Caselaw

Criminal Appeal 4466/98 Honey v. State of Israel IsrSC 56(3) 73 Judge M. Cheshin - part 5

January 22, 2002
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663/90 Anonymous v. District Committee of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Bar  Association [10], at p. 403 (by Justice Barak).  The state owes the individual the duty of Donio v. Stevenson – which is the duty in the tort of negligence – and the prosecution of a certain person without the basis for an accusation against a breach of that duty.

Indeed, the first cause of action in section 80 of the Penal Law is similar to the spirit of the tort of negligence in torts, and in the life of the act there can be an overlap, even if only a partial overlap, between the two.  See and compare: Civil Appeal 337/81 Buskila v. State of Israel [11], at pp. 345-346; High Court of Justice 64/91 Hilaf v. Israel Police [12], at p. 659; R.J.  Clayton, H.  Tomlinson Civil Actions Against the Police [45], at pp.  284-307).  Indeed, there is no identical between the two grounds, between the ground  of section 80 and the tort of negligence.  Thus with regard to the procedure of the law: see  section 80(c) of the Penal Law and the Compensation Regulations; the same applies to specific heads of damages, where the provision  of section 80 limits itself to compensation for imprisonment or detention and only to defense expenses, and unlike tort law it does not contain a head of damage of damage to a person's good name (Criminal Appeal 277/78 State of Israel v. Tuviyahu (The Tuviyahu Case [13]), at p.- Damage caused by pain and suffering (Criminal Appeal 586/78 Sulami v. State of Israel [14], at p. 830), and the same applies to the amount of compensation and indemnification for expenses, which the provision of section 80 – as opposed to the cause of tort – restricts it in a statutory manner, as the Compensation Regulations are concerned.

In spite of all this, we will not find it difficult to discern that the heads of damage that the provision of section 80 does  not explicitly recognize – those of pain and suffering – are hidden within the general compensation given within the framework of "other circumstances that justify" the payment of indemnity and compensation.  We will also discover that the main factor that led to the imposition of the obligation to compensate and indemnify the state was made of the same material that made the tort of negligence in torts.  This is what we have said: the wind blowing in the provision  of section 80 is the wind blowing in the tort of negligence in torts.

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