What do I have an acquittal from the east, what do I have an acquittal from the west, what do I have an acquittal from the south? Cf. the Macmillan case [18].
On the other hand, the counter-argument will stand up and make us hear: Indeed, a decision in a trial is a binary decision, that abstract justice must include itself in acquittal or conviction, in one of these two cases, and there is no other way around. This is not the case with a decision on indemnification and compensation that many shades can have. This is the case with regard to circumstances that justify indemnification or compensation and circumstances that do not justify it, and the same applies to the amount of compensation that will be awarded in these or other circumstances. As provided in section 80 of the Penal Law, a court will award compensation or indemnification on the second ground only – and only if it sees "circumstances... that justify it." The concept of "circumstances" by its very nature is a flexible concept, and the court will not know whether there are circumstances that justify her parents for compensation or indemnification if it does not look around it and examine the "circumstances" in the matter; all the circumstances of the matter. Is it said that the "circumstances" of the trial are circumstances outside the scope of the trial, and that only "circumstances" that are not part of the trial are circumstances that are relevant to them? Suppose, for example, that the defendant goes on to claim that a defendant is entitled to an "absolute" acquittal, but since the main witness does not appear for the hearing, and the prosecution places on the court's table evidence indicating that that witness fled the country because of the defendant's threats against him, or that the witness was smuggled out of the country by people pretending to be the defendant's agents. Is there justice or logic in awarding compensation and indemnification to the defendant, but where he is acquitted ("absolutely") in his judgment? And this is nothing but an example.
- Our opinion is the same as the Batra version. We did not say – not even said – that a technical acquittal or an acquittal from the doubt would necessarily lead to the denial of indemnity or compensation from the defendant, but in the case of-At the time, it was also not said that an "absolute" acquittal would automatically lead to an indemnification or compensation ruling. All we say is that the nature of the acquittal is any acquittal, and the circumstances of the acquittal are all the circumstances; Both the acquittal and the circumstances are considerations for the examination of a house-The judgment whether or not to order the payment of compensation or indemnification, and where it orders indemnification or compensation – the extent of the same. I do not find a good reason, either in common sense or in the logic of things, to determine that the considerations of the "circumstances" of the trial and the nature of the acquittal are irrelevant considerations for awarding compensation or indemnification.
Indeed, we are of the opinion that we will put into the cauldron considerations, as considerations of the matter, both the nature of the acquittal; the reasons given for the acquittal; and all the other circumstances in which we will see the circumstances of the matter. This has been ruled in the past, and this halakha is acceptable to me. See, for example: Criminal Appeal 870/81 Tatroashvili v. State of Israel [30], at p. 448; The Gabbay case [17], at p. 43; the Sabah case [15],