"In order to ensure security and certainty, heavy weight must be given to the purpose of legislation that is perceived in the mind of the ordinary reader, according to his ordinary understanding of his language", "Weighty considerations are required in order to bring about the formulation of a legislative purpose that does not correspond to that which arises from the ordinary language of the piece of legislation" (Barak, p. 589).
The appellant does not dispute that the ordinary and natural meaning as of today does not see a machine as an inventor under the law. The presumption that natural language reflects and fulfills the purpose of the legislation does not help him.
- The appellant argued, Because "The law must be interpreted in a purposeful manner, while the Registrar chose a simple and natural interpretation" (p. 44, paras. 15-16). Purposeful interpretation is not Standing necessarily in contradiction to what the appellant called a natural interpretation. On the contrary, as noted, there is a presumption that things are combined.
- There is no dispute that at the time of the enactment, the legislature did not see a machine as an inventor for the purpose of the law and was not required to answer the question of whether this is possible or desirable (MA/11 at p. 16, paras. 9-13). In this regard, it is not possible to attribute to legislation a concrete purpose and a positive decision.
- The appellant argues that the interpretation given by the Registrar "is fixed somewhere in the 1960s" while a purposeful interpretation must be given according to the change of times; The meaning of "the one that fulfills the purpose of the legislation in the most complete manner" (p. 44, 24-25).
- The fact that a certain technological, social or other reality was not in the eyes of the legislature at the time of enacting a law (here: Patent Law), in and of itself, does not necessarily preclude the possibility of recognizing an interpretation that includes an up-to-date meaning of the language of the law. New content can be poured into old tools (Civil Appeal 5097/11 Tellran Communications (1986) in Tax Appeal v. Charlton in Tax Appeal (September 2, 2013), paragraph 13 of the judgment of Justice Zilbertal, paragraph 2 of the judgment of the judge as he was then an associate).
"It is understood that the speech in the law should be given [...] It is not permanent and stands forever. The law is part of life, and life changes. With the change in reality, so does the understanding of the law. The language of the law stands on a machine, but its meaning changes with the "changing conditions of life" [...] Interpretation is a renewable process. Modern content must be given to the old language" (Lindorn case, section 17).