Caselaw

Civil Appeal 4628/93 State of Israel v. Apropim Housing and Development (1991) Ltd. IsrSC 49(2) 265 - part 12

June 4, 1995
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At the basis of my colleagues' interpretation of the provision of section 6(h)(3) is the assumption that the provision of section 6(h)(2) – which regulates the rate of reduction from the price in cases where the contractor suspends the presentation of his demand for the realization of the purchase obligation – should be interpreted as applying both to apartments in the sought-after areas and to apartments in development areas.  The problem is that my colleagues' assumption regarding the interpretation of section 6(h)(2) is a complete novelty.  Not only did the State not offer this interpretation in its argument before the District Court, but even in the argument before us (as I have already noted in paragraph 8 above) its counsel did not

 

dispute the correctness of the learned judge's determination that accepting its position as to the interpretation of section 6(h)(3) would leave the State without sanction for the delay on the part of the contractor in presenting his demand for the realization of its undertaking to purchase the apartments of the second type (apartments in the development areas).  Moreover, counsel for the State even explained that with such an outcome, the State would have no difficulty in accepting it, since some delay on the part of the contractor in presenting his demand does not entail great harm to it, and sometimes it may even be of interest to it.

This is how things unfolded from the beginning: although in the respondent's lawsuit, which was filed with the District Court, the words were worded in somewhat vague language, it implied the argument that section 6(h)(2) regulates cases of suspension of the demand for the realization of the obligation to purchase apartments of the first type.  On the basis of this assumption, and based on the identity of the expressions in the two sub-sections and their location in proximity to each other within the framework of section 6(h), the Respondent sought to interpret section 6(h)(3) as regulating the same subject with respect to the apartments of the second type.  In its reply and summaries, the State did not dispute the correctness of the Respondent's assumption as to the content of the arrangement of section 6(h)(2) and as to its scope, and its main argument was that despite the identical wording and their location in the neighborhood of the two sub-sections, section 6(h)(3) should be interpreted as regulating a different issue.  In the absence of an explicit argument on the part of the State that the Respondent's assumption as to the interpretation of section 6(h)(2) should not be accepted, the conclusion was that there is (at least implicitly) agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of this section.  Indeed, the parties' dispute, before the District Court and before us, focused solely on the question of the interpretation of section 6(h)(3).

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