Take a banknote in the United States, for example. On each bill are the words:
"IN GOD WE TRUST."
In a country that defines itself as democratic, neither Jewish nor Christian, there is a clear religious declaration of faith written on every banknote. As is well known, democracy in the United States is characterized by giving the utmost weight to freedom from religion, including freedom from faith in the Creator of the world. It would be legitimate to ask why the non-believer is obligated to use money that has a collective religious statement on it. Why is the infringement of his right weightless? My purpose is not to compare this example with the case of the sale of a pig, but to point out that the symbol has its own power, and its own ability to survive. Before we return to the case at hand, it is appropriate to clarify another point.
The democracy of the United States is different from the democracy in Canada, which is different from the democracy in France. Democracy as an abstract regime, detached from the background, from a special history, and from a culture, does not exist. This point is important because it is possible to think that the difficulty in defining the term "Jewish and democratic state," which has an important place in the Basic Laws, is in resolving the tension that may arise between the word democracy and the word Jewish. Beyond that, however, the term "democracy" in itself is not a clear term that can necessarily be defined by consensus in all its aspects. This has weight when the court interprets a law prohibiting the sale of pigs in accordance with the spirit of the Basic Laws, or when the court comes to criticize the exercise of the discretion of a municipality, and this only on the basis that it has chosen one of the extremes of the options that appear in the law (a sweeping prohibition as opposed to a sweeping permit).
(c) The Authority's Way of Decision:
In this case, it is sufficient to note that the Ashkelon bylaw has been in effect for 40 years.