77. Finally, regarding the relationship of enjoyment and the right of passage that were determined in favor of the rear unit of Sheetrit and the adjacent plot 482, Sheetrit responds that this is a vital arrangement based on the actual state of possession over decades.  The passage and the attachment of the areas reflect the existing structure in the area, as determined in the expert opinion and implemented in the judgment in accordance with the historical agreements and the access needs of the rear apartments.  This determination is in fact intended to prevent severe property damage to the other partners and to give faithful expression to the physical reality of the building.

Discussion and Decision -

78. After considering the parties' written and oral arguments, the conclusion is that the appeal should be dismissed. We will detail our position in accordance with the various issues that arose.

Boundaries of the appeal -

79. We accept the Respondents' position that most of Goita's arguments were swallowed up in the partial judgment, which has become substantively final. In other words, the determinations that there is no choice but to dissolve the partnership in this case by way of registering a condominium, and that balance payments should not be paid - are determinations that Goita cannot raise again at the present stage.  Admittedly, in the supplementary judgment in the first appeal it was held that the parties' arguments were reserved for them regarding the final judgment, and indeed even in the decision not to grant leave to appeal regarding the supplementary judgment in the first appeal, the honorable Supreme Court noted that there is also the present appeal, regarding the final judgment that has not yet been decided, but the possibility of "reopening" all the disputes in the case should not be read into these statements.
80. The partial judgment, although it was only "partial", and although it may have been a "decision" and not a judgment, decided with regard to the dissolution of the partnership itself, the way to carry out the dissolution - by registering a condominium according to the expert's opinion, and a decision not to award balance payments. These determinations were clarified in the first appeal and afterwards in the Supreme Court, and there is a real reason for the respondents' position that these "basic" determinations constitute an act of court, and the appellants are not entitled to raise objections to them in the framework of the current appeal against the final judgment.
81. The procedural situation that has been created does not allow for "parallel duplication of appeals" (as some of the respondents called it), and it must be said that the appeal proceedings regarding the "basic" determinations have been exhausted, especially since it is a "done act", since the process of dissolving the partnership has been completed and the condominium was actually registered at the Land Registry Office after all the requests for a stay of execution were rejected.
82. It should also be seen that in the present notice of appeal, Goita ostensibly "restricts" the arguments to the two questions as mentioned above (forced derogation of the proprietary rights and registration of the agreed articles of association against their will), and it can be inferred from the fact that they themselves no longer seek at this stage to attack the starting point that the solution was indeed the dissolution of the partnership by way of registering a condominium, as Kama held.
83. Moreover, and even if it was possible to raise arguments on the part of Goita regarding the manner in which the partnership should be dissolved, we are of the opinion that there is no room to intervene in the first instance, because in the circumstances of this case, the dissolution of the partnership as carried out is the best outline, especially when 3/4 of the property owners have been seeking to dissolve the partnership in this way for many years, and when Goita does not raise any other realistic proposal for dissolution of the partnership.

The court's power to deprive registered owners' rights in land is regulated in the Mosha -

