In many contexts and in a variety of areas of law, we tend to say that the court does not examine the hearts and kidneys, and this is also true for our own context. Since we are dealing with 'emotion, ' it is certainly understandable that the words 'crisis of confidence' will be used as 'magic words' that disguise the real reason for terminating the requested term. Hence the justification for carefully examining whether the crisis of trust is 'authentic', with the help of certain objective elements, for evidentiary considerations. Nevertheless, trust was and remains a subjective term" (ibid., at paragraph 57 of his judgment).
If so, at the basis of the judge's interpretation Elron The view was that the cause of the "crisis of confidence" should be analyzed in recognition of the subjective nature of the relationship of trust between the minister and the officer. This, to a large extent, is in contrast to the position of the State respondents, who argued that for the purpose of the grounds for termination of office, a "subjective" crisis of trust or an "artificial" crisis of trust is not sufficient, since this approach is liable to render meaningless the independent status of officers who serve as regulators and gatekeepers, and turn them, in practice, into positions of trust.
- On the other hand, the judge Kabub He mainly disagreed with this "subjective" approach, stating, inter alia, that:
"The cause of the crisis of confidence is not based solely on 'matters of the heart'. If this were the case, there would be no reason to call for an objective committee to examine the existence of this ground. It is therefore required that an external party be able to give the impression, on the basis of a proper factual basis, that there are objective reasons for which there is a severe and ongoing mistrust between the minister and the commissioner - between the political and the professional entity. It is clear that this matter is a matter of clear professional matters, within the framework of the law and what is permissible, and not for personal matters or political whims" (ibid., at paragraph 47 of his judgment).
- Taking into account this dispute, I will emphasize that in my view, the interpretive position of the judge Elron raises a great difficulty. This is also true in view of the apparent tension that arises between his approach and other determinations in case law regarding the manner in which the cause of the crisis of trust is interpreted. Thus, already in the matter Head of the Shin Bet - Given about two months before the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing - this court discussed the nature of the grounds for termination of this term. As may be recalled, in the same matter, the government decided to terminate the term of office of the previous head of the Shin Bet, due to allegations of "ongoing professional and personal mistrust". In my judgment on the same matter, I clarified that the claim of a crisis of confidence Inna can be based on the subjective feeling of the relevant elected official. Instead, it must be supported by an evidentiary basis Objectively, which is solid and detailed, which teaches that the source of the loss of trust is professional considerations. Because of their importance to our matter, I will quote the following words:
"Apart from the prime minister's general and unexplained position that in recent months he has 'lost trust' in the head of the Shin Bet and his professional abilities, nothing has been presented to the government. This is not enough. As noted in the past in a similar context, 'a relationship of trust is not a magic word' and the prime minister was obligated to substantiate his claim regarding the loss of trust and even to present evidence or concrete examples that could explain how this trust was lost (HCJ 651/86 Malka v. Minister of Police, IsrSC 40(4) 645,653 (1986))), as noted above, the government had to show that, objectively, the employment relationship between the political echelon and the head of the Shin Bet exceeds the definition of professional and proper employment relations" (ibid., at paragraph 96 of my judgment).