or to transfer them to other persons so that they can be held on their behalf so that they will no longer be in their custody on the day the order is issued.
Moreover. In modern life, access to a particular object does not necessarily involve physical possession. Sometimes a person can access information that is under his control "at the touch of a button", but not by physically holding it. Documents that people used to hold in a drawer, library, or archive are now replaced, in many cases, by databases on the Internet. For example, bank customers receive ongoing information about transactions in their accounts via the Internet and through the use of an identifier password that allows them, and only them, immediate access to the information as well as its immediate issuance in the form of a document. Similarly, people subscribe to e-mail accounts that can be accessed, via a password, through any computer connected to the Internet, anywhere in the world, and printed and received the information by way of a document. These developments greatly weaken the connection between the accessibility or availability of an object and its physical possession. They teach that the absence of physical possession of the object does not necessarily mean that the lack of accessibility to that object should not necessarily be derived. In these circumstances, in order to fulfill the purpose of section 43 in the circumstances of our lives today, which is to promote the investigation or trial, it is appropriate to interpret section 43 in such a way that an order under it can also extend to objects over which the person to whom the order is directed has control in the sense that he has the power to deliver or display them.
- The appellant did not argue, neither in the early incarnations of the affair nor before us, that some of the documents he was required to produce were not within his control or within his reach (and see also what was stated at p. 9 of the judgment-The Law of a House-District Court in this matter). His arguments were that Not obligated to hand over the documents, whether due to the existence of a right to remain silent (his claim in the previous hearing) or based on the interpretation of the Article 43, Shaal-whereby he is obligated to hand over only documents that are in his physical possession (his claim before us). In this situation, there was room to instruct the appellant to hand over all the documents listed in the orders. This is the obvious result from the accumulation of the following: a. the orders were issued lawfully; b. there is no impediment to the appellant producing the documents; c. the appellant has no claim regarding the fear of self-incrimination of-By submitting the documents.
In light of this result, it is not even necessary that we experience an opinion in the dispute that arose between the parties before us regarding the existence of jurisdiction for the court, the issuer of the order under section 43, to conduct judicial review of the manner and extent of the order and the essence of this power. However, what we have said here has a reservation stemming from an argument raised by the appellant's defense attorney at the end of the hearing. His argument was that although the appellant did not claim throughout the hearings that he was unable to produce the documents requested in the orders, according to him the extent of the appellant's control, at least in part of the