It should be said at once that counsel for the appellants committed a sin by presenting to the court, as part of his summaries, statistical data regarding the composition of the population in Ashkelon, noting that one-third of the city's residents are immigrants from the former Soviet Union who are consumers of pork.
A figure of this kind, assuming that it can support the appellants' defense, cannot be brought in the framework of the summaries, but must be proved by competent evidence, and the defense attorney was not permitted to cite this figure in his summaries.
The Trial Court examined the bylaw in light of the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and the question of whether the bylaw violates the protected right of the appellants, and held that "there is no doubt that the bylaw restricts the occupation of those who wish to sell pig meat... In addition to the infringement of the freedom of occupation, the bylaw violates freedom of conscience in that a citizen who is not observant cannot exercise his right to purchase pork." In light of the aforementioned conclusion, the court decided to examine whether the infringement of the aforementioned rights is permitted under the "limitation clauses" of the Basic Laws, and whether the bylaw is consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state – and whether the bylaw is intended to preserve only a religious value, or whether it is a law that includes, beyond the religious aspect, a national value, "and then perhaps both goals are achieved together with regard to the purpose clauses of the Basic Law."
The trial court emphasized that "in the work of interpreting the concepts Jewish and democratic (which appear in the two Basic Laws), one must strive to find the common denominator..." and to choose "an interpretation that will reconcile as much as possible between the different concepts found in the Basic Laws."
The trial court noted that in the book of Leviticus there is a long list of animals that are forbidden to eat and that "the pig is not the most severe prohibition..." Why, then, did the pig be "treated"? It is only that the reason is not only religious-halakhic. The reason for this, the court answers, is historical-national, "and hence the claim regarding religious coercion in light of this law is not a correct claim, since the subject of the pig has crossed the boundaries of the religious prohibition and has great and symbolic significance even in the hearts of Jews who do not observe Torah and mitzvot and even do not adhere to kashrut laws. There are quite a few people who do not keep Torah and mitzvot and even eat non-kosher food, but will refrain from bringing pork in their mouths."