A final word, also according to what was stated in the words of Justice Cheshin in the first judgment in the Mitral case [10], in which it was held that there is no authority to administratively prohibit the import of non-kosher frozen meat, and added, as a matter of course, that the emergency stock of meat in Israel must be entirely kosher, "since it is supposed to serve the entire population."
This is based on the fact that if this is not done, the observant public and religion will not be able to use the same stock in times of emergency, and therefore will not be able to consume meat at all, which will constitute a tangible harm to that public and should not be permitted, while with regard to the import of non-kosher frozen meat, such harm will not be caused because the religious public, even after importing non-kosher frozen meat, will be able not to need this meat and not to buy it, but this will not affect its ability to consume meat because it will also have meat at its disposal He is frozen as a minister that he is interested in, and therefore this does not entail a necessary violation of his rights. It can be said that this is the case in the present case, it is not a matter of creating a situation in which the religious public will not be able to consume meat at all because it will not have meat that is not pork at its disposal and will always be able to purchase meat that is not pork in the same stores that do not sell pork, while the public that is interested in purchasing pork will be able to purchase this meat in the same stores that will sell this meat, similar to the possibility of importing frozen meat that is not kosher and there will be stores that sell this meat. And there will be other stores that will not sell and will only sell kosher meat to which those who keep the religious commandments can turn to.
Therefore, if my opinion had been heard, the appeal would have been accepted and the appellants' conviction would have been annulled, because the interpretation of the provisions of the bylaw prohibiting the sale of pork in general in all areas of the city of Ashkelon, under which they were convicted, is inconsistent with the spirit of the Basic Laws.