the purposive interpretation of the contract will prevail over its literal interpretation, and that is when the context indicates an intention different from that which arises from the words in their literal sense' (Civil Appeal 1395/91[23], at p. 799).
And if this is indeed the case, how can it be reconciled with the view that "if the language is clear, then the purpose is also known, and the court no longer turns to examine the intentions of the communicators"? If the written words should not be seen as the be-all and end-all, and if it is indeed possible to give the contract an interpretation that does not correspond to the ordinary meaning of the words, how can it be perpetuated in the view that if the words are clear, the intention is also clear, and if the intention is clear, the words should be given their clear meaning? How, according to this method, is the two-stage method
- Will the interpreter ever come to the conclusion that there is a contradiction between intention and language? If the intention is that which arises from the clear language, how is it possible that the intention is contrary to the clear language? How is it possible to unravel the morality of the written words and arrive at the investigation of the true intention, if the rule is always that the real intention is only that which arises from the written and clear words? How can it be concluded that in the conflict between the language of the contract and the intention of those who make it, The intention is supreme, if the intention is that which arises from the ordinary language, and if in any case by the very definition of the concepts, such a confrontation, in the first stage, is impossible? Indeed, it seems to me that the answer to these questions is that the theory of the two stages is inconsistent with the basic rule that "in a conflict between the language of the contract and the intention of those who make it, the last hand has the upper hand" (Shalev, in her book, supra, at p. 330).