However, this is not the state of affairs in our case.  The government's decision to revote was made only a few days after the government's decision, and it was also given without a legal opinion supporting the move; and in fact, without any change in the factual or legal basis that the government had before it.  Moreover, the government itself noted that its decision was made Without prejudice to the validity of the government's decision And there "Prevention of Lip Abuse" With regard to the claim of a conflict of interest that occurred in the government's decision, and not out of a reconsideration of the merits of the matter.  In these circumstances, it is difficult to view the decision as a re-examination, independent and full examination of the data; in practice, it is a matter of full adoption of the government's decision, in the sense of "Copy-Paste" of an almost technical nature.  It is clear that such a move cannot, in and of itself, cure the flaw in the government's decision, insofar as it relates to the matter of D."R.  Ben Chai-Segev.

149. It should be emphasized: between the complete rejection of Dr. Ben-Hai-Segev's candidacy but due to a conflict of interest that occurred in the government's decision, at one extreme; and the legalization of the appointment in a formal ratification process a few days later by means of the government's decision to re-vote, at the other end - the distance is great.  Between these two extremes there are different intermediate paths, which may, under the appropriate circumstances, neutralize the conflict of interest without necessarily leading to the disqualification of the candidacy.  I do not express any position on this issue, and the matter is presented only with a forward-looking perspective.  Therefore, in the current state of affairs, it would be better for the legal advisors to the government to address the issue and examine what is the proper arrangement, if any, in the case of Dr.  Ben-Hai-Segev.
150. For the avoidance of doubt, it should be clarified that in the circumstances of the case, there was no flaw in Dr. Ben-Hai-Segev's own conduct in this context.  On the contrary, it appears that she was the first to be harmed by the manner in which the government acted.  In fact, there is reason to assume that if the legal counsel had been given sufficient time to address the issue - as requested in the sub-letter to the Attorney General - it would have been possible to prevent and at least reduce the flaw in the proceeding.  However, as stated, this request was rejected.  This is all the more reinforcing given that the request was made during the stormy days of Operation Lion's Roar.  Under these circumstances, when the government chose to move forward with the proceeding without granting the legal advisor a reasonable time to complete its examination - and thus apparently allow him to point out the defect that arises in advance - it has no choice but to complain about the consequences of that haste.
151. To conclude this part, I will note that I do not see the need to address the question of whether the flaw in the government's decision with regard to the appointment of Dr. Ben-Hai-Segev also tarnished the other 14 members of the "incoming" council, and to the extent that the defect stained them, was it cured in the framework of the government's re-voting decision.  This is because, as will be detailed shortly, I have reached the conclusion that the matter of all the candidates should be returned to the committee for re-examination.

From Defects to Remedy

152. We find that the decision of the committee to examine appointments in the matter of Adv. Barashi and Dr. Shine was given on the basis of a lack of infrastructure.  As I detailed above, this determination leads to the conclusion that even the government's decisions, which were based on the committee's recommendation, were made on the basis of a lack of infrastructure.  In the usual case, the appropriate remedy in circumstances of this type is the return of the candidacies of Adv. Barashi and Dr.  Shine for reconsideration by the committee in order for it to be required to consider all the relevant data as stated above (compare: High Court of Justice 23426-04-26 Almakais v.  Prime Minister (May 19,2026)); See also: Eisenberg case, at p.  244; Zamir, The Administrative Proceeding, at p.  1224).  Similarly, the existence of the conflict of interest defect that occurred in the process of appointing Dr.  Ben-Hai-Segev means that there is room to return her case for re-examination, while allowing the legal counsel to the government to examine the significance of the defect and to examine the possible ways to remedy it, as a precondition for approving the appointment.
153. However, in our case, I do not believe that this is the sum of the appropriate remedy. In the present case, the remedy must be examined against the background of the characteristics of the government's decisions, and in particular the fact that we are dealing with the election of members of a collegiate body, which is of particular importance to the compositionand the overall body.  This was expressly expressed in the provision of section 7(c) of the Second Authority Law, according to which when appointing the Council, its composition must reflect, to the extent possible, the diversity of public opinion.  This need - which requires the examination of all the candidates as a single body to be discussed - also arises explicitly in the decisions made by the committee itself, which indicate that the council is obligated to establish itself as a "single body" (see, for example, paragraph 11 of the committee's decision; in paragraph 12 of the committee's decision of March 16,2026).  Therefore, it is impossible to ignore the fact that a discussion of three candidates, especially when it comes to a chairman, has implications for the overall examination of the council as a whole, which includes 15 members.  This conclusion regarding the need for a re-examination of all the candidates is also necessary in light of the Committee's determinations that its decisions will be valid for only three months - as may be recalled, the Committee's decision was given during the month of January 2026, followed by the Committee's decision of March 8,2026, and the Committee's decision of March 16,2026.
154. Moreover, this conclusion is strengthened in light of the developments that occurred after the beginning of the litigation before us. This is said in light of the sudden resignations that occurred among the members of both the "incoming" and "outgoing" councils.  As may be recalled, Dr.  Raviv and Dr.  Wenig announced their resignations from both the "incoming" and "outgoing" councils.  In this state of affairs, only ten members remain among the members of the council in the composition that the government voted on.  Therefore, in these circumstances, and in view of the significant change that has taken place in the composition of the Council and taking into account the above, the matter of all the members of the "incoming" Council must be returned to an up-to-date examination by the Committee.
155. Therefore, in view of the accumulation of flaws that I discussed above, and in view of the significant change that has taken place in the composition of the Council, I have found that the matter of all the members of the "incoming" Council be returned to a re-examination of the Committee for the Examination of Appointments - accordingly, this means that the decisions of the Government are null and void.
156. Here is the place to add and address another point that is necessitated by the unusual sequence of events during the conduct of the litigation before us.
157. Naturally, the re-examination of the committee is contingent on the desire of the Minister of Communications to promote a new appointment decision in their case, and subject to any law. It is clear that in accordance with the law, when conducting its re-examination, the Committee for the Examination of Appointments must be required to have the current factual basis as of the date of the reexamination, including any new relevant information regarding the candidates.  Among other things, the Committee must consider the factual developments that occurred as a result of the proceeding in question, to the extent that they may have an impact on the examination of the matter of a particular candidate.  In this regard, I will mention that among the members of the "outgoing" council, there are four members who have announced their resignation from the "outgoing" council only - Asi, Mr. Shimoni, Prof.  Caspi and Ms. Kedem Maktobi.  The great difficulty inherent in this process, in a manner that casts doubt on whether such a resignation is possible in the first place, we discussed in the decision of the interim order.  We also noted in our decision that on the face of it, such a move - in view of the circumstances in which it was carried out as aforesaid - raises a difficulty in terms of the duty of fiduciary duty imposed on a council member.  This duty is anchored in section 13 of the Second Authority Law, according to which "a council member shall act in the performance of his duties fairly, faithfully and impartially".

