As for the objective purpose, it "includes the goals and policies, the values and principles that are intended to realize any piece of legislation in a modern democratic society, i.e., 'the purpose that the 'reasonable' reader of the legislation in a democratic state will give him at the time of giving the interpretation" (the Gortler case, ibid.).
- The Registrar is required to study the legislative history and individually to define the "owner of an invention" and to provide for the Section 11(b) to the law. In this context, the Registrar referred to what was said at the Knesset plenum session in which the law was approved in the second and third readings, when it was noted that a change had been made in the definition of "inventor owner" in the wording of the bill, in order to "emphasize the uniqueness of the inventor" and "emphasize and emphasize that the main protection is for the inventor". The Registrar also brought a statement relating to the obligation of an applicant who is not the inventor to notify the owner of the invention (Section 11(b) of the Law), as "additional protection of the inventor's right", where "in this way the Registrar can determine the way of the invention from the inventor to the patent applicant and thereby preserve the inventor's rights to the extent that they have been neglected" (section 35 of the decision; D.C. (August 8, 1967), 2908-2909).
- From these words and an examination of the Knesset itself, it emerges that the definition of "inventor" and the provision of Section 11(b) It was drafted in a manner intended to express the legislature's desire to protect the inventor and his rights and to emphasize his uniqueness, in addition to the economic interest in protecting the property of the person who will be recognized as the owner of the invention. The assumption from which the legislature emerged, that the inventor has 'rights' that must be protected, is not easily consistent with the reference to the machine as an inventor, when the appellant himself does not claim that the machine has rights (pp. 10, 12-13 of the transcript of M/11; p. 25, 16-17).
In the appellant's arguments, no appropriate reference was made to this matter. The appellant's reference to the purposes of the law related to the law as a whole and not to the purpose of a specific provision. The parties in the appeal did not elaborate on these matters and did not address the substance of the purposes (as opposed to the question of whether the purposes will be justified by one position or another).
- The subjective purpose of legislation can also be learned from the language of the legislation.
The natural and ordinary language of legislation constitutes a primary source, although not a singular source, for learning about the purpose. There is a presumption that natural, simple, and ordinary use of the language of the law "reflects the purpose of the legislation, and gives legal meaning to the law" (Barak, p. 588; In Tax Appeal 9752/08 Anonymous v. Attorney General (January 19, 2009), section 14; Civil Appeal Authority 4223/06 Katz v. Gottlieb (May 25, 2008), para. 25; High Court of Justice 10980/04 Association of Safety Officials in Local Authorities v. Minister of Education (January 23, 2007), para. 15; Civil Appeal 7975/98 Ahuzat Rishonim Rubinstein Registered Partnership v. Rishon LeZion Municipality (February 9, 2003), para. 11).