In cases where human beings have been accused of offenses, there is always doubt as to whether things they say after being caught in the crossfire, regarding their desire to rehabilitate, whether they were said verbally and externally, and whether their personalities and life circumstances allow them to detach themselves from the criminal characteristics. These concerns do not exist in the case of a corporation. In other words, the confidence in the process of rehabilitation is greater. Mainly, in cases such as the one before me, in which things were done prior to the sentencing.
Diamantis, Corporate Punishment, on page 50 of the article, noted this:
"Furthermore, we know it is possible to alter corporate character and have a decent sense of how to do it. Scientists are just beginning to understand the neurological basis for individual character and have little to no idea about how to change it forcibly. While we lack the tools to tinker with neurons, we can get a grip on the larger, human-sized pieces that generate corporate action. Indeed, that is the idea behind one of the fastest growing areas of legal practice: compliance. By definition, compliance programs aim to alter corporate dispositions so corporations are less likely to violate the law. In general, the sorts of techniques compliance programs employ today are commonsense: promulgation of codes of behavior, the institution of training programs, the identification of internal compliance personnel and the creation of procedures and controls to insure company-wide compliance with legal mandates."
Moreover, the evidence regarding the rehabilitation of a corporation is clearer and more measurable, both with respect to rehabilitation that the corporation has already undergone, as in the case before us, and with respect to a corporation that the court seeks to deviate from the punishment imposed on it due to the possibilities of rehabilitation (see, in this regard, Eyal's theft, deviation from the penalty range, ibid., at p. 546).