84. In fact, Goita's main argument is that when the trial court ordered the approval of the registration of the condominium as registered by the receiver, it resulted in the deduction of about 56 square meters from the area that was supposed to belong to Goita according to the "land registry". According to them, this is a plot with an area of 981 square meters, and therefore each of the owners of the apartments was supposed to have 25% = 245 square meters.  According to them, the significance of the judgment is that only 194 square meters were registered in their name, and this is a subtraction of about 51 square meters, which constitutes about 20% of the area they were supposed to receive (out of 245 square meters).
85. Indeed, in view of the manner in which the building was built on the lot, being "shifted" to the west, the space between the apartments on the west side (the apartments of Goita and Sheetrit) and the neighboring lot is narrower than the space between the apartments on the east side (of Marzouk and Goltz) and the neighboring lot. Therefore, if within each lot includes the apartment itself (of course), including the extensions that each of the parties saw fit to expand, and if we add to this the garden/yard of each of them (as has been used by the parties for years) - the result is that there is no choice but to determine that each tenant "receives" a plot of a different size.  The situation on the ground cannot allow plots of exactly the same size, as this will mean that part of the apartment itself of some of the tenants will not be "in their own area", or that some of the tenants will have to "give" part of their garden to another tenant, or that all the yards and gardens will all be common property of everyone, and everyone will be able to make use of all the common property (and it is clear that the parties are not interested in this).  From the photos attached to the expert's opinion, it appears that each tenant has cultivated his own yard and it is clear that the intention is for the exclusive use of each garden and not to turn all the yards into common property, or to oblige one of the tenants to demolish his garden and yard and give "part" of it to another tenant, when we recall once again that the actual uses and boundaries of the yards are in the same state as they are today for more than 30 years, and this was also the case in 2005, more than 20 years ago, when Goita bought their house.
86. In paragraph 6.15 of the expert's opinion, he states that according to the drawing he prepared, and in light of the difficulty created by the "diversion of the building" that is not located in the middle of the lot, the lots that should be allocated to each of them are different in size, so that the lot that is supposed to be Marzouk's will be 201 square meters, Goltz's lot will be 264 square meters, Shitrit's lot will be 233 square meters, and Goita's lot will be 194 square meters. Indeed, Goita's lot is the smallest, and there is a real gap between it and the largest lot, Goltz's, and indeed the division does not reflect 25% of the lot, but despite all this - in the special circumstances here, no solution was found for the dissolution of the partnership except by registering a condominium, with each of them having a plot of a different size, since any other solution would cause a more serious failure, and there is no better way to dissolve the partnership.
87. The expert, the receiver, the supervisor, and the Planning and Building Committee all confirmed that the registration could be carried out even though the division of the lots was not uniform. The trial court was persuaded, after hearing the witnesses for a long time, and made clear factual determinations in the partial judgment (which he reiterated in the final judgment) that Goita knew that the lot they had purchased was the lot in its current size, knew exactly the size of the built-up area and knew the size of the yard - and the conclusion is that the registration of lots of different sizes should be ordered.  No less important is that all the other parties agree to such a registration, and have seen that the gaps in the size of the lots between Marzouk, Sheetrit and Goltz are no less significant (and in fact there is almost no gap between Marzouk's lot and Goita's lot).  In other words, the other parties, who can also ostensibly claim a division of 25% of the plots exactly, do not claim this, but rather adopt the division of the plots of different sizes, on the basis of the fact that each of them purchased the lot, the house and the garden as they are (and claims were also raised that the price was different due to the different size).
88. It should also be added that even if there was room to consider balancing the gap in the size of the lots, and given that these are courtyards and a part that serves as an access path, from a financial point of view - a review of the expert's opinion (paragraphs 7.3 and 7.4) shows that we are dealing with possible balancing payments that are not high, and we see that the expert calculated that if the lots were registered in accordance with his proposal according to which Goita's lot would be 194 square meters - they would be entitled to a payment of ILS 20,900 (and from Marzouk they would be entitled to a payment of about 15 NIS). ILS 800, while determining that Goltz and Shitrit are the "payers", but if his recommendation is accepted according to which the move to the rear lots will be defined as an interest of the right of passage in the area of the owners of the front lots, then Goita's area will be 223 square meters (and not 194 square meters) and they will be ostensibly entitled to a balance of ILS 15,800 (and similarly, Marzouk's lot will also be in an area of 258 square meters and not "only" 201 square meters, and they will not be entitled to balance payments).  In other words, since it has been defined that in the front lots, the right of way will be given only to the vehicles of those who live in the rear lots, but the area will remain the property of the owners of the front lots, Goita's lot is not as they claim.
89. To this should be added the expert's determination, in paragraph 7.5 of the opinion, a determination that was not contradicted, according to which "the value of the balance payments is at a minimal rate of the value of the lots, as their distribution was agreed; In my understanding, with regard to the marginality of the balance payments together to the value of the lots, the balance payments are included in the range of the accepted deviation of the market value, according to appraisal criteria."
90. And if that were not enough, it should be seen that in the framework of the present appeal, no arguments were raised by Goita demanding to receive the balance payments, and certainly not in a clear manner.
91. Therefore, Goita's arguments regarding the fact that it was not possible to order the registration of the condominium as it was done in light of the proprietary infringement of their rights should be rejected.

