that the contract establishes for both projects. After all, the urging of the contractor to present his demand is already found in clause 6(h)(2) of the contract. Why is an additional spur required? Why is the existing "sanction" (within the framework of section 6(h)(2)) not sufficient in an area of the second type? Moreover, the language of clause 6(g) of the contract indicates that the parties sought to maintain civil "sanctions" for delay in the construction of the first type of the project (sought-after areas). Why is there no similar purpose underlying the provision of clause 6(h)(3) of the agreement, which deals with the second type of project (development areas)? But beyond that: my colleague notes, in his fairness – in rejecting the alternative argument of the state – that –
"If we were required to interpret the clause according to the order of priorities required by the business purpose of the program contract and its commercial logic, I would indeed be inclined to accept the state's position. But the clear wording of the clause blocks our way toward external standards."
How does this approach reconcile with his position, that "clear language testifies to the intentions of the contractors and the purpose of their engagement"? In our case, the purpose of the parties' engagement – so my colleague is willing to accept within the framework of the alternative argument – contradicts that which arises from the clear language of the contract. My colleague noted in his opinion that "a contract whose language is so clear as to leave no room for doubt as to its intention" is interpreted according to the intention that arises from it, and there is no need for circumstances. But how can my colleague determine that the language of the contract is "clear to the extent that it leaves no room for doubt as to its intention" when the external circumstances – to which my colleague referred within the framework of the appellant's alternative argument – indicate that there is great doubt as to the intentions and wishes of the parties, in light of the substantive contradiction between the purpose that arises from the language of the provision and the purpose that arises from the circumstances of the contract? The theory of the two stages and its inherent difficulties.3 These comments of mine did not come to the tail in one detail or another in the course of my colleague's interpretive thought. They are intended to present the inherent difficulties that his position raises. The basic view that underlies the interpretive position of my colleague is that the process of contract interpretation should be divided into two separate and detached stages. The first stage focuses on the language of the contract and the intentions of the parties that arise from it. The second stage focuses on circumstances external to the contract and the intentions of the parties that arise from these circumstances. The transition from the first stage to the second stage is determined according to the "clear language" test. If the language of the contract is clear, the contract is interpreted according to the intentions of the parties to the contract, as it emerges from the clear language, and no reference should be made to external circumstances. If the language of the contract is not clear, but rather implicit, the contract is interpreted according to the intentions of the parties to the contract as it arises from the external circumstances. This two-stage approach – or the "two-stage theory" as I call it – is not new to us. This was expressed by Justice Beisky, when he noted: