The overarching principle, as stated by both Justice Or and Justice Cheshin in the same judgment, and as also held in previous rulings, is that both freedom of religion and freedom of religion are reserved for citizens and residents of Israel. Freedom of religion in the sense that a person will not be forced to do things contrary to his religious beliefs, and freedom of religion in the sense that a person will not be forced to act in accordance with the instructions of the religion even though he does not believe in it and does not wish to fulfill its commandments.
In this context, it was further determined in the judgment of Justice Silberg in the case of the High Court of Justice 72/62 Rufaizen v. Minister of the Interior [11], as was also quoted in the judgment in the Mitral case [10], that: "Israel is not a theocratic state, because it is not religion that regulates the life of the citizen, but the law."
However, this is not so unequivocal because there is no separation between religion and state, as is customary in most Western countries, and there are many acts of legislation that adopt and validate various provisions of religion, starting with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law (Marriage and Divorce), 5713-1953 – continuing as an example in the law we are dealing with, the Enabling Law that authorized local authorities to enact by-laws regarding the prohibition of the sale of pig meat. and ending with the amendment to the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which included an override clause in order to enable the enactment of a law prohibiting the import of non-kosher frozen meat into Israel.
The truth is that all of these laws violate freedom of religion, and I don't remember a law that violates freedom of religion, that is, that it forces people to act against their religious beliefs. For this, we can only bless, although there are people who lack religious belief for whom freedom from religion is as important as belief in religion.
Due to the great sensitivity of the subject, a ruling was established from the early years of the state, and as was most famously stated in criminal appeal 217/68 Yzeramax in the tax appeal v. the State of Israel [12], which was also repeated by the justices in the judgment in the Mitral case [10], which was quoted above and also determined specifically in our case, the prohibition of the sale of pork, also in the judgments in the Friday case [2] and in the Menashi case [1], that the regulation of religious matters is vested solely in the main legislature, the Knesset, and that there is no authority for local authorities or subordinate legislators, including local authorities, within their authority to enact bylaws to establish regulations on religious matters without the express authorization of the Knesset.