Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 31735-01-22 Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Miriam Danoch - part 5

(See also the words of the Honorable District Court in CA (District Civil Case) 58568-04-18 Esther Baruch v.  Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (Nevo, September 2, 2019), which were subsequently accepted in an appeal to the Supreme Court in LCA 6330/19).

109. Therefore, I will reiterate that the expropriation proceeding is a proceeding in which the Tel Aviv Municipality initiated a proceeding against the Israel Land Authority, which owns the land, with public purposes and needs at its center. The expropriation is not directed at the defendants, nor are they the party from which the land was expropriated, since they have no rights in the land.  In addition, the provision of alternative housing in the rulings speaks of the need to provide a roof over one's head for those who live in the building by virtue of a legal right or equity.  These rights have not been proven before me.  Moreover, Mrs.  Danoch has an alternative roof over her head, so there is no connection between the judgments presented and our case.
110. I will also note, further to the defendants' reference to the judgments in the case of Levy v. Weiman (CA 515/76) and Nahum v.  State of Israel [Nevo] (CA 6757/13), that the compensation values discussed there relate to compensation for the betterment of the land and not to compensation in the amount of temporary housing.  The gap, of course, is huge.  The value of the compensation requested by the defendants in the amount of approximately ILS 6 million for each defendant is not the same as the value of the compensation for return on investment or betterment (which has not been proven and has not been presented).  It is also worth noting that the monetary payment offered by plaintiff 1 in the framework of the negotiations between the parties is immeasurably higher than the amount of the investments, insofar as they were proven.  The defendants refused to accept it.
111. It is also worth clarifying and raising that in some of the judgments presented by the defendants (for example, in CA 496/89) not only was permission granted, but permission was given in exchange for lands from which the holders were cut off by the military government in the country. This is not the case in our case.  It was not claimed or proven in the previous case that consideration was paid to the authorities for the land, and there is no dispute that the defendants were not transferred from one place of residence to another place of residence from which they are required to evacuate.  In the Levy case above, too, we are dealing with a case in which it was ruled that permission was granted and therefore the eviction is subject to compensation, but even in this case the compensation is at the current value of the investments in construction - and certainly not at the current value of the entire land.  In addition, and no less important, we are not talking about public land.

Number Words towards the end        

112. Indeed, evicting a person from a residence is a dramatic and not simple remedy, which brings with it heavy consequences and is not given as a trivial matter.
113. I was convinced that the municipality gave full attention to this matter and acted fairly and in good faith in an attempt to resolve the disputes even in the early stages of the process. In the course of the hearings that took place before me, it emerged that the parties had negotiated between them outside the walls of court, and that an agreed sum was even raised for payment in order to end the dispute and evacuate the land.  The parties even shared with the court the amount offered to the two families and the fact that they had reached an agreement regarding the date of the eviction.  It appears that there was in fact an offer on behalf of the municipality and a receipt on behalf of the defendants.  However, after the aforementioned agreement, the defendants decided to file a monetary claim for compensation to the District Court.  Therefore, the plaintiffs also in fact withdrew their agreement to pay the agreed amount, to the extent that the compensation claim stands.
114. As a wishful thinking, and as I explained at length to the parties during the hearing in the courtroom, they are expected to reach agreements regarding the division of the significant financial payment. I proposed, inter alia, to authorize the court to rule in accordance with section 79A, so that the authority regarding the distribution of the amount allocated by the municipality would be given to the court, which would determine the share of each family.  Counsel for the defendants refused this offer.
115. I find it appropriate to point out that there is a fundamental difference between the two families. When it comes to the Or family, there is a real need to take care of two households, since the couple has been divorced for many years.  In addition, there is a real complexity in light of Mr.  Or's health condition and the presence of minor children at home.  This is especially true when it is clear that they do not have any other property that can serve as an alternative roof over their heads.
116. This is not the case with Mrs. Danoch, who is an elderly woman, with no children at her desk, and she has other living options, including at least one apartment located on Rabbi Meir Street in Tel Aviv.  This apartment stands vacant and empty, according to her son, who testified before me (see the minutes of the hearing of October 22, 2025, on page 2).  At the time of the hearing, I got the impression that the Civil Case Municipality was not aware of the existence of an additional apartment owned by Ms.  Danoch, and it is possible that the amount of payment in the framework of the negotiations would have changed accordingly, had it known this.
117. In order for the Or family to be evacuated and able to begin its new journey with the money that will enable it, and in order to avoid the corruption of funds for interim housing, the parties are expected to reach understandings even before a decision is made in the proceeding that was opened in the District Court. It appears that the ball is now in the defendants' court.
118. I have found it appropriate to further clarify and remind that the claims before me are in fact part of an entire compound that is being evacuated.  Within this compound there were other properties that were evacuated, and as part of the agreed eviction, the defendants in these claims received different sums of money, each in its own circumstances, in the range of ILS 1 million to ILS 3 million.  There is no room to compare and place all the defendants on the same level, and it is not appropriate to obligate the municipality to compare the payment given on the basis of other data or different circumstances.  The same is true of the Or family and the Danoch family.
119. In summary, and as was presented at length above, the claim is accepted, so that in fact the defendants are required to vacate the land. In these circumstances, and when it was determined that the defendants had no rights to the land, there was no inherent obligation to award compensation in the framework of this proceeding.  The entire issue of compensation was raised in order to reach a settlement between the parties outside the walls of court, and beyond the letter of the law. 
120. This should be kept in mind when we discuss the compensation demands of the Or family and the Danoch family. For this reason, the defendants' arguments on the administrative level, as to the need to compare all of the evicted defendants, are also irrelevant in the proceeding before me.

Conclusion

121. As detailed in detail above, I found it appropriate to accept the eviction claim and order the removal of the defendants from the land, no later than June 1, 2026.
122. An order is hereby issued whereby the defendants must vacate the land that is the subject of the lawsuit - a residential complex near Metzitzim Beach located on Tel Aviv Port Street and known as Block 6962, part of Plot 150 in the city of Tel Aviv-Yafo - and return it to the plaintiffs, free of any person and object belonging to them or anyone on their behalf, no later than June 1, 2026 at 12:00.
123. With regard to the legal expenses, taking into account the results of the proceeding, I found it appropriate to award expenses in the amount of ILS 50,000, which will be divided equally between the two cases (25,000 the Or family and 25,000 the Danoch family).  The payment will be made as follows:

• ILS 10,000 will be paid by each of the defendants within 30 days (a total of ILS 20,000).
• ILS 15,000 will be deposited by each of the defendants in the court coffers, within 30 days (a total of ILS 30,000). If the evacuation of the land is completed on the date set out in the judgment, this sum (ILS 15,000 for each of the defendants) will be returned to the depositors.  If the eviction is not completed and is not carried out as prescribed, the sum will be transferred to the plaintiffs.

124. I also found it appropriate to order that to the extent that the evictions are carried out on the date set in the judgment and without the need to contact the Execution Office, the costs of the demolition will be borne by the plaintiffs and not by the defendants.

Granted today, 17 Kislev 5786, 07 December 2025, in the absence of the parties.