The court further noted that although "a municipality may exclude from the application of the bylaw a part of an area for various reasons, such as the fact that this part is inhabited by residents who, according to their religion, or according to their conscience, the prohibition of the sale of pig meat is not necessary or undesirable", but in the matter before us it is not possible to do so because the appellants did not bring sufficient evidence that the application of the law could have been split into certain parts of the city of Ashkelon – instead of applying to the entire city. The court was correct in this determination, and it should be noted that not only was it not presented with "sufficient evidence" as in its article, but it was not presented with the slightest evidence regarding the "areas of residence" of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, nor was there any evidence that these immigrants consume, massively, pork. On the other hand, there is room to note that the trial court was equally not authorized to determine that there are quite a few people who abstain from pork, even though they are not observant of Torah and mitzvot. Conclusions of this kind can only be determined after hearing evidence and such were not brought before the court.
With regard to the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the bylaw, the court reiterated that since the subordinate legislator did not prohibit the eating of pig meat, but only prohibited its sale, it follows from this that the bylaw does not interfere in the personal affairs of the individual and therefore the restriction it imposes is reasonable – "The bylaw is constitutional and the provision permitting the authority to prohibit the sale of pig in any area of its jurisdiction does not constitute a sweeping provision that exceeds what is required in the circumstances of the case." It also ruled that section 3 of the bylaw does not contradict "the provisions of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the provision in section 3 does not infringe on the freedom of occupation of the defendants or the freedom of the residents of the city of Ashkelon to an extent that exceeds what is required. The provision meets the criteria set out in the limitations sections. Hence, the indictments that rely on section 3 have a constitutional basis."