For these reasons, I determine that the actions carried out by Shteif, which led to the violation of Naveh's privacy, are not protected under any of the permanent protections Section 18(2) To the Protection of Privacy Law.
- As mentioned, The case of the other defendants is different. We are dealing with a group of senior media professionals, who were not involved in the improper process of producing the information from Naveh's telephones and were not aware in real time of the manner in which the information was produced. As it emerged from the evidence brought before me, the information was given to them in print. An examination of the information showed that it was related to news events of real public interest. We saw that close to Steif's report on the content of the information, an assessment of the situation was conducted with Adv. Danino and the commander of Army Radio (Elkabetz). At that meeting, an instruction was given not to publish any of the information. The defendants complied with this instruction. The defendants acted responsibly and prepared for publication (as part of the preparatory meeting at Barkai's home), but despite the temptation of the press to publish important news information, they maintained the legal and command directive not to do so. It was only in the wake of the "breach", Naveh's arrest, and after the gag order imposed on the affair was reduced, that the special broadcast was held. All of this shows that there is an element of good faith in their case.
Therefore, I will be required to examine the concrete components of the defenses by virtue of Article 18 to the Protection of Privacy Law for this class of defendants.
Protection Section 18(2)(a) Law
- Section 18(2)(a) The law states that this will be a defense if the offender "did not know and should not have known about the possibility of the invasion of privacy." This section lists two cumulative conditions. The first condition: the offender did not know about the possibility of the invasion of privacy.
From the evidentiary evidence that was placed before me, and as I have already determined, defendants 2-6 did not know, in real time, that the materials presented to them by Shteif were obtained by way of hacking into Naveh's mobile phones. Therefore, I determine that the first condition of section 18(a)(2) is met.
- The second condition of Section 18(2)(a) is that the offender should not have known about the possibility of the invasion of privacy. In this context, the journalistic ethics expert, Dr. Altshuler, was of the opinion in her opinion (P/2) that the defendants did not have a normative expectation to know about the possibility of the violation of privacy according to Section 18(2)(a) to the law. I accept this conclusion in part. And I will explain.
The special status of a journalistic source has been mentioned more than once in case law (SC 298/86 Citrin v. The Disciplinary Court of the Tel Aviv District Bar AssociationIsrSC 41(2) 337 (1987); Criminal Appeal Authority 83664-02-26 Essenheim v. Israel Police, paragraphs 21-34 of the judgment of President Y. Amit (May 20,2026) (hereinafter - The Essenheim Affair)). In view of the special status of a journalistic source, it is not acceptable in the professional practice that customarily investigates a journalist's sources or demands that they be exposed.