of the Law is a rule according to which interpretive validity will be given first and foremost to the intention implied in the contract; and only if such an intention is not implied by it – from the circumstances. Therefore, if it is possible and appropriate to use the circumstances external to the contract in order to understand the intentions of the parties as implied in the contract, this should be done. Prof. Zeltner noted this, noting:
"There is, therefore, a twofold action: first of all, it must be clarified what the parties wanted to say. Afterwards, the result must be qualified by the question: Did this desire find expression in the declaration" (Z. Zeltner, Contract Law of the State of Israel (Avuka, 1974) 103).
In a similar vein, Prof. Glenville Williams wrote, in an attempt to clarify the English "literal rule" (which is the underlying two-stage theory): ... It is a misleading formulation of the problem of" interpretation to say that there are two separate questions ,' secondly? First, 'is the act plain and unambiguous:if it is not 'can the words be interpreted so as to be asked The first? Question is not independed of the second, and to further the probable intention of parliament Reverse them. The primary question then is 'what was the statute sometimes it better reflects the actual process of interpretation to 'Will a particu:' next comes the question? Trying to do And only, lastly? Williams, lar proposed interpretation effectuate the object . G) '? Is the interpretation ruled out by the language ( 1150, 1128(1981) . New l.j 131 "The Meaning of Literal Interpretation" and to be precise: there is no fixed time limit in formulating the intentions of the parties. One interpreter will refer to the language of the contract and from it to the external circumstances. Another interpreter may turn first to the external circumstances and then to the language of the contract. Whatever the order of the appeal – and it will usually be a pendulum swing from language to circumstance, and from circumstances to language – its final result must be intentions implied in the contract. If the intentions implied in the contract are not relevant to the solution of the interpretive problem before the judge, he will turn to the intentions that are required from the external circumstances. In all these cases, the transition from the language of the contract to the external circumstances is not at all contingent on the question of whether the language of the contract is clear or unclear.