Criminal Appeal (Be’er Sheva) 7182/98 Shmukler et al. v. State of Israel – Ashkelon Municipality Vice President Y. Pepper - part 28

However, it seems to me that there is no need to rule on this difficult dilemma in light of what was said in the case of the Mitral High Court of Justice [10] and in light  of the amendment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation by including the override clause in which it was determined that "a provision of the law that violates the freedom of occupation will be valid even when it is not in accordance with section 4 [the limitation clause – A.L.] if it is included in a law that was passed by a majority of the members of Knesset and expressly stated therein,  that it is valid despite what is stated in the Basic Law..."  What I mean by this is that with regard to the prohibition of the import of non-kosher frozen meat, which was discussed in the judgments in the Mitral  Company [10], it was stated by  Justice Or, in the first judgment mentioned above, in connection with the enactment of a law that would allow this prohibition, that in light of the provisions  of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,  "it appears that legislation according to which the import of meat will be conditioned on the condition that it be kosher, is legislation that restricts the freedom of occupation, not in accordance with the limitation clause, and therefore constitutes a change in the Basic Law.  Therefore, it must be passed by a privileged majority of 61 Knesset members."  Indeed, accordingly, when they wanted to prohibit the import of non-kosher frozen meat, the Basic Law:  Freedom of Occupation was amended by adding the override clause, when it was clear that the thought was that without amending the Basic Law, it would not be possible to enact a law prohibiting the import of non-kosher frozen meat, since this constitutes an infringement on the freedom of occupation, and only because of the use of the override clause as detailed and explained in the Fifth Judgment in the Mitral case [16] This restriction is valid.  The same is true in my opinion regarding the prohibition of selling pig meat, which is a prohibition that relates to that material and that area of action in accordance with the mitzvot of religion.  If, even though the Basic Laws stated that their purpose was to anchor the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, they believed that this was not sufficient to legitimize restrictions on freedom of occupation stemming from religious provisions, but rather by amending the Basic Law by including the override clause, even if the Enabling Law had been enacted after the enactment of the Basic Laws, and not in accordance with the provisions of the Override Clause, it would not have been valid.