The legality of the registration of the condominium in light of construction irregularities -

92. Goita raised arguments regarding the fact that it was not possible to order the registration of the house as a condominium because there were construction deviations relative to the original building permits, by reference to section 42 of the Land Law and section 143 of the Planning and Building Law. They specify that it is forbidden to register the building as a condominium because it was built in contravention of the zoning plan and the building permit, and that 3 apartments were added to it on the colonnaded floor without a permit.
93. The trial court ruled that there was no impediment to carrying out the registration, and that the reference to the building irregularities was reflected in the registration of the warning note in accordance with Regulation 29, regarding the building's non-conformity with the permit.
94. It should be clarified that indeed, as Goita points out, and there is no dispute about this, there are significant construction irregularities in all the properties (see, for example, the expert's answers in the Kama file dated October 19,2021, to the clarification questions addressed to him, where he details in the table in section 1.2 all the expansions that were carried out in all four units, including the closure of column floors, the closure of open and covered foyer spaces, the closure of open balconies and the use of closed spaces, including extensions in large areas on behalf of Goita themselves; and see also the documents submitted to the Kama file on July 8,2025, which include the Supervision Report detailing exactly all the extensions, additions, closures, etc. - of all of them).
95. It is also clear that the registration of the condominium, despite the deviations, does not "legitimize" the construction of the extensions and deviations, insofar as the construction is illegal - and it was seen that the trial court was careful to note this and clarified that the registration of the condominium does not justify the construction in violation of the permit.
96. However, and as it has been ruled - the registration of the condominium does not become "illegal", as Goita claims, and it is not possible to accept their demand to order the cancellation of the registration (which has already been made) because of those additions or extensions. First, it should be remembered that the trial court heard the position of the professional bodies, including the local committee, who determined that the registration can be carried out in this case (subject to a note by virtue of Regulation 29), since these are not housing units - and we are not convinced that there is a basis for factual intervention in this issue.  It should also be seen that Regulation 29 of the Registration Regulations assumes that there may be situations similar to the situation here, in which it is necessary to register a condominium despite deviations, and this is what the Regulation, entitled "Note on Non-Conformity", instructs:

"29.    (a)      At the request of a planning institution, the Registrar will record a note regarding the non-conformity of a building with the permit granted by the planning institution in accordance with the provisions of the Planning Law.

• (b) A registrar may order the deletion of a note registered as stated in sub-regulation (a), at the request of the planning institution that requested the registration of the note, or at the request of a person interested in that real estate, to which certificates proving that the cause of action for the note has been canceled."

97. Therefore, we accept the trial judge's determination that in the present case, the condominium could have been registered subject to a comment by virtue of Regulation 29 according to which there is a discrepancy between the building in the area and the building permit.

