Labor Dispute (Tel Aviv) 5587-11-22 Tzala Cohen – Ankori Factories (1971) Ltd. - part 5

Dismissal Notice

88. The plaintiff was summoned to a meeting with Mr. Klar on May 30, 2022, during which he informed her that it had been decided to terminate her employment with the defendant. This conversation was recorded by the plaintiff.[47] Klar stated to the plaintiff that he had read the minutes of the hearing and thought about it a lot over the weekend, adding, "On the one hand, I know that you are a very, very good teacher professionally. And I also experienced it as I told you last week, and also from the reactions of children, but at the same time I feel that there are quite large gaps in our understanding of what it is, what it might be, what is criticism, what is conduct, what is cooperation? I think it is difficult, it is very difficult for you within the workplace as well. And so, unfortunately, and I really say unfortunately, because as you know there is no teacher, so I think it is better that we separate at this stage. First of all, I wish you a lot of success, first with the birth, that he will be healthy, that is the most important thing. "Afterwards, Mr. Klar made sure with the plaintiff that there was no need to involve the students at the end of her work and the participation of the staff members – he left it to her discretion. In other words, Mr. Klar knew that the plaintiff was pregnant and nevertheless chose to fire her, without hesitation and without the approval of the supervisor.

He also agreed that the plaintiff was an excellent teacher, but that her dismissal at the end of the day was in light of the lack of cooperation, without elaborating on this matter. 

89. At the end of the conversation, Mr. Klar received a dismissal letter from the plaintiff, including the minutes of the hearing, and when asked if she would be paid "compensation for a pregnant woman, there is a letter from the supervisor," he replied in the affirmative: "There is, there is a letter, everything is in it. Everything."
90. The dismissal letter that was given to the plaintiff dated the conversation (May 30, 2022) and was titled: "Notice of termination of employment," in which Mr. Klar stated as follows: "After considering your words at the hearing, I hereby inform you that I have reached the conclusion that despite being an excellent teacher of education, the principles of work at Studio Ankori are unclear and do not suit you. In light of the difficulties and challenges that arose in several sectors in the process of your absorption at the studio, and since it is not clear from your words that you understand the gaps we have discussed, or take any responsibility in order to bridge them, there is unfortunately no choice but to terminate your employment as a teacher at Studio Ankori at the end of the current school year (2023).
91. The wording of the dismissal letter and the reasons for the dismissal are vague and unclear. From the letter of summons to the hearing, the minutes of the hearing and the transcript of the hearing – we get the impression that the plaintiff fully understood the first two reasons for terminating her employment and dealt with them in a matter-of-fact and clear manner. At the same time, in the dismissal letter, Mr. Klar did not argue and did not elaborate on how he dealt with the plaintiff's answers to these two reasons and what led him to reject her answers and decide to dismiss her. Mr. Klar also did not elaborate on how he considered the plaintiff's response to his claims of lack of trust, and how she led him to her dismissal. We are of the opinion that since this issue has not been exhausted and during the hearing Mr. Klar announced that he was willing to examine it again, it would have been appropriate, at the very least, to have responded to the plaintiff on this matter, even though he chose to dismiss her. We are under the impression that Mr. Klar did not find a solution that would satisfy the plaintiff. He understood that not providing detailed pay slips and not paying overtime pay and filling a place as demanded by the plaintiff would not satisfy her and would cause a lack of trust and disputes between her and him, and therefore he decided to fire her.
92. In these circumstances, we determine that the reason for the dismissal is the plaintiff's demand to receive detailed pay slips and overtime pay and to fill a place. The defendant's refusal to give the plaintiff these rights caused anger and disappointment on her part and a sense of distrust on the part of the plaintiff in her administration, but this is for a reason rooted in him and the defendant. It is not rooted in the plaintiff.
93. The defendant therefore chose to fire the plaintiff, only because she insisted on her right to understand the salary components that make up her salary, every month, and to receive details on the pay slip as is customary for teaching employees, as well as her demand to receive compensation for overtime work. These demands led the defendant to the conclusion that she was not suitable to teach at the school, despite the fact that she was a good teacher, with great knowledge and access to the students.

