In this procedural format, the committee may hold a preliminary hearing on the application, on the basis of the written only - the Minister's request, the officer's response, to the extent that it was submitted, and the legal advisor's opinion - without summoning the parties to an oral hearing or requiring additional factual clarification. It is superfluous to note that during the hearing that took place before us and in response to the Court's comments in this context, neither the Minister's counsel nor Lavi's counsel disagreed that the Committee (as opposed to the Commissioner) was authorized to examine the Minister's request in the framework of such a summary proceeding (see, for example, the words of Lavi's counsel at p. 30, lines 6-10 of the minutes of the hearing of June 30,2026).
- In what cases can it be expected that the commissioner will bring up the committee's agenda for a discussion of the minister's request in the format of a summary proceeding? Without establishing a closed list of cases, I am of the opinion that these are those cases in which an examination of the application reveals on the face of it that it lacks a factual or legal basis that establishes, even prima facie, grounds for termination of office; or in circumstances in which there is a concern that the submission of the application is tainted by a clear administrative flaw, such as extraneous considerations and a conflict of interest (see also the judge's position on this matter Kabub in paragraph 40 of his judgment in the proceeding that is the subject of the additional hearing). In these situations, there is a clear public interest in the existence of an expedited procedural proceeding that will reduce the possibility that the termination of term of office proceeding will be abused.
- It should be noted here that when the Commissioner comes to examine the appropriate manner of handling a minister's request submitted to him - that is, a choice between a "regular" procedural proceeding and the shortened proceeding - he is expected to be assisted by the relevant legal counsel, who will provide him with an appropriate legal opinion as to the fulfillment of the relevant considerations for choosing the shortened proceeding, as described above. In this context, it should be clarified that it can be expected that the receipt of such a legal opinion will be done quickly appropriate to the sensitive nature of the issue at hand, in a manner that will not lead to an unreasonable delay in convening the committee.
- Thus, the shortened proceeding provides, within the framework of the law, a considerable response to the concern of a "chilling effect" on officers as a result of the existence of a proceeding to terminate their tenure. From a broader perspective, the duty to act with the appropriate speed also derives from the fear that the sword of dismissal hovering over the head of the officer whose term of office is sought to be terminated will be misused. Therefore, it is presumed that all those concerned will be dismissed, including - The commissioner and the committee, of course, but also the minister and the government - that they should act as quickly as possible and all in order to remove the cloud that is hanging over the office holder as soon as possible.
- Conclusion of this section. Although the "chilling effect" cannot establish authority out of thin air, it is still an important consideration that deserves attention. Against this background, we have found that Israel is not widowered. What the Commissioner cannot do alone, he can achieve through the committee in its plenum, in the framework of a preliminary and abbreviated discussion at the Minister's request, on the basis of the Scriptures alone, and while giving appropriate weight to the opinion of the legal counsel. It goes without saying that the meeting of the committee and the preliminary discussion are required to be done as quickly as possible, all with the aim of minimizing as much as possible the negative consequences on the officer that accompany the clarification of the proceeding in his case.
- and with a forward-looking view. The proceeding in question sharpened the need to anchor the rules in a directive that will deal concretely with the process of termination of tenure and not only with the appointment. The Normative Sources Relating to the Procedure Termination of term The ones that exist at this time are missing and leave many open ends. In this regard, it is appropriate that the parties concerned consider the matter as quickly as possible and in a manner that will provide a response to the various issues raised within the framework of the proceeding before us with regard to the termination of the term of office of a senior officer.
Grounds for "acute and ongoing crisis of confidence"
- Now that we have reached this point, and in order that the picture will not be missing, I will briefly address the additional issue in whose shadow the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing - the grounds for termination of the term of office, which deals with "a severe and ongoing crisis of confidence". As stated, this ground is one of the two grounds defined for the termination of the term of office of an officer set forth in Resolution 4062. The judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing included various determinations - both on the part of the judge Elron Both on the part of the judge Kabub - Regarding the interpretation of this ground. Although to a large extent these determinations should not be regarded as explicit halakha in themselves, when we convened in an expanded panel, I nevertheless found room to set the taqla, even briefly, as they were (cf. the discussion A High Court of Justice was added8537/18 Anonymous v. The Great Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem, paragraph 21 of the President's judgment Animals [Nevo] (24.6.2021)). This is the case, as will be explained below, in view of the contradiction that arises from some of the rulings included in the judgment of this Court to previous rulings of this Court.
- At the beginning of the discussion, I will once again put before our eyes the language of section 4.b(2) of Resolution 4062:
")2) The existence of a severe and ongoing crisis of confidence, or the existence of substantial and protracted disagreements between the senior officer and his superiors, which create a situation that prevents efficient and proper functioning."
- Against this background, when he came to delimit the scope of the interpretation of this ground, the judge reasoned Elron In the judgment, the additional consideration was held, inter alia, that:
"In my opinion, in terms of the 'intensity' of the lack of trust, it is indeed clear from the wording of the clause that a consistent crisis of trust of a significant degree of severity is required - as it is written as 'acute and prolonged.' At the same time, trust, by definition, is a subjective term. [...]