The validity of an "agreed bylaw" signed by "coercion" -

98. It should be recalled that Goita's argument was that the Receiver had drawn up and registered an agreed bylaws "in the dark" and in complete contravention of the provisions of section 62(a) of the Real Estate Law, which requires the consent of all the rights holders for the purpose of attaching parts of the common property to one unit or another. Goita objected to the registration of the agreed articles of association and clarified their position prior to its registration, and therefore their argument is that the trial court erred when approving the conduct of the receiver who, despite their objections, registered the articles of association together with the condominium as they were recorded.
99. Goita's argument that the registration of an "agreed bylaws" is not possible without the voluntary consent of all the partners by virtue of section 62(a) of the Real Estate Law should be rejected. As was clarified in the judgment, the term "agreed articles of association" is a legal-technical concept defined in the law, and it also applies in the case of a forced dissolution of a partnership by the court where there is no other statutory term for an adapted bylaw.  In a situation of dissolution of a partnership, as was the case in this case, the receiver's authority also included the possibility of signing the said articles of association on behalf of the parties, as a derivative of the appointment by the court and of the court's "long hand" to implement the partial judgment.
100. Accepting Goita's approach, according to which their objection could thwart the registration of the articles of association, would have emptied the right given to each partner to sue for the dissolution of a partnership and thwarted the provisions of section 42 of the Land Law, and therefore it must be said that the authority to order the registration of the condominium includes the accompanying power to approve the articles of association that specify the attachments and rights of passage required for the purpose of dissolution.
101. In addition, as Marzouk's counsel argued during the hearing, dissolution of a partnership is a forced proceeding in the first place in which the court exercises the statutory right of each partner to demand the termination of the partnership. Had Goita's position been accepted, according to which attachments cannot be established in the bylaws, a clearly impractical situation would have been created in which the entire area surrounding the buildings would remain open common property.  This impossible situation would have allowed each of the neighbors to roam "freely" within the courtyards and doorways of the others' houses, which is not recommended, and in the specific case here - would perpetuate and exacerbate the shaky neighborly relations and thwart the purpose of the dissolution.
102. Counsel for the respondents also commented that even when a receivership proceeding is carried out for the sale of a property (dissolution of a partnership by way of sale) - the receiver on behalf of the court is authorized to sign any document, agreement or deed in the name of the refusing owner, and without his consent; and an equal decree also applies to the receiver appointed for the purpose of registering a condominium.
103. There is also weight to the fact that the registration of the bylaws as they were registered was in accordance with the requirements of the Land Supervisor, and the previous determinations regarding the need to regulate the access roads to the rear apartments by means of an appropriate provision in the bylaws - and they saw that the director of the engineering department in the Hadera Municipality and the supervisor demanded that the rights of passage and parking be arranged as an integral part of the registration. Therefore, without the Receiver's signature on the agreed bylaws, the approval of the supervisor and the local committee would not have been obtained, and the dissolution of the partnership would not have been possible.
104. As for the ruling to which Goita referred, according to them, from the judgment Other Municipal Applications (Haifa Districts) 52403-09-11 Strolovich v. Lazarovich (February 6,2012), it appears that the court does not have the authority to force the attachment of parts of the common property to units in a condominium by "coercion" and that an agreed bylaw must be "agreed".  It should be seen that in the same matter, in a majority opinion, the District Court ruled that it was not possible to remove parts of the common property and attach them to one of the apartments without consent, but an appeal was filed regarding that judgment and no decision was made there, since the parties there were able to reach understandings and an arrangement (see the judgment in Civil Appeal 1785/12 Strolovich v.  Lazarovich of December 23,2024)).
105. In its ruling, the trial court referred to another case, in which other municipal applications were clarified 10322/03 Lavi v. Streicher (IsrSC 59(6) 449), and found that this judgment supported the fact that there is authority to order the attachment of parts of the common property upon the dissolution of the partnership.  There, the Supreme Court upheld a judgment that ordered the registration of a house as a condominium, while attaching the relative part of the roofs and courtyards to each of the housing units in accordance with the drawing.  It was held that this linkage reflects and realizes the original intention of the parties when purchasing the plot, and that the essence of registration as a condominium in these circumstances is the dissolution of the partnership in the plot by way of division in kind.  With regard to the unused building rights, it was held by a majority opinion that they do not constitute "common property" that can be physically attached, but rather a jointly owned property whose division will be arranged by way of registering a binding contractual declaration in the condominium's bylaws.
106. The Court of First Instance also referred to Civil Appeal 1409/23 Schwartz v. Haddad (October 29,2025), where the Supreme Court ruled that it is preferable toregister articles of association that reflect the actual state of possession that has existed over the years, over another situation - in which the court will allow a party to benefit from a previous erroneous registration in order to receive a "gift from heaven" that it does not deserve.  In that case, the dispute revolved around one room in a building located between two adjacent apartments.  According to the registration in the Condominium Register from 1980, the two apartments were equal in size (about 65 square meters, 3 rooms each).  In practice, near the end of construction in 1972 (when the building was owned by the state and managed by the Amigur Company), the room was subtracted from the Haddad apartment and attached to the Schwartz apartment, so that the Schwartz apartment included 4 rooms (about 78 square meters) and the Haddad apartment included only 2 rooms (about 53 square meters).  Both parties purchased their apartments in 2006 in their actual condition and in accordance with their physical market price.  In 2016, Haddad accidentally discovered the registration deduction and demanded the return of the room, while Schwartz demanded the amendment of the registry in accordance with the situation on the ground.  The District Court rejected Schwartz's claim and accepted Hadad's claim.  It was held that in accordance with the principle of finality of the registry set forth in section 125(a) of the Land Law, the registration constitutes conclusive evidence of its contents.  The court ruled that the amendment of the registry can be done only according to the limited grounds of sections 93-97 of the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (fraud or improper omission/registration of a previously registered right), which did not exist in this case.  The Supreme Court accepted the appeal by a majority opinion, and it was ruled that Schwartz's appeal should be accepted and the registry should be amended.  According to the opinion of the Honorable Justice Grosskopf, this is a "clerical error" under section 95 of the Settlement and Registration Ordinance and did not reflect the true intention at the time of registration.  It was emphasized that the rationales for the finality of the registry are weakened when it comes to the condominium register, as opposed to the regulated land registry itself.  According to the opinion of the Honorable President Amit, the actual registration should be amended, but for a different reasoning, namely that a condominium registration order can be amended by virtue of section 145(a) of the Land Law.  According to the minority opinion, of the Honorable Justice Ronen, the appeal should be granted only partially.  According to her, the claim to amend the registry has long since become obsolete (in 2005), but nevertheless, for considerations of justice, preemption and good faith, and on the basis of the fact that the parties purchased the apartments according to their physical condition and the price was adjusted accordingly, it must be determined that Hadad's ownership of the room is subject to a "real estate license" - i.e., a non-dwelling right to use and possession, permanently fixed and a transfer to third parties in favor of Schwartz.  Thus, in accordance with the majority opinion, the Land Registrar was instructed to amend the condominium registration order, so that the area of the room would be transferred from sub-plot 11 (Hadad's apartment) to sub-plot 4 (Schwartz apartment).  It should be said that the final result there is consistent with the result here, in the sense that the registration of the condominium reflects the division in the area and the actual uses.
107. The Trial Court also mentions Civil Appeal Authority 3251/11 in Yaalostotzky v. Holt (June 9,2014), where an appeal against a judgment of the District Court that ordered the dissolution of a partnership in the land by way of registration of a condominium, despite the objections of some of the parties, was dismissed, and even the judgment there strengthens the conclusion here, even though the data and the disputes were not identical.
108. Therefore, and since the bylaws drafted by the Receiver translated in practice the recommendations of the expert and the partial judgment, while adapting the "enjoyment ties" to the term "right of passage" in the Articles of Association in accordance with the District Court's note, and since the document also includes the regulation of the safe rooms and the attachment of the courtyard areas, in a manner that will reflect the actual state of possession that has existed for decades (and in order to prevent a situation of partnership in the courtyards that would lead to mutual abuse between the neighbors) - it is not necessary to intervene in the preliminary determination to approve the Receiver's actions when she signed the Articles of Association also on behalf of Goita.
109. It should also be clarified that these are bylaws that property owners can change or amend in the future, as long as they reach understandings and as long as the need arises.

Determination of an Usufruct and the Right of Passage of Vehicles for the Benefit of Third Parties

110. Goita further argues that the determination that the right of passage will be granted to Shitrit's vehicles through their lot, also includes the right of passage in favor of the person who owns the adjacent plot, Plot 482, the owners of which were not party to the proceeding at all (hereinafter: "Plot 482"). It was argued that the passage strip in their area, on the western side of the building (which was supposed to be a maximum width of 1.5 meters and was unlawfully "expanded" by the receiver to 1.90 meters), in a total area of 36 square meters of their lot, allows the passage of vehicles to Shitrit's rear apartment and Plot 482, and even allows the parking of vehicles in Goita's lot, and they emphasize that the owners of Plot 482 were not a party to the proceeding and certainly did not demand this remedy.  Goita also argues that the original building permit and the sales contracts do not include any mention of parking or the passage of vehicles in the plot.  Goita further emphasizes that the local committee did not permit parking in the plot, and therefore the significance of the registration of the condominium as it was carried out is to approve illegal "pirate parking".  Moreover, Goita argues that the determination of an "usufruct interest" in the form of a right of passage in the land is not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court.  According to them, an action concerning the registration or cancellation of an usufruct is not classified as a claim regarding "possession and use" under section 51(a)(3) of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, but rather constitutes a "other claim in real estate", which is within the residual jurisdiction of the District Court.  They emphasize that this remedy, of granting an usufruct for the purpose of moving vehicles, was not requested at all in the original pleadings by any of the respondents (including the Shitrit family), and therefore its granting constitutes an extension of a prohibited front and exceeding authority.
111. The respondents argued that there should be no interference in the preliminary rulings regarding the adoption of the expert's position that the solution must include a right of passage for the purpose of the vehicles of the tenants in the rear houses arriving with their vehicle from the road to their lots.  They also argued that the trial court had the authority to hear and decide any question required for the purpose of dissolving the partnership, since the substantive authority is determined according to the "remedy test" (when the main remedy was the dissolution of the partnership in the land), and the derivative conclusion that the reality obligation was to allow the transfer with the vehicles to the apartments of Goltz and Sheetrit.  The respondents reiterate that the building, which was built around 1987, was built as a "rectangle" with two front apartments and two rear apartments, and that the only way to reach the rear apartments with vehicles from the road (Goldenberg Street) was through a physical passage on both sides of the building, through the area of Goita to the west and through the area of Marzouk to the east.  The respondents emphasize that this is a practical and necessary solution that reflects the reality and the actual use for decades without objection.  With regard to Plot 482, the respondents clarify that since the building was built in a "deviation" and not in the center of the lot, a situation was created in which the western passage path is physically shared by the two plots (481 and 482).  However, in the condominium bylaws of Plot 482 (registered in 2017, section 5 of the bylaws) there is an explicit reciprocal clause in which the owners of the rights declare that the passage serves as a common road for them and the owners of Plot 481, and agree in advance to register mutual interest interests.  Therefore, the registration of the identical clause in the bylaws of Plot 481 is intended to prevent future disputes, to ensure the continuation of the actual use, and to prevent a situation in which Goita blocks the passage in their vehicles (as they did in the past).
112. We are of the opinion that even Goita's arguments on this issue do not lead to a conclusion regarding the acceptance of the appeal and the cancellation of the registration of the condominium. First, it should be seen that indeed the owners of Plot 482 are not a party to the proceeding and no remedy was requested on their behalf regarding the passage through Goita's lot, but such a move was requested in the framework of the Statement of Claim on behalf of the parties to the case.  It should be recalled that the plaintiffs were Merzok - who referred to a proposed sharing agreement, which includes clear determinations regarding the right of passage to the rear lots (an agreement agreed upon by the parties except Goita, and therefore it was not signed), and requested remedies in accordance with that agreement.  In other words, the statement of claim included claims regarding the rights of passage to the rear lots, as part of the demand to order the dissolution of the partnership.  It should also be seen that already in the first hearing in the trial court, Mr. Goita testified in the transcript (hearing of June 21,2018, p.  4, lines 20-32) regarding the passage of the vehicles, which was always through his lot to the rear apartment, of Sheetrit.  Thus, the issue of the passage of the vehicles was "on the table" from the first pre-trial meeting in the trial case - and the parties raised many arguments regarding the matter during all the proceedings.  Therefore, it is difficult to say that no remedy was requested regarding the arrangement of the move, or that the arrangement of the move is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court (and there is certainly a difficulty in the fact that the argument is raised by Goita in the framework of the present appeal).
113. However, it should be clarified that the preliminary determination was regarding passage in the strip that passes through Goita's lot, and not with respect to the construction of parking in favor of Sheetrit or others (including the owners of the rights in Lot 482) on Goita's lot.

