"It must be remembered that the purpose of the objective test is to protect the party who relies on the representation of the other. The appellant cannot claim such reliance, and therefore it appears that there is no room at all to apply this test in our case" (Civil Appeal 1932/90 Peretz Bonei Hanegev v. Peretz Brothers in Tax Appeal v. Bohbot [26], at p. 365).
From this it follows that where there is a subjective conclusion on the part of both parties, and it can be proved on the basis of reliable external circumstances (such as evidence anchored in writing), the existence and content of the contract are determined according to this conclusion, and not according to an objective perception (i.e., the conduct of the parties as reasonable persons) of the contract, which arises from the clear language of the contract, otherwise the (objective) interpretation of the contract will lead to its annihilation (in the absence of finality). Such a strong suicidal inclination is not characteristic of contract law. Take the following famous example ([68] (1864) Raffles v. Wichelhaus): Reuven made a contract with Simon, according to which he sold him cotton which would be delivered to him on the ship Pearls leaving Bombay. There are two ships of this name that depart from Bombay. One comes out in October and the other in December. A dispute arises as to which of the two ships the agreement relates. The objective approach to contract law holds, and rightly so, that
the (interpretive) answer to the question will be made according to the test of the conduct of the parties as reasonable persons.
The test is objective (see Civil Appeal 536/89 Paz Oil Company in Tax Appeal et al. v. Levitin [27], at p. 627). According to it, it is possible that a valid contract has been concluded relating to the carriage of one of the ships, and it is possible that no contract has been concluded at all, since there is no final opinion. However, the law of contracts further states that if both parties have agreed (subjectively) on the ship Pearls departing in December, whereas from their conduct as reasonable persons it can be learned (from a perusal of the "clear" language of the contract) that the agreement relates to the Pearls ship departing in October, then the agreement reached by the parties is for carriage on the Pearls ship departing in December and not in October. Prof. Farnsworth noted this: ... A seemingly simple case can be disposed of. Suppose that" it is shown that, when the parties made the contract, both had in If one party does ... Mind the same ship, say the december peerless Surely if one party? Shows that the other par ty attached the same meaning show this, should that party not preveil To avoid that meaning by showing that a reasonable that the first party did, the other party should not be able Certain that the purpose of the court is, in all cases the person would have attached a different one. According to corbin, it is Ascertainment of the 'intention of the parties' if they Boston, tonoto and) e. A. Farnsworth, on contracts) ". Had one in common( 245vol. ii, at( 1990, against londonthis background it is understood that the determination of - 201 (1) restatement, second, contractsis understood that: Where the parties have attached the same meaning" to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in