Therefore, there are those who argue that since in large companies, even the best compliance program will not be able to prevent all offenses, it is appropriate to take into account a compliance plan that has been implemented in advance, either for the conviction itself or for the punishment. Thus, there are those who believe that the implementation of compliance programs, control, and enforcement in advance should constitute an exception to the criminal liability of a corporation (similar to the exception to the criminal liability of managers with strict liability), and others believe that this should be taken into account for the purpose of punishment (see, for example, Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, "Organizational Justice: Recognizing and Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation", 21 J. Corp. L. 731, 764-65 (1996); John S. Baker, Jr., "Reforming Corporations through Threats of Federal Prosecution", 89 Cornell. Rev. 310, 321 (2004); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, "Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability", 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 414 (2007); Ellen S. Podgor, "A New Corporate World Mandates a "Good Faith" Affirmative Defense", 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537 (2007); Albert Alschuler, "Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corporations," 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev 1359 (2009), states at p. 1360 that: "If the goal of corporate criminal liability is to induce appropriate monitoring, the creation and maintenance of an appropriate corporate compliance program (should provide a defense to liability"
The Sentencing Guidelines in the United States determine the circumstances for harsher corporate punishment, and what are the circumstances for leniency, and all of them are related to the organizational culture and the question of whether there was a compliance program, supervision and control in a previous corporation suspected of committing the offenses. The circumstances considered to be more serious are the involvement or organizational culture as complementary or encouraging the commission of offenses; the corporation's history in terms of compliance with the law; Previous violations of administrative orders and interference with the legal process. The circumstances of the case are twofold: the existence of an effective compliance program prior to suspicions of an offense, and cooperation with the authorities, including the voluntary extradition of officers who have committed offenses and the acceptance of responsibility for the acts (see Lauren Giudice, "Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement," 91 Boston U. L. Rev. 347, 359 (2011).