Eligibility for compensation. This grounds for the lack of any basis for the accusation may arise in another case, in which, according to the evidence that the prosecution had prior to the filing of the indictment, it was reasonable to file an indictment, but this evidence was lacking at the time, due to the negligence of the state. Had it not been for this negligence, the prosecution would have been aware in advance that there was no basis for the accusation (this case is different from the case in which the state was negligent, and only because of this negligence the defendant is acquitted. In this last case, the state's negligence does not entitle the defendant to compensation, since if it were not for that negligence, he would have been convicted in law).
- The second ground of entitlement is the cause of the other justifying circumstances. On this ground, there are two sets of circumstances – those relating to the legal proceeding, and those relating to the individual circumstances of the accused. The first is the conduct of the prosecution during the trial and the other sequence of events in it. A case in which there was indeed a basis for the accusation from the outset, and there was no negligence on the part of the prosecution at that stage, except after the filing of a statement-The indictment was flawed in her conduct, and this defect led to the suspension of the acquittal or the extension of the detention – a case that falls within the scope of the first group of the second ground. Thus, for example, in a case where the state was negligent in examining findings that could indeed have been discovered only after the filing of a reporter-The indictment, but at an earlier date than the date of the ruling-The law. The other group may be taken into account by the exceptional suffering and severe legal torture that the defendant suffered as a result of the legal proceeding, even in the absence of a "guilty" on the part of the prosecution. The award of compensation in this case has a degree of compassion and kindness.
- Unlike my colleagues in the panel, I am of the opinion that none of the aforementioned grounds existed here. As he pointed out Judge M. Cheshin, was also the basis for the submission of a letter-The indictment was filed at the time it was filed, and therefore the first cause of action was not met. Other circumstances justifying compensation did not exist, on the contrary: the appellant's conviction was "close" to the opinion of the house-District Law. Home-The trial believed that there was "almost a conviction" here. A defect from the first group in the second cause of action does not exist. and the personal circumstancesA: The appellant who suffered from the fear of the law in this case was not a "different circumstance" that justified compensation in view of the "proximity of the conviction" – in the words of Beit-First Instance. In my opinion, the law prohibits a house-The District Court refused to grant the appellant compensation, and for this reason I was of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.
It was decided by a majority opinion as stated in paragraph 89 of the opinion of Justice M. Cheshin.