She presented the binders for the defendants' review in the framework of two separate meetings: the first was a situation assessment meeting held at the offices of Army Radio. The second was a meeting held at Barkai's home and was intended, as Steif put it, "to prepare our debriefing." In these meetings, the defendants reviewed Naveh's personal contents and discussed the affairs that arose from them.
Clues regarding the content of the information produced by the devices were published in the public domain during a special broadcast of the program "What's Burning." Anyone who reads the transcription of the special broadcast understands that the central figure on whom the broadcaster revolves is Naveh, and this also arises from a question addressed by Barkai to the retired President of the Supreme Court, who was interviewed on the program.
- These actions constitute a serious violation of Naveh's privacy as a matter of course In Sections 2(5), 2(9), 2(10) and 2(11) To the Protection of Privacy Law: Copying the content of a letter or other correspondence (including an electronic message) that is not intended for publication, or using its content, without the permission of the recipient or the author; Using information about a person's private affairs or giving it to another, other than for the purpose for which it was given; Publishing or delivering something obtained by way of an invasion of privacy; Publishing a matter relating to the privacy of a person's personal life, including his sexual past, or his state of health, or his conduct with the permission of the individual.
The right to privacy is not absolute. Its realization sometimes involves a balance with other rights that are protected by law. The normative basis for balancing rights is found in the protections set forth in the Protection of Privacy Law (Civil Appeal 1928/93 Israel Securities Authority v. Gabor Sabrina Textile Factories Ltd., IsrSC 49(3) 177,194 (1995)). In our case, the focus on the implementation of Naveh's right to privacy involves a balance between two opposing interests: the right to privacy versus the public's right to know (Criminal Appeal 480/85 Courtam v. State of Israel, IsrSC 40(3) 673,691 (1986)). In this context, the defendants raised a series of defense arguments, which I will address below.