[In a parenthetical article, I will note that this obligation originally appeared as section 15 of the Second Authority Bill, and it was approved almost as worded by the Knesset.  It is interesting to note that during the discussion in the Knesset's designated committee for the law, the secretary of the committee noted that "In section 15 there is a comment.  From the moment he is elected to his position, the council member represents the council and ceases to represent the bodies that appointed him.  His loyalty is to the council" [emphasis added - J"A]; The following words were answered by the representative of the Ministry of Communications in the committee simply: "It's obvious" (Transcript ישיבה 19 of The Committee for the Second Network Law, The Knesset-11,3 (1.6.1987)) - However, the circumstances of our case may teach us that what was foreseen in the past is no longer self-evident.]

158. I will also mention that even the affidavits submitted on behalf of the resigning council members raised many questions (and we will recall that contrary to our decision of June 14,2026, supplementary affidavits were not submitted). Thus, for example, and without exhausting, we will mention the identical wording of some of the affidavits and we will also refer to the affidavit of Mr. Assi, in which he explained that his resignation from the "outgoing" council was made, inter alia, "for the purpose of professional advancement and integration into a senior public position in the Civil Service Commission [...] Out of a desire to prepare optimally for the next professional challenge and for a position with broader public impact, I have made a decision to end my current position as a member of the Council of the Second Authority in an orderly and dignified manner.  This decision stems from considerations of professional development and public mission" (paragraph 2 of Mr. Assi's affidavit of June 13,2026).  On the face of it, however, it is difficult to reconcile this reasoning with the fact that Mr. Assi ultimately chose to resign only from the "outgoing" council, insisting on his desire to be appointed to the "outgoing" council.

Added to what has been said so far is the fact that the Minister of Communications, as you may recall, declared that "Some of the council members spoke with Ram"The minister, who expressed to them the minister's position on the issue".  These figures, as well as the extent of the impact that the minister had on the resignation of the resigning council members, remain vague and their clarification is likely to have implications for their suitability for the position, and therefore there is room for the committee to require them when examining their renewed candidacy.

159. For the avoidance of doubt, it should be clarified that until the establishment of a new Second Authority Council, the "outgoing" council will continue to serve, in accordance with what was stated in the decision of the interim order and in the spirit of the precedent established in the case of the High Court of Justice 382/75 Buchbaza v.  Or Yehuda Local Council, IsrSC 30(1) 576,580 (1975).

Not yet signed

160. The proceeding in question, and in particular the attempts of the Minister of Communications, following the temporary order that was issued, to bring the members of the "outgoing" council to resign from their positions - in a manner that would lead, in practice, to the council not to act, and to thwart the purpose of the temporary order - provide an opportunity to shine a spotlight on the phenomenon that has recently occurred: Administrative paralysis as a policy (see in this context and without exhausting: High Court of Justice 3329-12-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The 37th Government of Israel (August 31,2026), which is still pending and is engaged, inter alia, with the permanent appointment of the Minister of the Interior and the manner in which he exercises his powers; High Court of Justice 42914-08-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.  Minister of Regional Cooperation and the Commissioner of the Government Companies Authority (July 6,2026), which dealt with the failure to appoint a chairman of the board of directors of Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd.; High Court of Justice 79117-07-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.  Minister of Justice (May 31,2026), which dealt with the convening of the Judicial Selection Committee; High Court of Justice 5404/22 Success - For the Promotion of a Fair Society v.  Minister of Communications (May 12,2026), which is still pending and dealing with the appointment of the Board of the Israel Broadcasting Corporation; High Court of Justice 24855-04-25 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.  Minister of Labor (26.  2026), which is still pending and dealing with the appointment of a permanent director general of the National Insurance Institute; High Court of Justice 1711/24 The Movement for Quality Government v.  Minister of Justice (September 8,2024), which also dealt with the convening of the Judicial Selection Committee; High Court of Justice 2144/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.  Speaker of the Knesset (March 23,2020), which dealt with the Knesset plenum).
161. Indeed, administrative authority also entails the obligation, in appropriate cases, the discretion not to exercise it. However, from here to turning the avoidance of action into a policy of administrative paralysis - the long haul.  In this context, the words of Justice H.  Cohen are appropriate:

"Refraining from implementing and implementing an existing and binding law is not policy and cannot be a policy, in any respect; It only causes a demoralization of the relationship between the government and the citizen, and entails the unburden of all the laws of the state" (High Court of Justice 295/65 Oppenheimer v.  Minister of the Interior and Health, IsrSC 20(1) 309,328 (1966)).