Caselaw

Miscellaneous Appeal – Civil (Tel Aviv) 33353-05-23 Dr. Stephen L. Thaler v. Registrar of Patents, Designs and Trademarks - part 14

December 31, 2025
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It seems that different positions in case law regarding the application of the theory of purposive interpretation are expressed to a large extent in the determination of the range of linguistic possibilities; there may be different opinions on the question of whether a particular possibility is within the boundaries of the scope or outside it (see, for example, the Clement case, paragraphs 65-66 of the judgment of Deputy President Sohlberg; paragraph 1 of the judgment of Justice Elron; compare: paragraph 3 of the judgment of Justice Barak-Erez; paragraphs 5-6 of the judgment of Justice Ronen).

  1. Although the Registrar found that the meaning requested by the appellant exceeded the range of linguistic possibilities, the Registrar also addressed in his decision the arguments regarding the purposes of the Law. This is what is needed now.

Purpose

  1. When addressing the purposes of the legislation in the framework of an interpretation proceeding, it is customary to relate to a subjective purpose and an objective purpose (a distinction that was not identified in the parties' arguments).

 

The subjective purpose is learned "from the declared intention of the legislature as it emerges from the legislative history of the law and the words of the Knesset" (Petah Tikva Municipality case, section 36).  "This is the 'intention of the legislature' when the specific piece of legislation was enacted, and it is learned from the legislative history, as it is expressed, inter alia, in the explanatory notes to the bill, or in the legislature's reference to it during the legislative process in the Knesset plenum or in its committees" (Civil Appeals Authority 67114-01-25 Anonymous v. As'ad (December 22, 2025), section 15).  "This is not a presumed intention, but rather the goals that the legislature had in mind when it enacted the provision of the law" (Gortler, section 19).

First and foremost, and to the extent possible, the purpose of the concrete provision of the law will be examined (see, for example, the Neumann case, section 49; Civil Appeal 2000/97 Lindorn v. Karnit - Road Accident Victims Compensation Fund, IsrSC 55(1) 12 (December 19, 1999) (Lindorn case), paras. 10-11).

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