The defendant's personal conclusions are his conclusions only, and I do not believe that the reasonable hearer, who was exposed to the plaintiff's words, would have seen them as a threat to the defendant and his family and concluded that they were facing mortal danger by the plaintiff or his son.
Moreover, the purpose of section 15(3) is not to protect a person's legitimate personal interest, by way of defamation. The plaintiff's statements included extreme and excessively insulting expressions, in a manner that negates the existence of the element of good faith (Shenhar, pp. 586-587).
Therefore, I do not see how the publication of the statements is intended to protect the defendant's personal interest.
In his summaries, the defendant referred to the decision to transfer a hearing to the Small Claims Appeals Authority (Central District) 71919-11-20 Lior Ayalon v. Ofir Golan (June 22,2021) (hereinafter: the "Ofir Golan Judgment"), from which he sought to learn that case law recognized that subjective feelings of a person who feels threatened should not be canceled or nullified, when statements that express a feeling threatened and unprotected are perceived as expressing a legitimate opinion and not as establishing a false fact.
The Ofir Golan judgment dealt with a lawsuit, which was filed on the grounds of defamation, due to the filing of two complaints with the police, which were claimed to have been false. The court says: "In this regard, it should be reiterated that insofar as the matter relates to a complaint to the Authority, there is a clear public interest that the complainant will not be deterred from filing it due to a fear of conducting proceedings by virtue of the provisions of the Prohibition of Defamation Law. Therefore, and even where a reasonable person would not objectively view the applicant's conduct as being accompanied by a threat, this does not permit the filing of a lawsuit by virtue of the provisions of the Prohibition of Defamation Law." (paragraph 10) and further on: "As was clarified in relation to the second complaint, it is doubtful whether a complaint to the police due to a sense of threat that stems from a demand for payment or the taking of legal measures will establish grounds for a claim by virtue of the provisions of the Prohibition of Defamation Law, even if it is a subjective feeling that will be found to have no substance (to the extent that it is found)." (paragraph 14).