The Dismissal Procedure - Unlawful Dismissal

94. The defendant claimed that her teachers' salary, including the plaintiff's salary, is paid in accordance with every law, is also examined and audited by the teachers' union, and that the defendant has no legal obligation to produce pay slips that correspond to those of the official educational institutions.[48] The defendant denied the plaintiff's claim that there is no detail in the pay slips of the salary components and the benefits paid to her, and claimed that the plaintiff received a detailed pay slip, as is customary for her, which even meets the requirements of the provisions of the Wage Protection Law. She also claimed that she was not obligated to detail the pay slips beyond the details that appear in them. Therefore, the plaintiff was told that the structure of the pay slip would not be changed.
95. We are unable to accept these arguments of the defendant.
96. According to the ruling, "various provisions of the law impose on the employer registration duties, the purpose of which is to ensure the transparency and certainty of the employee's terms of employment, both those required by the law and the extension orders, and those that are the result of an agreement between the employee and the employer." "The purpose of the registration duties imposed on the employer is to create certainty and transparency with regard to the working conditions and the employee's rights, thereby reducing the information gaps between the employee and the employer; to enable the employee to monitor the payment of his rights and to check whether he has been paid in full; to create tools that will enable supervision of the implementation and enforcement of the employee's rights, to the extent that they have been violated. ([49] Kaplan Judgment, paras. 10-11).
97. Section 24 of the Wage Protection Law states that the employer must provide the employee with a pay slip. Section 1 of the Law states that the pay slip shall include the items included in the addendum to the Law.
98. Section 5(3) of the addendum to the Wage Protection Law states that a pay slip must include –

"Other payments, in addition to the regular salary, including overtime pay and weekly rest, work productivity, convalescence pay, vacation pay, sick pay, payment on account of remuneration for reserve duty and the balance of such remuneration, etc.; Regarding payments as stated in this paragraph, the type of payment, the number of units for which it was paid – if paid by units – and the amount of the payment must be specified in respect of payments as stated in this paragraph; "

99. The plaintiff's pay slips did not specify overtime pay, place-up pay, trip concentration compensation, education compensation, and double degree pay. In addition, no salary was listed according to the Oz for Consideration plan and no salary was listed according to the Old World Plan. There is no dispute that the plaintiff is entitled to these wages and benefits. In their conversation of April 6, 2022, Mr. Klar agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to these salaries and benefits, but did not know how they were calculated.
100. Moreover, Mr. Klar explained to the plaintiff that her salary was made up of her profile and his report[50] , but did not present the report and did not show that the plaintiff did not work overtime or did not change places or did not work on her days off.
101. In these circumstances, we are able to determine that the defendant did not comply with the provisions of the Wages Protection Law.
102. In addition, Section 11 of the State Education Law, 5713-1953 stipulates that:

 "The Minister may prescribe, in regulations, procedures and conditions for the declaration of unofficial institutions as recognized educational institutions, for the leadership of the basic plan therein, for their management, for supervising them, and for the State's support for their budgets, if and to the extent that the Minister decides on the support."

103. By virtue of this authority, the State Education Regulations (Recognized Institutions), 5714-1953 (hereinafter – the Recognized Institutions Regulations) were enacted, in which criteria were set for the recognition of an educational institution as a recognized non-official institution, such as the defendant. Regulation 3(a) of these Regulations states as follows:

"An educational institution shall not be declared a recognized institution unless the following conditions are met:

• ...

