I will note that in the Shomroni case, when the Supreme Court referred to the alternative that the recalcitrant tenant must present as part of the justification for his refusal, his words were made in the context of a planning alternative. This is because the arguments that were made in that matter revolved around the lack of a planning alternative. At the same time, in my view, I do not believe that the Supreme Court sought to limit its determination only to the circumstances before it, i.e., to determine that the relevant alternative that the recalcitrant tenant must present is a planning alternative. This is because, in my view, and as emerges from a purposive interpretation of the Supreme Court's rulings on that matter, the intention is that the tenant who refuses must present another possible alternative in every area and matter that is in dispute - that is, to support the existence of an alternative that is consistent with his approach and objection. This determination arises first with the language of the ruling in the Samaritan case, and accordingly the Supreme Court speaks of an "alternative" and not necessarily a planning alternative. Moreover, from the words of the Supreme Court it emerges that the considerations presented by it are possible considerations, but this is not an exhaustive list of considerations. And finally, as a thread, the considerations enumerated by the Supreme Court go through the logic and rationale, according to which it is required that the objection be a real objection and not a trivial or theoretical one. In line with this, in my view, the alternative that the Supreme Court is talking about is also an alternative that embodies a possibility that is consistent with the reasons for the objection of the refusing tenant. Thus, insofar as the tenant's refusal is based on economic reasons - he must present another economic alternative that is consistent with his objection, to the extent that his refusal is based on planning reasons - he must present another planning alternative that is consistent with his objection, and to the extent that his objection is based on the outline of the engagement with the contractor - he must present a possible alternative that is consistent with his objection - i.e., with the outline proposed by him. And documented - the demand does not revolve around a theoretical alternative imaginary by the objector, but rather an alternative in the form of another plan that can be approved by the planning institutions; another agreement - which the developer of the screens agrees to sign that embodies surplus economic considerations; and finally - a concrete developer who agrees to the concrete outline proposed by the opposing tenant. I am of the opinion that the aforesaid applies at least in the circumstances of the case that is the subject of discussion here, in which the defendants declare that they are interested in the existence of the project, but in their view, they should be entitled to additions to the rights granted to them under the agreement (see in this regard, similarly, my ruling in a different appeal - Civil (Tel Aviv District) 69335-06-23 Noam Nir v. David Naor (deceased) (January 24,2024), against which an application for leave to appeal was rejected, By the Honorable Judge Dafna Barak Erez, with the permission of Civil Appeal 2331/24 Nir Noam v. Naor Sasson David , Deceased and 80 others (June 23,2024), while in paragraph 10 of her judgment it was held that: "Even the questions relating to the nature of the alternative that the Applicant should have presented were of a practical and concrete nature. In addition, all of the Applicant's arguments were discussed at length in the framework of the proceeding, and after they were examined on their merits, they were rejected one by one."
- on equality in the Pinui-Binui deal;
As emerges from the list set out in section 2(b) of the Law (which has already been clarified that it is not a closed list), a claim regarding the lack of equality in consideration, or a claim regarding discrimination against the minority, is not mentioned in this section as a reason for refusal. At the same time, as was mentioned in the Samaritani case, and as the case law went on to change - a claim regarding the lack of equality in consideration, or an argument based on discrimination against the minority - is sufficient to establish grounds for refusal. Thus, in Civil Case (Haifa) 30410-10-20 Avner Daniel v. Shimon Feibish (February 12,2026), it was recently decided in this regard: