It should be noted that although the lawsuit against Barkai on the grounds of invasion of privacy has long been dismissed by virtue of the permanent defense In section 18(2)(a), it is also rejected by virtue of the permanent defense in section 18(2)(b). As a journalist, Barkai, like the other defendants, has a professional and moral obligation to disclose the information he has received.
Protection of Section 18(2)(c) of the Law
- Beyond the need, I will also address Steif's detailed argument that she is entitled to the application of the "valid personal interest" protection as a matter of principle In section 18(2)(c) to the law, when she claims that the legitimate personal interest is the protection of Hani.
As I will detail below, this argument should be rejected for the following reasons:
First, this protection applies to the personal interest of the offender. Even if Hani was a partner in delivering the phones, she was not the one who broke them and she was not the one who recruited Yuli for this purpose. The rule is that you protected Section 18(2)(c) requires that the violation of privacy be for the purpose of protecting the personal interest of the offender (Eli Helm, Privacy Protection Law 212 (2003) (hereinafter - Shock)). If so, Shteif is not entitled to copy the defense that is attributed to Hani in her favor.
Second, it is required that the defense be on a "kosher" matter, i.e., the defense must be within legal normative boundaries. Thus, for example, it was determined that a private investigator is not entitled to protection Section 18(2)(c) A place where he or she breaks into the spouse's apartment in order to document an intimate encounter as part of a divorce proceeding, even if it was invited by the betrayed spouse (Criminal Appeal (Tel Aviv-Jaffa District) 1132/96 Hatuka v. State of Israel, paragraph 8 (Nevo 20.1.1998); The Galam Matter, paragraph 11). A similar approach was taken in the case of the collection of evidence for the purpose of a legal proceeding in a commercial dispute (Miscellaneous Civil Applications (Tel Aviv District) 1614/02 Mul-T-Lock Ltd. v. Rav Bariach Investments Ltd. (Nevo 7.2.2002)). In accordance with these principles, penetration into mobile phones for the purpose of producing personal content in violation of the law cannot be considered a protection of a legitimate personal interest, even if the good faith element had not been examined. Therefore, the law of the defense argument raised by Steif by virtue of Section 18(2)(c) to be rejected in its entirety.