 (6) The salaries of the principal of the institution, the teaching staff, and the service and administrative employees of the institution, according to the rates and rules that were customary in official educational institutions that are not included in the new program, and in educational institutions in high school – according to the collective agreements that apply to all educational institutions in high school owned by a local education authority, and in a special education institution, with the exception of a special education classroom – according to the lessons and rules customary in official special education educational institutions included in the new program;"

104. The National Court in Civil Appeal (National) 203/09 Agudat Yisrael Kindergarten Authority - Simcha Bossi et (October 2, 2011) (hereinafter –  the Bossi Judgment) held that a recognized educational institution that is not official, such as the defendant, operates in a "normative duality". In other words, it operates as a public body and its activity in the fields of private law, including its relations with its employees, is subject to increased duties of fairness and good faith. Its obligation to comply with the provisions of Regulation 3(a) of the Recognized Institutions Regulations, and in particular the provision of Regulation 3(a)(6) of these Regulations, is towards the general public, including employees of the recognized non-official institution. The denial of a recognized educational institution that is not official to pay salaries to its employees as is customary in formal education, while at the same time receiving financial benefits whose purpose, inter alia, is to assist in the financing due to the employees – will stand in complete contradiction to the duties of increased fairness and good faith to which it is obligated according to the doctrine of normative duality.
105. In our case, the defendant argued that the wages and conditions of employment of her teachers correspond to those of the teaching staff in official educational institutions as they are in accordance with the collective wage agreements signed by the state (which do not apply directly to the defendant). The defendant did not prove this claim and did not even present the agreements claimed before us. The defendant did not give notice to the employee and her pay slip is "silent" on this matter. The defendant also did not argue or detail the wage components to which the plaintiff was entitled in comparison to the wage components to which teaching employees in official educational institutions are entitled.
106. It is precisely in view of the plaintiff's claim that the pay slip is unclear, and that despite her appeals to Mr. Klar, and despite inquiries he made himself, and despite her application to the salary accountant, she was unable to understand from the pay slip what salary components she was entitled to and whether she actually received them, the defendant would have been expected to specify clearly and unequivocally, in the framework of the statement of defense, her affidavits and/or summaries, what are the salary components to which the plaintiff was entitled. The fact that the defendant refrained from doing so says Darshani! and testifies to unfair and bad faith conduct towards the plaintiff.
107. The defendant also did not see fit to testify with her payroll accountant, despite her claim that the plaintiff should have contacted the payroll accountant in order to clarify her claims regarding the pay slips. Her choice not to bring the accountant to testify works against her.
108. Instead, the defendant testified to her CEO, Ms. Osnat Haber Cotton, who already at the beginning of her affidavit stated as follows: "Throughout the entire period of employment, the plaintiff received a pay slip, as is customary in Ankory, and which, according to legal advice, complies with the provisions of the Wage Protection Law and there is no need for further details."
109. Even in the conversation that took place between the CEO and the plaintiff on June 1, 2022[51], after the plaintiff's dismissal, it became clear that the CEO had no idea how the plaintiff's salary was calculated (see details of the conversation below) and knowing clearly that this was the reason for the plaintiff's dismissal – she did not bother to update and find out how the plaintiff's salary was calculated prior to the submission of her affidavit and testimony. In her testimony, the CEO did not know how and what components the plaintiff's salary was structured.
110. In support of her claim that she is not obligated to specify in her employees' pay slips details beyond that which appears therein, the defendant referred to a judgment given in the Beersheba Regional Court (Labor Dispute 21107-05-18 Hannah Whitman - The Independent Education Center for the Execution of a Claim in the Writ of Execution and Schools (October 12, 2020). This judgment deals with a claim of placement in a position and the court ruled that this matter is not included in Regulation 3(a)(6) of the Recognized Institutions Regulations. In our opinion, this judgment is irrelevant and does not support the defendant's claim. This court recently ruled that "the box adopted by the proposer of the regulations: 'as is customary in official education' adopts all the rules that apply to the employment of teachers in the state education, whether they are anchored in writing in the Director-General's Circulars or in procedural provisions, or whether they are actually implemented." (Tel Aviv Region) 9577-09-21 Elisheva Ynet - The Independent Education Center for the Execution of a Claim in the Writ of Execution and Schools (September 10, 2025)). We are able to accept this position.
111. Regarding the actual implementation of detailed pay slips, in which all the components of the salary to which the plaintiff is entitled, we can learn from the pay slips that the plaintiff received from her previous place of employment, through schools.[52]
112. From all of the above it therefore emerges that the defendant is obligated to detail all the components of the pay slips that it issued to the plaintiff, and that when it did not do so, it acted unlawfully.
113. With regard to overtime pay and place-filling, the plaintiff claimed that she worked on days off and that she was entitled to overtime pay. This is supported by the attendance reports marked by the plaintiff[53]. The defendant did not show otherwise. Thus, it was also appropriate for the defendant to detail this in a separate line in the pay slips, and since it was not stated in this way, the pay slips were drawn up illegally.
114. The plaintiff did not ask for compensation for illegal pay slips. Instead, she claimed that due to her insistence on her right to receive detailed pay slips in accordance with the law, overtime pay and filling a place, she was fired and therefore her dismissal was unlawful.
115. When we have reached the conclusion that the letter of summons to the hearing was prepared by Mr. Klar before he held a meeting with the plaintiff on May 24, 2022 and before he heard her position regarding her continued employment with the defendant; When we have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was fired because she insisted on these rights and not for the reasons stated in the letter of summons to the hearing (this conclusion is supported by the defendant's refusal to detail in her pleadings the components of the plaintiff's salary and even in the CEO's conversation with the plaintiff on June 1, 2022) – we determine that the hearing held for the plaintiff was ostensibly conducted. We are not persuaded that Mr. Klar considered the plaintiff's answers during the hearing for the reasons stated in the letter of summons to the hearing, and we are under the impression that the decision made by Mr. Klar to dismiss the plaintiff was made even before the hearing was held. From all of this, we have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was unlawfully dismissed and therefore entitled to compensation.
116. The plaintiff claimed non-pecuniary compensation for unlawful dismissal, as well as compensation for mental anguish and breach of duties by virtue of a bad faith employment relationship. We are of the opinion that the reasons for the two types of compensation overlap, and therefore we have found that one compensation should be awarded in relation to these two components of the claim in the sum of NIS 50,000.
117. Unlawful Dismissal - Contrary to the Provisions of the Women's Employment Law

 Theplaintiff was fired when she was nine months pregnant in violation of the provisions of  the Women's Employment Law

114. There is no dispute that the plaintiff was dismissed as early as May 30, 2022, in a dismissal letter from that day entitled: Notice of termination of employment[54] . In this letter, Mr. Klar noted that "there is unfortunately no choice but to terminate your employment as a teacher at Ankori Studio at the end of the current school year (2023). He added: "Please see this notice as advance notice of dismissal, as required by law."
115. 115. Section 9(a) of the Women's Employment Law states that:

       "An employer shall not dismiss an employee who is pregnant and has not yet embarked on a period of maternity and parenthood except with a permit from the Minister of Labor and Welfare, and the Minister shall not permit such dismissal if the dismissal is, in his opinion, in connection with pregnancy; The provisions of this subsection shall apply to both a permanent employee and a temporary or temporary employee, provided that the employee has worked for the same employer or in the same workplace for at least six months. "

116. There is no dispute that at the time of the aforesaid dismissal letter to the plaintiff on May 30, 2022, the defendant did not have a permit from the Commissioner of the Women's Employment Law at the Ministry of Labor (hereinafter – the Commissioner) to dismiss the plaintiff. There is also no dispute that at that time the defendant did not submit to the Supervisor an application for the granting of such a permit. As detailed above, Mr. Klar even informed the Plaintiff that there was an application to the Supervisor, even though he did not do so.
117. In these circumstances, we are able to determine that the plaintiff was fired in contravention of the provision of section 9(a) of the Women's Employment Law.
118. The National Labor Appeal Court 23169-10-18 Araya Netsanet Malaki - Tirza Pastry Ltd. (23.10.2019) (hereinafter – Judgment) ruled that the decision to dismiss a pregnant employee is invalid unless a permit is obtained from the supervisor And in advance.  The decision to dismiss will take effect only after the permit is granted.  "It follows from the aforesaid that the king's way is, therefore, to obtain a permit and only after that the actual termination of the employee's employment." (ibid.). And the National Court also ruled there:

            "A rule of thumb in our case law is that dismissal without obtaining a permit from the supervisor is contrary to the law and therefore is essentially null and void. This court has already ruled that a pregnant employee who was dismissed in violation of the law is entitled to continue her work, and alternatively, if the employer ceases to employ her, she is entitled to receive wages for the period in which she was deprived of her due to her dismissal as aforesaid (See, for example: Labor Appeal (National) 1334/02 Heli Nosetsky vs. State of Israel, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport (December 7, 2004); Labor Appeal (National) 1138/02 Dana Shani - Start-Net Ltd. (30.04.2002); Labor Appeal (National) 285-09 Prof. Ariel Ben Amar Dental Services and Investments Ltd."M. - Ada Feldman (December 28, 2010)."

119. Since the defendant did not have a permit from the supervisor at the time she fired the plaintiff on May 30, 2022, the plaintiff's dismissal is essentially null and void.
120. While there is no legal impediment to holding a hearing for a pregnant employee before dismissal – dismissal while the plaintiff is pregnant and dismissal during the protected period of 60 days – are prohibited unless the defendant has a permit from the supervisor (Sections 9(a) and 9(c)(1a) of the Women's Employment Law). Dismissal during maternity and parenthood are prohibited in any case and the supervisor has no authority to permit them (Section 9(c)(1) to the Women's Employment Law).
121. The plaintiff gave birth at a good time on June 20, 2022. Only on July 10, 2022, while the plaintiff was in the period of birth and parenthood, did the defendant apply to the supervisor for a permit to fire the plaintiff and was rejected for lack of authority[55]. In other words, the defendant did not have a permit from the supervisor to fire the plaintiff.
122. In these circumstances, the dismissal of the plaintiff on 31.5.2022, 31.8.2022, 2.12.2022, and not on 18.12.2022 has no effect (see the dismissal letters of 30.5.2022 and 31.5.2022, [56] see correspondence between the defendant's payroll accountant, Ms. Lilach Mizrahi, and the plaintiff from July [57]2022).
123. At the end of the day, only on February 18, 2023, i.e., at the end of the 60-day protected period, the plaintiff was fired, in coordination with her (see Ms. Mizrahi's email dated July 21, 2022[58] ).
124. The defendant's claim that she sought to inform the plaintiff as early as the end of May 2022 about the termination of her employment in order to enable her to prepare for the next school year, and in the defendant's formulation: "to the implications of the possibility of separation of the parties". This intention does not exempt her from lawful conduct. Moreover, this intention did not assist the plaintiff in view of the date on which the plaintiff gave birth and her right to a period of maternity and parenthood of 26 weeks (section 6(a) of the Women's Employment Law).
125. In our opinion, there is also irrelevance to the defendant's claim that in a conversation that took place between the defendant's CEO, Ms. Osnat Haber Cotton, and the plaintiff on June 1, 2022, the former understood that the plaintiff did not intend or wish to continue working for the defendant under the control of the chain or the school management, and that in no case would she return to work for the defendant, including not during the protected period at the end of her maternity leave, so that the desire for separation is mutual. Beyond the plaintiff's denial of what was said, as detailed above, of the CEO's version, after receiving the statement of claim, she reached the conclusion that it is possible that she did not understand the plaintiff[59]
126. After the plaintiff was given the amended dismissal letter dated May 31, 2022, she was summoned to a conversation with the CEO, Ms. Osnat Haber Cotton, on June 1, 2022. This conversation was recorded by the plaintiff.[60] The purpose of this conversation after the plaintiff's dismissal is unclear.
127. The CEO began by saying that the purpose of the conversation was to clarify the plaintiff's anger and say goodbye, but in practice it is clear from the transcript of the conversation that the purpose was to justify the defendant's conduct and even to try to convince the plaintiff of the defendant's justice. Thus, although at the beginning of the conversation the CEO reiterated that if the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for overtime work, it would be paid to her, in practice she explained that the defendant was working in the offset method or as Mr. Klar put it: The give-and-take method This is because a clear and accurate calculation of working hours is very complex and complicated. The CEO made it clear to her that even though the teachers in the defendant are required to sign an attendance card – in practice no one checks it, and if a careful examination of the plaintiff's actual working hours had been carried out – she would have seen that she was not entitled to a salary. At the same time, such an examination was not presented to the plaintiff. In other words, the defendant's CEO tried to convince the plaintiff that the defendant was acting in accordance with the law, but even in this framework she failed to provide a clear explanation of the manner in which the plaintiff's salary was calculated. This did not prevent her from claiming, without examination, that the plaintiff's salary had been paid in full[61].
128. The CEO was unable to make a clear and detailed calculation of the plaintiff's salary according to her data, and did not even bother to check whether the overtime hours claimed by the plaintiff were offset by the standard hours in which the plaintiff did not work before us as well. This is despite her claim that the data is "offset". In the affidavit, the CEO also evadedGive details and explanation toThe plaintiff's pay slip and even claimed that the plaintiff did not point to salary components that were not paid to her, while in her conversation with the plaintiff on June 1, 2022, the plaintiff told her that according to calculations, she was not paid hundreds of shekels in her salary. Lack of detail or calculation, did not hinder the CEO from declaring that "..I have no reason to assume that her salary was paid unduly." - This As mentioned, without any check. Also Her statement that the plaintiff did not submit details regarding the alleged overtime hours As detailed above, Baseless.  The plaintiff also told her in their conversation on June 1, 2022, that she had submitted such a table to Mr. Klar and he refused to receive a letterThe. Similarly, the plaintiff stated that she detailed the hours for which she did not receive salary in the framework of the proceeding, and in support the plaintiff attached attendance reports that she received from the defendant as part of the document disclosure process.[62]
129. As for the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's conduct in this conversation with the CEO was understood by the latter as a clear statement on her part that she did not know or wish of the plaintiff Continue to work for the defendant under the management of the chain or the school administration and that under no circumstances will you return to work for the defendant andThe desire for separation is mutual – our impression of the recorded conversation is different. The conversation took place after the plaintiff had already been fired, and therefore it is not clear how the CEO got the impression that the plaintiff was not interested in continuing to work for the defendant. Throughout the conversation, the plaintiff was not asked if she wanted to return to work and was not offered to return to work. On the contrary, in view of her insistence on her demands and since the CEO was unable to convince the plaintiff that the defendant's path was justified, she was the one who told the plaintiff that if she did not like the system, she could work elsewhere. Hence, this argument of the defendant is also rejected.
130. The defendant claimed that Only After receiving the statement of claim on November 16, 2022, It turned out that there may have been a misunderstanding between the parties andTherefore On November 23, 2022, and before the plaintiff's maternity leave came to an end, the CEO contacted her To the plaintiff She offered to continue working for the defendant at the end of the period of maternity leave in the 2023-2023 school year, i.e., during the protected period of 60 days, and for this purpose she asked to be summoned for a conversation to examine the possibilities of her placement.
131. A review of the CEO's letter to the plaintiff from [63]23.11.2022 indicates thatN This is the way things are. The letter completely ignores the dismissal notice of May 30, 2022. It reads that the plaintiff agreed to terminate her employment with the plaintiff and therefore it is In a mutual desire for separation The plaintiff was also offered to work during the protected period only.  There is no suggestion in the letter to employ the plaintiff beyond that – which indicates the defendant's intention to dismiss her again after the protected period.
132. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no substance to the defendant's claim that since the plaintiff rejected her offer to work during the protected period, she thwarted her continued employment, and therefore this argument is also rejected.

