In the case before me, the sentence of defendant 6 was presented as an agreed punishment in the framework of a plea bargain. In such a case, the punishment compound should not be elaborated on, and there is no room to comment on the relationship between the punishment compound and the plea bargain (for details on this matter, see my judgment in the case of defendant 6 in another case, Michael Kramer in Crim. Crim. (Tel Aviv-Jaffa) 18772-01-17 State of Israel v. Leibowitz (published in Nevo, February 18, 2018). This is because, according to the Supreme Court's ruling, the punishment compound should be discussed only when the court considers intervening in the plea bargain, which on the face of it appears to fall outside the scope of punishment.
In Crim. Crim. 6943/16 Gandhi Galkin v. MI (of January 28, 2018, hereinafter: the Galkin case), the Honorable Justice v. Hendel ruled (in paragraph 3 of his judgment):
"The connection between Amendment 113 and plea bargains is unclear. Suffice it to say that the amendment does not relate to a situation of plea bargain. The trial court is correct that according to one approach of this court, in such a case, the court must determine a compound. The District Court did the job extensively, as is customary in cases that end without a plea bargain with an agreed range of punishment. However, it should not be forgotten that there are also other approaches as to what is required of the court of inquiry with regard to determining a sentence in the framework of a plea bargain that includes an agreed range of punishment.
In my opinion, it is not correct or appropriate – certainly in such a case – to expand the determination of the complex. As stated, a distinction must be made between the components of Amendment 113 and the degree of the court's intervention in plea bargains. This court, in an expanded panel, determined the relevant rules on the matter (see: Crim. Appeal 1958/98 Anonymous v. State of Israel, IsrSC 57 620-621, 577 (1) paragraph 24 of the judgment of President D. Beinisch (2002) hereinafter: the Anonymous Rule). This is the focus. This is especially true in a case of this type, where on the face of it, the range of punishment in the plea bargain does not fall outside the scope of the punishment. The required discussion does not revolve around the postponement of the settlement, but rather around the quantification of the final sentence within the set range. In such cases, I do not believe that there is a need to expand the task of determining the scope of punishment. There is no need to address more difficult cases in which the court is considering, according to the Certain Rule, whether to intervene in the plea bargain."