"They demanded that an inventor or his survivors mention the name of the inventor...(Section 40 of the Law).
The term "remnants" of an inventor, which is also not defined in the law[5], implies that we are dealing with a person, and even a person who is a human being (for "where we are dealing with a human being, there is no association of human beings in the sense of a human being", section 4 of the Interpretation Law, 5741-1981; and all, "if there is no other provision for the matter at hand, and if there is nothing in the matter at hand or in its context that is inconsistent with this law", section 1 of the aforementioned law).
- There are also provisions in the Patent Law that attribute certain actions to the inventor.
Section 39 of the law, quoted above, relates to a case in which an inventor (or his survivors) "demands" that his name be mentioned. Section 42 of the Law excludes the possibility of contractually stipulating the right to specify the name of the inventor by stating: "A condition whereby the inventor waives the right to demand that his name be mentioned is invalid." Acts of demand, waiver, and contractual engagement are currently attributed only to "Adam". Although these actions can also be attributed to a human being and not only to a human being, it is sufficient for our needs that the appellant does not claim that a machine can perform them.
- It may also be mentioned that according to Section 11(b) law, in a case where the patent applicant is "A person who is not the inventor", he must announce how the owner of the invention was. The use of the word "person" in this section applies to a patent applicant, but the contrast included in the phrase "a person who is not the inventor" can imply that the inventor is also supposed to be a "person". No argument was found that the word "person" in the Patent Law should be interpreted to include "machine".
- The appellant argues that the fact that a machine cannot be combined with certain actions and terms attributed to the finding in the instructions Patent Law (demand, waiver, remains, etc.), "does not necessarily need to be neutralized" the possibility of seeing the machine as an inventor as well, and alternatively, because by way of appropriate interpretation it should be possible to adapt the terms in the various provisions to the circumstances in which the inventor is not human (section 22 of the appeal). I will be precise because for our purposes, the argument should be: for the circumstances in which the inventor is a machine (the appeal did not deal with the question of whether a corporation can be an inventor, and being required to do so expands the scope beyond what is required).
- We have seen that Patent Law Refers in various provisions to the term inventor in a sense that cannot include a machine. According to the Supreme Court's ruling, when a piece of legislation uses the same expression in different provisions, there is a presumption that the meaning of the expression in its various provisions is the same ( Clement, section 65; Civil Appeal 3319/94 Pfeffer v. Ra'anana Local Planning and Building Committee, IsrSC 51(2) 581 (February 14, 1997), section 11; Civil Appeal 3368/93 Ventura v. Bolotin, Piskei Din N(4) 452 (January 14, 1997), section 4; Criminal Appeal 107/73 "Negev" - Automobile Service Station in Tax Appeal v. State of IsraelIsrSC 28(1) 640 (February 24, 1974), p. 642; Lightning, pp. 599-600).
This presumption can be contradicted, but a foundation must be established that will lead to a different conclusion, which is an exception. "It is true that a case may arise in which a certain term will be interpreted differently in different statutes, and sometimes even in the same statute, but this is the exception to the rule. For in terms of uniformity and completeness in the wording and for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the law, it is accepted and desirable that the same term that appears in it in different contexts should have the same and identical meaning" (Civil Appeal Authority 3530/21 Halperin Optics in Tax Appeal v. Ziss (March 3, 2022), section 20).
- In the concrete case, no real discussion was held on the possibility of giving a different meaning to an identical expression that appears in several provisions of the same law, and no appropriate basis was brought to reach the conclusion that this is a case in which as of today, a distinction must be made between the meanings that should be given to the term inventor in various provisions of the Patent Law.
- The concrete provisions in the Patent Law in which the appellant wishes to read the word "inventor" as including a machine are in fact a definition of "inventor" that appears In Section 1 Law and Provision Section 11(b) to the law. No analysis of these provisions was found in comparison with other provisions in which the same expression appears in a way that would indicate that in view of the context and purpose of the provisions, this is a case in which a different meaning must be determined for identical expressions in the same piece of legislation (Civil Appeal 8438/09 Rubab Property Company in Tax Appeal v. Dunitz Brothers Ltd.IsrSC 65(2) 635 (April 19, 2012), para. 26; Appeal Petition/Administrative Claim 8360/08 Ministry of Interior v. Hebrew Union College Institute of Jewish Studies (November 30, 2011), section 22; Civil Appeal 8265/00 Shufersal in Tax Appeal v. District Planning and Building Committee, Central DistrictIsrSC 56(c) 885 (August 20, 2002), para. 35). It should be noted that according to the examiner's position (which was not adopted), the limited context of the concrete law (the definition of "owner of an invention") emphasizes the opposite conclusion, that an inventor cannot be a machine, since according to his reading of the definition, it must "come by virtue of an inventor" (in addition to entitlement by virtue of transfer, agreement or law), and this is not possible with regard to a machine.
- The appellant argues that flexibility should be exercised in the interpretation of a law in order to enable coping with changes in reality and technology. In principle, the claim is correct. "Words are charged with meanings and unload meanings with the passing years and changing times, and the same word has different meanings in our youth and old age."Civil Appeal 2622/01 Real Estate Appreciation Tax Administration v. Lebanon, IsrSC 57(5) 309 (July 29, 2003), paragraph 2 of Justice Turkel's judgment). The range of linguistic possibilities can include not only the meaning of a phrase at the time it was enacted, but also current meanings, if they are established. The language of legislation is not "frozen" as it was understood at the time of its enactment (Lightning, pp. 131-132). However, for the sake of such flexibility, it must at least be shown that with the change of times, it is indeed possible to express the current meaning that is claimed (Lightning, p. 134) (and there is a need for additional circumstances that do not need to be addressed here). As of the date of this judgment, it has not been established that the term inventor has been updated in the natural and ordinary language in a way that also includes a machine.
- Given the above, and in particular in light of a reading of the phrase in the context of the concrete law, there are those who will reach the conclusion that at least at this time, the range of linguistic possibilities of the term 'inventor' in the Patent Law does not include a machine. Such a conclusion leads, according to all approaches, to the conclusion of the exegetical journey ( Clement, section 4 in the opinion of the minority).
On the other hand, anyone who believes that despite the deviation of the meaning and its incompatibility with other provisions of the Patent Law, the range of linguistic possibilities also includes a machine within the definition of the term "inventor", will proceed to examine what interpretation best fulfills the purposes of the legislation.