See also the words of the court in another hearing in IEC: "In any publication that seeks to shield under the wings of section 15(4) a clear separation between the description of the facts and the expression of an opinion on those facts. The very mixing of these two elements is liable to obscure the text and enable the "theft" of incorrect and defamatory facts into the expression of the opinion. The writer must indicate which facts he relies on - and these must be true (except for minor details that do not cause any real harm), and once he mentions the facts, he is permitted to draw his conclusions from them by expressing an opinion about them, but on condition that he clarifies and distinguishes between a fact and a conclusion."
Without a full and correct description of the plaintiff's words in the interview, the listeners and viewers would not have been able to understand what the plaintiff really said and what constituted an expression of opinion on the part of the defendant. And as the Supreme Court in the Ben Gvir Civil Appeals Authority said: "... Whereas if the publication includes a defamatory claim that is presented as an opinion, without the facts on which it relies have been presented, the cover of expressing the opinion that it has taken on itself will be removed from that fact, and the defense will not apply to it." (Paragraph 14 of Justice Arbel's opinion).
In light of the above, I find that the foundations of the defense of expressing an opinion do not exist.
Even if we were to find that which of the expressions in dispute were protected under which of the protections of sections 15 of the Law, we would still find ourselves in a situation in which the defendant does not have a presumption that he acted in good faith, in accordance with section 16 of the Law. This section establishes presumptions that in the presence of which it is possible to determine that the advertiser acted in good faith or not in good faith;
Among the considerations that are necessary for the requirement of good faith, it is possible to take into account the intention behind the publication, the advertiser's sincere belief in the truthfulness of the publication, the subject of the publication and its object - whether the publication revolves around public figures and political, current or other issues in which the public has a great interest, the proportionality of the publication - its language, style, wording and the scope of its publication, when these are in contrast to the matter in which the publication is engaged, taking reasonable measures to examine the veracity of the opinion and the reasonableness of the conclusion that emerged from the factual basis on which it relies (see the Ben Gvir case, paragraph 32 of the judgment of the Honorable Deputy President E. Rivlin).