        Compensation due to dismissal in violation of the Women's Employment Law

141. From all the details it emerges that the defendant fired the plaintiff without a permit from the lawful supervisor and thus violated the provisions of the Section 9 to the Women's Employment Law.
142. The Proper Remedy in Respect of Violation Section 9 The Women's Employment Law is permanent In section 13a(b) This law provides as follows:

          ")1) If the Regional Labor Court finds that the employee who filed a claim was dismissed in violation of the provisions of section 9, the amount of which shall not be less than 150% of the salary to which they were entitled during the qualifying period; However, the court may, for special reasons to be recorded, award compensation in an amount other than it shall determine; With regard to the calculation of wages under this subsection, the provisions of section 13B of the Severance Pay Law, 5723-1963, and regulations under section 13 of the said law, shall apply;

• For the purposes of this subsection, "the qualifying period" means a period that begins on the day of the dismissal or on the day on which the employer knew or should have known of the existence of the grounds for limiting the dismissal, whichever is later, and ends on the earlier of the following:
• The end of the period in which the restriction of such dismissal applies;
• If a dismissal permit is granted in accordance with Section 9 – the date the permit begins to take effect;
• If the employee is returned to work – the day of return to work."

143. The plaintiff claimed monetary compensation for the 60 days in which she was entitled to return to work after the end of her maternity leave in the amount of NIS 20,180. This sum is made up of a last salary of NIS 8,013 multiplied by two months, for a total of NIS 16,026. In addition, contributions to pensions, compensation and a study fund in the total amount of NIS 1,815 per month multiplied by two months, for a total of NIS 3,630. In addition, the accumulation of a convalescence entitlement worth NIS 449 multiplied by 7 days multiplied by 2/12 and a total of NIS 524. The defendant denied the plaintiff's right to this compensation but did not present a calculation on her behalf.
144. Therefore, In the absence of a counter-calculation, we are able to accept the plaintiff's calculations The defendant must pay the plaintiff monetary compensation in the amount of NIS 20,180.
145. We also found it appropriate to obligate the defendant in these circumstances to pay the plaintiff, in addition to the monetary compensation, compensation in the sum of NIS 1,000.
146. As for the non-pecuniary compensation, it should be recalled that the plaintiff was fired on May 30, 2022. The qualifying period is from June 1, 2022 to February 18, 2023. The defendant issued the plaintiff pay slips until August 2022 (inclusive) and it appears that she was paid salary and pension contributions, compensation, and a study fund for these months. In addition, the defendant issued the plaintiff a final account slip in February 2023, in which she paid the plaintiff only convalescence pay. In other words, the defendant did not pay the plaintiff salary and differences for the period from September 1, 2022 to February 18, 2023. Had the plaintiff not been fired, she would have been entitled to full salary during those months, including pension differences, compensation, and a study fund.
147. The defendant's denial of the claim that she violated the provisions of the Women's Employment Law Very outrageous. Given that she herself fired the plaintiff on May 30, 2022, without having permission to do so from the supervisor, she handed her a dismissal letter from that day, and on the same day, Mr. Klar held a farewell meeting with her, during which he explained to her that there was no room to share her dismissal with her students and left it to her discretion whether to share it with the staff. All this with the knowledge and clear understanding that the plaintiff is nine months pregnant and her dismissal could harm her financial situation. The indifference to the plaintiff's dismissal in this situation also arose in her conversation with the CEO on June 1, 2022.

        Moreover, the defendant added sin to the crime in her cynical attempt, it must be said, to first unilaterally postpone the date of the actual dismissal, without understanding that in the absence of a permit from the supervisor, it would not benefit her. She then tried to present a representation as if the dismissal was consensual and with the plaintiff's consent. This is also how her proposal, which came after the filing of the statement of claim, should be viewed with severity, from which it appears that the plaintiff consented to the dismissal while she was pregnant from the outset. This conduct of the defendant is serious, certainly when we are dealing with a pregnant employee, when in her conversations with Mr. Klar she also made it clear that she was interested in continuing to work. 

