"There are no 'clear' words per se. Indeed, there is nothing less clear than the assertion that the words are 'clear' Justice Traynor rightly observed: Plain words, like plain people, are not always so plain as they seem
the meaning of a law is not clear, so long as it is not consistent with a clear legislative purpose...
The sense of clarity that arises when the law begins to be read is only preliminary and momentary. It gradually disappears when it becomes clear that this 'clear' meaning does not achieve the purpose of the legislation" (High Court of Justice 47/83 Tor Air (Israel) in Tax Appeal v. Chairman of the Antitrust Supervisory Council et al. [20], at p. 176).
These words were intended for the interpretation of the legislation. However, they are not limited only to the interpretation of the law. My colleague, Justice D. Levin, rightly noted that:
"It does not matter, basically, whether it is an interpretation of legislation or an interpretation of a contract or an interpretation of any other document, including an insurance policy. The basic rules in the laws of interpretation, which were formulated and became part of the case law accepted by us, found expression, inter alia, in the comprehensive judgment of Justice Barak in the High Court of Justice ... 47/83" (Civil Appeal 631/83 [15], at p. 570).
Indeed, the contract is the law between the parties (cf. section 1134 of the Napoleonic Code), and the basic interpretive conceptions, which are based on the view that the language of the text should be interpreted according to its purpose and that the purpose of the text is learned from any reliable source and is formulated according to the interpreter's discretion as to the relative weight of the purposes that arise from the various sources, these concepts apply to the interpretation of all legal texts as a whole.
The boundary line between the two phases is blurred
- Moreover, the transition from the first stage to the second stage is not at all clear. The boundary line itself is blurred. Justice Cheshin rightly noted that:
"...The boundary line between the 'contract' and the 'circumstances' of the drafting of the 'contract' may be the thinnest, and the domains suck from each other. In the interpretation of a contract, we do not occupy ourselves with purely linguistic research, and we know that the interpretation directs itself to the intentions of the parties. However, the opinion of the parties is not an abstract and theoretical concept, and it is, inter alia, the product of the circumstances in which the contract was made.