The Trial Court and my colleagues Vice President Y. Pilpel reached the conclusion that the Bylaw does not contradict the provisions of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, the Trial Court also held this in relation to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, with reference to the provisions of the Basic Laws, whose purpose is to anchor their provisions "in the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state", and taking into account that the Bylaw prohibiting the sale of pig meat in an appropriate comprehensive manner, It establishes provisions on a matter that is not only religious but also national, the values of the State of Israel, which is, as stated, a Jewish and democratic state, and therefore is intended for a proper purpose and does not exceed what is required, taking into account that there is no prohibition on eating pork and that pork can be purchased in other places of settlement.
My colleague Vice-President Y. Pelpel distinguished between the two situations, the one that relates to the legislation that was enacted before the entry into force of the Basic Law: freedom of occupation and the one that relates to the legislation that will be enacted afterwards, but does not need the temporary provisions that stipulate that previous conflicting laws will remain in force and will only be interpreted in the spirit of the Basic Laws, and rightly so, because if in his opinion the bylaw does not contradict the Basic Law, there is no need to discuss the question of its validity as a law that existed prior to the enactment of the Basic Law. On the other hand, there is a judgment of the Netanya Magistrate's Court (Criminal Case (Netanya) 1310/95, 1311, 1312 State of Israel v. Rubinstein [22], a copy of which was attached to the file) that dealt with a Netanya bylaw that is completely identical to the Ashkelon bylaw that we are dealing with, which the trial court referred to in its ruling:His judgment, in which it was determined that the general prohibition on the sale of pork in all parts of the city is indeed in accordance with the values of the State of Israel and is intended for a proper purpose, but in his opinion it establishes a prohibition to an extent that exceeds what is required and violates the freedom of occupation of Netanya merchants and the freedom of the residents and visitors of Netanya, by establishing the prohibition in general in relation to all parts of the city, and therefore determined that it has no validity and acquitted the business owners who were brought to trial on charges of selling pork. This judgment was not appealed, not out of lack of attention, but following a discussion held by the Attorney General, with the participation of the State Attorney, the Deputy Attorney General, members of the State Attorney's Office, and the Legal Advisor to the Netanya Municipality, in the conclusion of which the Attorney General ruled that the judgment should not be appealed because its result is correct even without recourse to the Basic Laws. This determination is ostensibly contrary to the Menashi ruling [1] quoted above, but the rationale for this was that once a local authority has been granted the authority to restrict or prohibit the sale of pork in all or part of the city, it is obligated to first consider a restriction only to certain areas, and only afterwards the possibility of a sweeping prohibition in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, and taking into account the composition of the population and the needs and practices of all components of the population.