The Receiver's Conduct and Allegations of Fraud, Deception and Retroactive Approval

114. All of Goita's claims regarding the fact that the Knesset misled the local committee or the supervisor - whether by submitting contradictory drawings or by registering the condominium before receiving prior approval from the court, should be rejected outright.
115. All the determinations of the trial court regarding that there was no deception, forgery or fraud on the part of the receiver, are clear factual determinations and we will not interfere in them.
116. The severity of serious allegations, which amount to forgery and fraud, against a person appointed by the court as an objective professional body, without any support or basis (and needless to say, the burden of proof regarding claims of this kind is higher than usual).
117. In more detail - the claims regarding the significance of the discrepancies between the expert's table and the receiver's documents should be specifically rejected, i.e., the claim that the discrepancies indicate "forgery" or "fraud" or an attempt at deception. As explained - the discrepancies stem from the actual situation, the gaps are negligible, the expert noted in advance that when a sketch is prepared it is likely that there will be gaps - and the distance between the existence of gaps and the attribution of forgery and fraud to the receiver - is a long and substantial distance.  Similarly, the claim that the receiver forged documents and added data in her own handwriting, or that she changed data regarding distances or areas in the records should be rejected.  These claims have also not been proven, and we should regret that the claims arose as they arose.
118. The only difficulty that did indeed relate to the fact that the registration was carried out before the final judgment was rendered. The trial court addressed this, clarified that it had approached the Knesset and asked for an explanation of the conduct, and even detailed that it accepted her explanations regarding the mistake that was as far as she was concerned.  There is no reason to doubt those explanations, and there is no reason to intervene in the preliminary determination that the explanations provide a solution to the difficulty that has arisen; and in any event, and here the main thing is - when at the time the judgment was rendered there was approval by the Supervisor and there was approval by the local committee - it cannot be said that the aforesaid necessitates the conclusion to which Goita is directed.  In other words, the misunderstanding does not lead to the annulment of the Receiver's action and the cancellation of the registration of the condominium, as Goita requests.

The legal expenses imposed on Goita -

119. The last issue mentioned in the notice of appeal is the cumulative expenses imposed on Goita in the trial court. According to them, this is more than ILS 250,000 cumulatively, including expenses in the framework of interim decisions, including expenses in favor of the receiver.  In the judgment in the first appeal regarding the partial judgment, it was determined that the expenses imposed there on Goita should be reduced to 50% of the amount awarded, and a similar determination was made in the supplementary judgment as well.  Moreover, it was not found to interfere with the award of costs, whether the expenses determined in the partial judgment (in respect of which the appeal had already been partially accepted), or the expenses in favor of the receiver in the framework of the final judgment (in the sum of ILS 7,000 in favor of the receiver only).

Conclusion -

120. In light of all of the above, the appeal was dismissed. We deeply regret that it was not possible to promote dialogue between the parties, in a manner that would lead to cooperation between the property owners, since beyond the fact that they are neighbors, they have common interests in the properties.  It is to be hoped that the parties will find the way to respectful neighborly relations in the future.
121. With regard to the expenses of the trial, we award expenses in the total amount of ILS 6,000 in favor of Respondents 1-5 together, in the total amount of ILS 6,000 in favor of Respondents 6-7 together, and in the total sum of ILS 6,000 in favor of Respondent 9. In other words, expenses in the total amount of ILS 18,000, which will be divided among the three "groups" of the Respondents, each of which will be presented separately.  The Secretariat will transfer the sums awarded to the relevant parties, through their representatives, out of thedeposit deposited to secure the expenses.  The remainder - a resident for the appellants through their counsel.

Granted today, August 12,2026, in the absence of the parties.