And now go out and learn:
For many generations, Jews in the Diaspora dreamed of a return to the land of their forefathers and the renewal of national-independent life, and all those long years the people did not detach themselves from their historical past, nor did they deny the heritage of their ancestors, and is it conceivable that precisely when the wish was fulfilled and the people returned to their land, they would destroy with their own hands any national value just because it was suspected of a 'disguised prohibition for religious reasons'?"
- I have already emphasized and reiterated that the bylaw does indeed infringe on the rights of the individual (the potential buyer of pork) and the right to freedom of occupation (of the seller), but I accept the learned Magistrate's determination that:
(a) The extent of the harm in the bylaw does not exceed what is required, since of course there is no prohibition on Eating After all, every person is entitled to eat whatever his heart desires, and in addition, the damage caused to the individual is less than the damage that would have been caused to the character of the state and its values, as a Jewish state, if the bylaw or the authorization law had not been enacted.
(b) The law has a territorial and non-personal character It applies to the entire population of the city of Ashkelon, and not to some of the residents who are characterized by the-According to their religious affiliation or place of residence.
(c) The aforementioned bylaw is reasonable
In this regard, I have no choice but to refer to the words of the Honorable Justice Berenson, in the Menashi case [1], at pp. 220 ff. These remarks referred to a bylaw that is very similar to the wording of the bylaw that we are dealing with. The Honorable Justice Berenson explicitly ruled that the bylaw "does not suffer from any unreasonableness and is valid in every respect." See also the identical opinion of the President (Olshan) there, at p. 218 and who are we to disagree with these words?