151. The rule is that "The purpose of the increased compensation prescribed by law, which instructs us that the rate of compensation for an employee whose dismissal is contrary to the law "shall not be less than 150% of the salary to which they would have been entitled during the qualifying period" is to serve as "an effective punitive tool for instilling norms of constitutional rights, protective rights, and legally granted rights for employees, and ensuring their fulfillment in practice. In this context, the purpose of exemplary compensation is twofold: to deter employers from violating the right; and to increase awareness among employees of their rights acquired by law and to motivate them to act to realize those rights that protect their welfare, security and health." (See: Labor Appeal (National) 33680-08-10 Dizengoff Club Ltd. - Yaakov Zuili (16.11.2011)(.
152. In light of all of the above, we find that the defendant should be obligated to pay the plaintiff compensation according to Section 13A(b) to the Women's Employment Law in the amount of NIS 80,000.
153. Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and childbirth
154. The plaintiff claimed that among the defendant's considerations for firing her was the consideration of her pregnancy. According to her, Mr. Klar told her at the time of the summons to the hearing that one of the reasons for which it is difficult to continue employing her in the next school year is that she will be going on maternity leave and therefore she will not work during the entire school year. She further argued that this consideration is prohibited and discriminatory, and that the very fact that it is brought up taints and pollutes the dismissal decision with discrimination.
155. Our impression from all the evidence in the case is that the plaintiff's dismissal came against the background of her demands for detailed pay slips and payment of overtime pay and placement, and this is also what we determined above. The claim of discrimination due to the plaintiff's pregnancy was not expressed in the letter of summons to the hearing, nor in the minutes of the hearing, nor in the transcript of the hearing recorded by the plaintiff.
156. In a conversation on May 24, 2022, Mr. Klar spoke with the plaintiff about the difficulty that he felt the plaintiff was expressing vis-à-vis him and the system, and that in his opinion this was a problematic situation, and in this context he added: "At this stage of the year, you actually have to consider what to do next year, because you go out, you, go to give birth, with God's help, and then there's what happened after that and where it puts us in terms of the rest." The difficulty was the plaintiff's insistence on her demands to receive detailed pay slips and to receive overtime pay and to fill a place, and with this difficulty, in Mr. Klar's opinion, it is necessary to consider what to do in the next school year, whether the plaintiff is pregnant and about to give birth or not. From what we find out that Mr. Klar is not discussingPregnancy and childbirth, but Because the difficulty is The plaintiff's insistence on her demands, and this conduct She is the one whoInna Settling with Policies The defendant creates a difficulty as to the continued employment of the plaintiff.
157. In these circumstances, we find that there was no intention of discrimination on the part of the defendant due to the plaintiff's pregnancy, and the evidence in the case does not show such discrimination, and therefore we reject this claim of the plaintiff.
158. Notice Fee
159. There is no dispute that the plaintiff was fired by the defendant. Since the defendant did not show that she paid the plaintiff advance notice fees, we oblige her to pay the plaintiff in lieu of advance notice fees in the sum of 8,013 ₪ Together with the shekel interest from the date of the end of the protected period (February 18, 2023).

Conclusion

160. The claim is accepted in large part.
161. The defendant will pay the plaintiff the following sums plus linkage and interest differentials from the date of termination of the employment relationship between the parties (February 18, 2023) until the date of actual payment:

• Compensation for failure to give notice to the employee NIS 15,000.
• Salary differential: 5,000 NIS.
• Compensation for Helena Salary - NIS 500.                               
• Compensation for unlawful dismissal - NIS 50,000.
• Compensation for dismissal in violation of the Women's Employment Law (Monetary Law) NIS 20,180.
• Compensation for withholding wages - NIS 1,000.
• Compensation for dismissal in violation of the Women's Employment Law (Non-Monetary Benefit) NIS 80,000.
• Prior notice - 8,013 ₪

163. In view of the outcome of the judgment, we obligate the defendant to pay the plaintiff legal expenses and attorney's fees in a total amount of NIS 20,000, which will be paid within 30 days from the date of publication of the judgment, otherwise linkage and interest differentials will be borne until the actual date of payment.
164. The right to appeal the judgment to the National Court in Jerusalem within 30 days of its receipt.

It was given today, August 13, 2026, in the absence of the parties and will be sent to them.