On the other hand, as a rule, denying defendants the right to pay defense expenses and compensation in the event of an absolute acquittal – that is, when it turns out in retrospect that their accusation had no basis, since they did not commit the offenses of which they were accused – is unlawful. This is because refraining from paying expenses and compensation to such defendants harms them to a greater extent than is necessary. The state's budgetary interest and the public interest in preventing excessive deterrence from filing lawsuits were adequately protected – and in my opinion, as noted, even more so – in denying expenses and compensation to defendants who were acquitted due to doubt, without determining that they did not commit the offenses attributed to them, and limiting the amounts of expenses and compensation that the court is authorized to award. Refraining from paying expenses and compensation even to defendants who have been acquitted completely – a situation that experience shows is not common – is not reasonably necessary to achieve the aforementioned public purposes, and it may even encourage the prosecution's excessive eagerness to continue conducting trials even after it has discovered, or has the power to clarify, that they will end in a complete acquittal.
However, the proposed rule, according to which the court will award costs and compensation to defendants who are determined to have not committed the offenses attributed to them, is not absolute. There may be situations, in the spirit of those mentioned in the English guidelines discussed above, in which no costs or compensation will be awarded even to defendants who have been acquitted outright, or the amount of expenses and damages awarded will be reduced. Thus, for example, expenses or compensation may be withheld from defendants who were determined to have given false testimony, or those who refrained from giving their version of events or evidence that they had to prove their innocence. But such situations, naturally, would be rare. The rule should be the payment of expenses and compensation to the defendants who have been acquitted completely."
- Truth-The degree of the type of credit justifies our intervention in the consideration-The Mind of a House-The District Court, as noted, held that "near-conviction" was sufficient grounds for rejecting the request for a ruling on payment. Because, in my opinion, the withdrawal of the indictment, which means that in retrospect it turns out that there was no room for filing a writ of habeas corpus-The indictment is a complete acquittal and from it the obligation to pay is required. Whereas the reasoning of a house-The district law regarding the fact that the situation is "almost convicted" justifies the reduction of the payment.
In light of these reasons, I agree with the result proposed by my colleague Justice M. Cheshin.